It is only where the wording of a planning permission is unclear that a court will consider extrinsic material to resolve the ambiguity.
In Mid Suffolk District Council v First Secretary of State and another[2005] EWHC 2634 (Admin); [2005] PLSCS 183 the court considered an application to quash an inspector’s decision regarding two enforcement notices where the local planning authority alleged that a change of land use had taken place and that hard-standing had been laid on the site. In this case, the local planning authority had, around eight years previously, granted planning permission for a picnic area, car park, mobile catering unit and ancillary works. They subsequently granted planning permission to retain a portable catering unit and to install a toilet block and private sewerage system. Both permissions were in accordance with the application particulars and block plans. Despite this, the planning authority issued two enforcement notices in November 2003 alleging that there had been a material change of use in the land, citing the stationing of a mobile catering unit, toilet block and ancillary parking for the parking of vehicles unrelated to the site, and the laying of hard-standing. The inspector found on appeal that the toilet block, part of the hard-standing, and the parking area had been laid out under the 1995 permissions and were lawful.
He found, by reference to the block plan and site layout, that both planning permissions related to the site of the enforcement notices appeals, and varied the enforcement notices by requiring a reduction in the hard-standing available for parking and refusing permission for an overnight lorry park. In addition, he found that because the mobile café was a building constituting operational development rather than change of use, unrestricted use of the café could continue.
The local planning authority appealed on the basis that both permissions related to the appeal site and the inspector had erred in treating the stationing of the mobile café as operational development rather than as a change of use.
The court concluded that extrinsic evidence was admissible, as the planning permission was ambiguous as to where the application site was located, and found that the inspector’s decision that both planning permissions related to the appeal site was correct. The application was, however, remitted to the inspector for further consideration of his finding that the café unit was a building and therefore constituted operational development rather than change of use.
This case illustrates the general rule that each planning permission is a public document and that the public should be able to rely on the permission itself and should not have to refer to background material. The only three recognised exceptions are; (i) where a document such as a plan has been incorporated by reference within the permission itself; (ii) where the validity of the planning permission is challenged on the grounds of mistake or absence of authority, or, (iii) as discussed here, there is ambiguity in the wording of the permission.
Gill Castorina is an associate at Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker (Europe) LLP
It is only where the wording of a planning permission is unclear that a court will consider extrinsic material to resolve the ambiguity.
In Mid Suffolk District Council v First Secretary of State and another[2005] EWHC 2634 (Admin); [2005] PLSCS 183 the court considered an application to quash an inspector’s decision regarding two enforcement notices where the local planning authority alleged that a change of land use had taken place and that hard-standing had been laid on the site. In this case, the local planning authority had, around eight years previously, granted planning permission for a picnic area, car park, mobile catering unit and ancillary works. They subsequently granted planning permission to retain a portable catering unit and to install a toilet block and private sewerage system. Both permissions were in accordance with the application particulars and block plans. Despite this, the planning authority issued two enforcement notices in November 2003 alleging that there had been a material change of use in the land, citing the stationing of a mobile catering unit, toilet block and ancillary parking for the parking of vehicles unrelated to the site, and the laying of hard-standing. The inspector found on appeal that the toilet block, part of the hard-standing, and the parking area had been laid out under the 1995 permissions and were lawful.
He found, by reference to the block plan and site layout, that both planning permissions related to the site of the enforcement notices appeals, and varied the enforcement notices by requiring a reduction in the hard-standing available for parking and refusing permission for an overnight lorry park. In addition, he found that because the mobile café was a building constituting operational development rather than change of use, unrestricted use of the café could continue.
The local planning authority appealed on the basis that both permissions related to the appeal site and the inspector had erred in treating the stationing of the mobile café as operational development rather than as a change of use.
The court concluded that extrinsic evidence was admissible, as the planning permission was ambiguous as to where the application site was located, and found that the inspector’s decision that both planning permissions related to the appeal site was correct. The application was, however, remitted to the inspector for further consideration of his finding that the café unit was a building and therefore constituted operational development rather than change of use.
This case illustrates the general rule that each planning permission is a public document and that the public should be able to rely on the permission itself and should not have to refer to background material. The only three recognised exceptions are; (i) where a document such as a plan has been incorporated by reference within the permission itself; (ii) where the validity of the planning permission is challenged on the grounds of mistake or absence of authority, or, (iii) as discussed here, there is ambiguity in the wording of the permission.
Gill Castorina is an associate at
