Mole Valley District Council v Smith and others ; Reigate and Banstead Borough Council v Brown and others

Injunction — Use of land by gypsies for stationing caravans in breach of planning control — Applications for injunctions by local planning authorities — County council in breach of their statutory duty to provide adequate gypsy caravan sites — Whether defence to claims for injunctions — Whether relevant that defendants would move on as soon as authorised pitches available — Relevance of increased criminal penalties for contravention of enforcement notices Two appeals were heard together relating to sites in Surrey where, in both cases, in proceedings brought under section 222 of the Local Government Act 1972, an injunction had been granted to the plaintiff local authority to restrain the use of the site for the stationing of caravans in contravention of planning law. The defendants were gypsies and in each case the site had been acquired in the mid-1980s and developed and occupied as a gypsy caravan site without planning permission. Between 1986 and 1990 enforcement and stop notices had been served and not complied with. Appeals to the Secretary of State for the Environment against the enforcement notices and against refusals of planning permission had been dismissed. Some of the defendants had been prosecuted and convicted of contravening the enforcement and stop notices, but had been given only moderate fines. On June 14 1989 the Secretary of State issued a direction under section 9 of the Caravan Sites Act 1968 directing the county council to provide more pitches in the area of each plaintiff district council. The defendants appealed against the23 injunctions on the principal ground that any injunction should be refused, or its operation suspended, while the county council remained in breach of their duty under section 6 of the 1968 Act to provide adequate sites for gypsies residing in or resorting to their area. Held  The appeals were dismissed. 1. The appellants had a legitimate grievance in that the county council were in breach of their duty to gypsies generally, but they were unable to say that the breach was of a duty owed to them personally, akin to the duty owed by local authorities under the Housing Act 1985 to homeless persons or persons threatened with homelessness: see pp 27G-H and 33E. 2. It was not for the court in these proceedings to review the decisions of the respondent councils under section 222 of the 1972 Act to bring the proceedings as being ‘expedient for the promotion or protection of the interests of the inhabitants of their area’. No doubt there were potential disadvantages for the public in moving the appellants off their existing sites if no other site was available, but where the balance of public interest lay was for the respondent councils to determine, not the court: see p 31C-D. 3. In City of London Corporation v Bovis Construction Ltd (1988) 86 LGR 660 at p 682 Bingham LJ had stated that the essential foundation for the court’s jurisdiction to grant an injunction was the need to draw the inference that the defendant’s unlawful operations would continue unless and until effectively restrained by the law and that nothing short of an injunction would be effective to restrain them. That could not be said of the appellants, who wanted to move to an authorised site as soon as one became available. However, Bingham LJ could never have contemplated that it would be a defence to a claim for an injunctive order in support of the criminal law for the defendant to say that he would comply with the law if he were offered an acceptable inducement: see p 31D-H. 4. While the criminal law remedies were potentially powerful — and the maximum fine on summary conviction for failure to comply with an enforcement notice would rise to £ 20,000 when section 8 of the Planning and Compensation Act 1991 was brought into force — it had never been the law that an injunction would not issue if the criminal courts could, but did not in fact, use their powers to the full extent: see pp 31H-32C. 5. On the argument that the injunctions should be refused on the general equitable principle that the respondent councils were not blameless, it was not for the courts to usurp the policy-making functions of the Secretary of State by a side wind. To refuse an injunction, or to suspend its operation, would be equivalent to saying that the appellants should be granted temporary planning permission pending the availability of sufficient authorised sites: that was a policy decision for the planning authority. Further, it was not a case in which either respondent council, or the county council, was in breach of any duty owed to the appellants other than as members of a class: see pp 32C-D and 33B-F. 6. The defendants had demonstrated beyond a peradventure that they would continue to flout every means of planning control and method of enforcement unless and until restrained by injunction. The case for24 injunctive relief was therefore overwhelming, but the orders would be amended to take effect on May 31 1992 to give the appellants a short period in which to arrange for their removal from the land: see p 32E-G. Decisions of Hoffmann J in Mole Valley District Council v Smith and Sir Michael Ogden QC in Reigate and Banstead Borough Council v Brown affirmed. Cases referred to in the judgments City of London Corporation v Bovis Construction Ltd [1992] 3 All ER 697; (1988) 86 LGR 660; [1989] JPL 263, CA Greenwich London Borough Council v Powell [1989] AC 995; [1989] 2 WLR 7; [1989] 1 All ER 106; (1988) 87 LGR 423; 57 P&CR 249; [1989] 1 PLR 108; 21 HLR 218; [1989] JPL 513, HL R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte R & J Smith unreported, April 28 1988 Runnymede Borough Council v Ball [1986] 1 WLR 353; [1986] 1 All ER 629; (1985) 84 LGR 481; 53 P&CR 117; [1986] JPL 288, CA Appeals against decisions of Hoffmann J and Sir Michael Ogden QC In Mole Valley District Council v Smith the defendants, Henry Smith, Albert Smith, William Smith and Edward Smith, appealed from a decision of Hoffmann J on June 21 1991 granting an injunction to the plaintiff local authority to restrain the use of land at The Evergreens, Reigate Road, Betchworth, Surrey, for the stationing of caravans or mobile homes and/or as a residential caravan site. In Reigate and Banstead Borough Council v Brown the defendants, Benjamin Brown, Albert Eastwood and Caleb Jones, appealed from a decision of Sir Michael Ogden QC (sitting as a deputy judge of the Queen’s Bench Division) on May 21 1991 granting a similar injunction to the plaintiff council in respect of a site at ‘Crosswinds’, Collendean Lane, Horsehills, Norwood Hill, Surrey. The two appeals were heard together. Patrick Clarkson QC and Marc Willers (instructed by Atkins Hope) appeared for the appellants (defendants) in the Mole Valley case. David Friedman QC and Alan Masters (instructed by Atkins Hope) appeared for the appellants (defendants) in the Reigate and Banstead case. Gerard Ryan QC and Timothy Comyn (instructed by Sharpe Pritchard, agents for R Burn, solicitor to Mole Valley District Council and by the borough solicitor to Reigate and Banstead Borough Council) appeared for the respondent local authority in both cases. Cur adv vult The following judgments were delivered. LORD DONALDSON OF LYMINGTON MR: These two appeals have been heard together because they raise the same issue. This is whether an application by a local authority for an injunction to restrain the use of a site for the stationing of caravans in contravention of the planning laws can be resisted on the grounds that the defendants are gypsies and that a different local authority, namely the county council, are in breach of their statutory duty to provide adequate sites for the accommodation of gypsies. 25 In the Mole Valley case the injunction was granted by Hoffmann J on June 21 1991. In the Reigate and Banstead case the injunction was granted by Sir Michael Ogden QC, sitting as a deputy judge of the Queen’s Bench Division, on May 21 1991. Nothing turns on the precise terms of the two orders, although it should be said that neither was to take effect for a period of three months thereby, in effect, giving the occupants three months’ notice to quit. ‘Gypsies’ are defined in and for the purposes of the Caravan Sites Act 1968 as ‘persons of nomadic habit of life, whatever their race or origin . . .’ (section 16). This is not a particularly happy definition, although it may well be that no better can be produced. I say this because it might be thought to suggest that, if persons of a ‘nomadic habit of life’ take root where their caravans have rested, as is the case with all the appellants save Mr Edward Smith in the Mole Valley appeal who has left the site and now lives in a conventional house, and a fortiori if they buy the pitch on which their caravans are resting, as is the case with all the respondents other than Mr Edward Smith, they case to be within the definition. This seems to have been the view of this court in Runnymede Borough Council v Ball [1986] 1 WLR 353 where Fox LJ at p 360A described the respondents as simply being ‘landowners who are determined to use their land unlawfully in breach of the planning controls’. That approach cannot stand with the decision of the House of Lords in Greenwich London Borough Council v Powell [1989] AC 995 where it was held that a person might be within the definition of ‘gypsies’ in the 1968 Act if he led a nomadic life only seasonally and regularly returned to the same place for part of each year. The matter is further complicated by the definition of ‘caravan’ as: any structure designed or adapted for human habitation which is capable of being moved from one place to another (whether by being towed, or by being transported on a motor vehicle or trailer) and any motor vehicle so designed or adapted, but does not include — (a)     any railway rolling stock which is for the time being on rails forming part of a railway system, or (b)     any tent. This would include not only what the man in the street would recognise as a caravan, but a large portakabin and indeed almost any house which rested on or is secured to, as opposed to being integral with, its foundations. However it is true that there are some limitations on size (see section 13 of the 1968 Act), but a structure which met those criteria might still not be recognisable as a ‘caravan’ in common parlance. Putting all these considerations together, it is difficult to see why someone who lives in a small prefabricated house, which rests on foundations and who chooses to be nomadic for his holidays does not fall within the definition. However, I accept the approach of the appendix to the Secretary of State for the Environment’s Circular 28/77 — Gypsy Caravan Sites — which regards ‘gypsies’ as a recognisable (if ill-defined) cohesive and separate group within our society with strong internal social ties. After quoting the statutory definition, the circular continues: 4. . . . This definition makes no distinction between different groups of26 travellers or their trades. It includes romanies, didicois, mumpers, tinkers — hawkers, etc. 5. In law, therefore, the term ‘gypsy’ refers to a class of person and is not confined to an ethnic group. Nevertheless, it is clear that gypsies do constitute a cohesive and separate group within our society, with strong internal social ties, notwithstanding the differences and tensions often apparent between families and sub-groups. The criterion ‘nomadic habit of life’ leads to a certain ambiguity, especially in relation to gypsies who settle for lengthy periods on authorised sites. Although fears have been expressed that the gypsy way of life encourages ‘dropouts’ from settled society to enter it, there is little evidence generally to substantiate this. There has always been a degree of movement by gypsies into and out of houses, often by marriage, and outward movements of this kind should not be misinterpreted as a substantial movement of the homeless and others into the gypsy way of life. Suffice it to say that whether a person is or is not a gypsy is a question of fact and it is common ground between the parties to this appeal that all the appellants are gypsies. Gypsies, as a social group, are small in numbers relative to the whole population, but are nevertheless of significant size — perhaps 10,000 families. The problem of making provision for their legitimate needs and aspirations is of long standing. The Parliamentary approach was originally to enable and encourage local authorities to provide sites for the caravans of gypsies within their areas. The enabling approach was unsuccessful due to the stresses and strains of the relationship between the gypsies and other groups in our society which led to pressure on local authorities not to exercise their powers. Whether rightly or wrongly — rightly in some cases and wrongly in others including, on the evidence, the appellants — gypsies are regarded by many as undesirable neighbours. This has led to Parliament imposing a duty on county councils under section 6 of the 1968 Act ‘to exercise their powers under section 24 of the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960 . . . so far as may be necessary to provide adequate accommodation for gypsies residing in or resorting to their area’. Section 24 of the 1960 Act enabled local authorities generally, and by virtue of section 6 of the 1968 Act required county councils, to acquire caravan sites and gave them powers of compulsory purchase. By section 7 of the 1968 Act, while the duty of ‘determining what sites are to be provided and acquiring or appropriating the necessary land’ fell on the county council, all other duties in relation to the site devolved upon district councils. However, district councils are also involved in a consultative process before the county councils can acquire land for the provision of sites within their area (section 8(1)) and the NIMBY (not in my back yard) syndrome has been far from unknown. There is no doubt that there are insufficient caravan sites within the county of Surrey and within the areas of the respondent local authorities, both of which lie within that county. So far as the county council is concerned, in April 1988 Henry J in R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte R & J Smith heard an application for the judicial review of the Secretary of State’s refusal to exercise his powers under27 section 9 of the 1968 Act to require the county councils of Hereford and Worcester and of Surrey to comply with their duties under section 6 of the Act. So far as Surrey County Council were concerned, he found that they were in breach of those duties having achieved only 247 pitches against a target figure of 370. All that could really be said in defence of the council was that the process of providing sites in the face of determined local opposition was one of extreme difficulty and that over the years the target had been raised from 229 in 1972-76, a figure which had been reached and passed by 1988, to 340 in 1977-83 and 370 in 1984. Henry J declined to make any order against the Secretary of State, but made a declaration that the county councils were in breach of their duties. Following the conclusion of this action, and possibly as a result of it, the Secretary of State in June 1989 issued a direction to Surrey County Council under section 9 of the 1968 Act, but since this failed to specify any time-limit for compliance, it is unenforceable by order of mandamus as might otherwise be the case. The target of 370 pitches has been refined into subtargets for the areas of the 11 district councils within the county. In the case of the respondent councils, the subtargets are 30 pitches each. Reigate and Banstead have two privately owned sites (Lonesome Lane and Woodmansterne) providing eight pitches. Their local plan has identified another site (Earlswood) which the plan regarded as capable of providing 17 pitches, but this concentration is under review and may be scaled down to 15 or even 10 pitches. Nothing has happened on the ground and it is unlikely that it will be in use before 1994. Another site at Horley (the Star Inn site) at one time seemed to be a possibility, but it is owned by the Department of Transport, which is not willing to sell and compulsory acquisition is not possible against a government department. Mole Valley likewise have only one operative site (Young Street, Leatherhead) providing eight pitches. However, future prospects are better than in the case of Reigate and Banstead. Three sites are expected to open in July 1992 (Ranmore Allotments, Dorking; Coldharbour Lane Allotments and Okewood Hill Road) providing a further seven pitches. In addition, sites at Cowslip Lane, Mickleham, and Gatwick Dairy Farm, Hookwood, are expected to open in November 1992 providing six further pitches. Yet another site at Randalls Road, Leatherhead, might become available in April 1993, but this is too far into the future to be a reliable forecast. Against this background it has to be stated that the appellants have a legitimate grievance. They are entitled to say, and do say, that the county council are in breach of their duty to gypsies generally, but are unable to say that the county council, and still less that the respondent councils, are in breach of a duty owed to them personally akin to the duty owed by local authorities under the Housing Act 1985 to homeless persons or those threatened with homelessness, which would have been a wholly different situation to which other considerations would have applied. I now turn to the history of the conflict between the appellants and the respondents as planning authorities. 28 Reigate and Banstead appeal This concerns the ‘Crosswinds’ site, Collendean Hill, Surrey. In or about 1984 it was acquired by Lorraine Castle who conveyed parts to the three appellants. The subsequent history was as follows: July 1986 Benjamin Brown, Albert Eastwood and Caleb Jones carried out certain unauthorised works on the land in the nature of the clearance of the site and removal of top soil and brought onto the site and deposited there materials to form hardstandings. August 1 1986 The council issued and served two enforcement notices and one stop notice. August 5 1986 Stop notice came into effect and an inspection revealed that a hardstanding laid down by Albert Eastwood had been completed and that being constructed by Caleb Jones was three quarters complete. August 26 1986 Appeals were made to the Secretary of State pursuant to section 88 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971 by Lorraine Castle, Albert Eastwood and Caleb Jones against the enforcement notices served on August 1 1986. September 4 1986 Caleb Jones was still working on the hardstanding. A third hardstanding was in the process of construction. September 16 1986 Benjamin Brown confirmed that he was laying the third hardstanding to put his two caravans on it. September 17 1986 Further enforcement and stop notices were issued and served. September 19 1986 Concrete was poured onto an area to form a hardstanding for Benjamin Brown and a mobile home was brought on to the site. September 23 1986 Fencing was erected across the site to divide it into plots. September 25 1986 A further mobile home to be sited on Mr Brown’s hardstanding was delivered. September 30 1986 A further enforcement notice was issued and served. October 1986 Electricity was installed and telephone services connected. October 15 1986 Caleb Jones pleaded guilty at Reigate Magistrates’ Court to an information alleging breach of a stop notice and was fined £125. November 4 1986 Five caravans, three mobile homes and a stable block had been stationed and/or erected on the site and hardcore had been laid to the accessway. December 19 1986 Interim injunction obtained restraining certain named 29 occupiers, including Albert Eastwood and Benjamin Brown, from contravening the stop notices. March 24-25 1987 Public local inquiry in respect of appeals against enforcement notices issued on September 17 1986 and September 30 1986. April 27 1987 All four appeals dismissed but period for compliance extended from 28 days to four months. August 28 1987 and September 17 1987 An inspection revealed that no steps had been taken by the defendants to comply with the enforcement notice. January 15 1988 Planning permission was sought by Jones, Brown and Eastwood to use part of the Crosswinds site as a residential caravan site for three gypsy families. April 28 1988 Planning permission was refused. August 10 1988 The defendants were committed to stand trial at Guildford Crown Court. February 14, 15, 16 and 24 1989 Public local inquiry in respect of appeal against refusal of January 1988 application. June 14 1989 Section 9 direction to the county council. June 14 1989 Appeal dismissed. In so doing the official concerned was in ignorance of the issue of the section 9 direction. August 8 1989 All three defendants pleaded guilty but sentence was deferred. February 2 1990 Eastwood and Jones were fined £ 100 each and Brown £ 105. Mole Valley Appeal May 1986 Land at The Evergreens, Reigate Road, Betchworth, Surrey, acquired, developed and occupied. June 30 1986 Five enforcement notices issued. July 3 1986 Appeals lodged. October 8-9 1986 Local inquiry held. January 28 1987 Appeals dismissed by Secretary of State. July 28 1987 Extended period for compliance with notices expired. November 1987 William Smith takes up occupation. 30 November 26 1987 Notice of motion for injunction issued against William Smith. February 11 1988 Motion stood over until judgment in Surrey judicial review case. March 2 1988 Guildford Crown Court: Henry and Albert Smith pleaded guilty to using land in contravention of enforcement notices — each fined £ 300, with costs of £ 700. April 28 1988 Judgment delivered by Henry J in Surrey judicial review case: Surrey County Council held to be in breach of statutory duty to provide caravan sites. August 19 1988 Injunction proceedings against William Smith discontinued. April 14 1989 Planning permission for continued use of lands for stationing of mobile homes refused. June 14 1899 Secretary of State issues section 9 direction requiring Surrey County Council to provide sites for a further 190 caravans. November 6 1989 Guildford Crown Court: Henry, Albert, William and Edward Smith all plead guilty to various contraventions of enforcement notices — each fined £ 10. December 15 1989 Planning permission for a new vehicular access to site refused. May 16-18 1990 Local inquiry held into appeals against refusals of planning permission. August 15 1990 Appeals dismissed by Secretary of State. December 12 1990 Further enforcement notices issued re laying of concrete base, erection of timber structure and horse exerciser/walker roundabout. August 23 1991 Enforcement notice issued concerning the erection of a building. This has not been complied with. The problems which confront both the appellants, the respondent councils and the county council are social in nature and fall to be solved in the context of town and country planning policies. These are matters ultimately for the Secretary of State, subject only to the court’s supervisory jurisdiction by means of judicial review, which is not invoked in these proceedings. Hoffmann J in the Mole Valley case drew attention to the fact that in the decision letter dated August 15 1990 which followed the last inquiry, the Secretary of State referred to the shortage of caravan sites in Surrey and within the Mole Valley district. He went on to consider whether, in the circumstances, it would be appropriate to set aside the enforcement notice under appeal or to grant temporary planning permission for a period of 12 months in anticipation of the county council making nine further pitches available in late 1991, but on planning grounds declined to take either course. That was a decision for the Secretary of State and not for the courts. As Hoffmann J put it in his judgment: There can be no doubt that requiring [the appellants] to leave the site would cause considerable hardship. This court, however, is not entrusted with a general jurisdiction to solve social problems. The striking of a balance between the requirements of planning policy and the needs of these defendants is a matter which, in my view, has been entrusted to other authorities. Similarly, it is not for the courts in these proceedings to review the decision of the respondent councils under section 222 of the Local Government Act 1972 to bring these proceedings on the basis of the councils’ view that to do so was ‘expedient for the promotion or protection of the interests of the inhabitants of their area’. No doubt there are potential disadvantages for the public in moving the appellants off their existing sites if no other site is available, but where the balance of the public interest lies is for the respondent councils to determine and not for this court. It is common ground that the principles to be applied were summed up by Bingham LJ in City of London Corporation v Bovis Construction Ltd (1988) 86 LGR 660, at p 682: The guiding principles must, I think, be — (1) that the jurisdiction is to be invoked and exercised exceptionally and with great caution . . .; (2) that there must certainly be something more than mere infringement of the criminal law before the assistance of civil proceedings can be invoked and accorded for the protection or promotion of the interests of the inhabitants of the area . . .; (3) that the essential foundation for the exercise of the court’s discretion to grant an injunction is not that the offender is deliberately and flagrantly flouting the law but the need to draw the inference that the defendant’s unlawful operations will continue unless and until effectively restrained by the law and that nothing short of an injunction will be effective to restrain them . . . On behalf of the appellants it is submitted that in these cases it cannot be said that their unlawful operations will continue unless and until restrained by the law. Nothing would suit them better than to be able to move on to an authorised site and as soon as one becomes available they will do so. As Hoffmann J said in answer to the same argument: ‘It seems to me that valuable though Bingham LJ’s formulation is, it is not possible to read it as if it were itself a statute, and one must look at the matter as one of principle’. I agree. Bingham LJ can never have contemplated that it would be a defence to a claim for an injunctive order in support of the criminal law for the defendant to say that he would comply with the law if he were offered an inducement acceptable to him. Next it is said that the remedies available under the criminal law are quite adequate and that the respondent councils should be left to use31 them. I agree that those remedies are potentially powerful. At the relevant time they were to be found in section 179 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 — on summary conviction a fine of up to £ 2,000 and a fine of up to £ 200 per day in respect of continued use of the land after conviction, and on conviction on indictment an unlimited fine. Since January 2 1992, when the relevant provisions of the Planning and Compensation Act 1991 came into force, the maximum fine on summary conviction has risen to £ 20,000. But it has never been the law that an injunction will not issue if the criminal courts could, but do not in fact, use their powers to the full extent. That is this case. Indeed, Judge Rubin’s decision on November 6 1989 to fine Henry and Albert Smith £ 10 each when they had been fined £ 300 for similar offences in March 1988 was an open invitation to them to continue to ignore the planning control laws. Finally, it was submitted that on general equitable principles an injunction should be refused on the grounds that the respondent councils were not blameless in the matter. Under this head we were referred to all the considerations which had been properly urged in support of the appellants’ appeals against stop and enforcement orders and the refusal of planning permissions. Suffice it to say that it is not for the courts to usurp the policy decision-making functions of the Secretary of State as it were by a side wind. Furthermore, as I have already pointed out, this is not a case in which either of the respondent councils, or for that matter the county council, are in breach of any duty owed to the appellants other than as members of a class for whose general benefit duties have been imposed upon them. This is a wholly different case from one in which a local authority seek to evict a tenant in the exercise of their rights as a landlord, while refusing to fulfil their duty to him under the Housing Act 1985 directly consequent upon his being threatened by them with homelessness. All the appellants, other than Edward Smith, have demonstrated beyond a peradventure that they will continue to flout every means of planning control and method of enforcement unless and until restrained by injunction. The case for injunctive relief is therefore overwhelming. However, they will need some short period in which to arrange for their removal. The lower courts considered that three months was appropriate and while over six months later there are grounds for shortening the period, I would not do so and would amend the orders under appeal to take effect on May 31 1992. No doubt in deciding whether to enforce the injunctions both respondent councils will have regard to whether alternative authorised pitches will become available to the appellants very shortly thereafter, but that must be a matter for them and the appellants should be in no doubt that they may put their liberty at risk if they fail to comply strictly with the injunctions in the absence of the relevant council consenting to their doing otherwise. Subject to a variation in the operative date of the orders, I would dismiss both appeals. BALCOMBE LJ: The facts of this case are set out in the judgment of Lord Donaldson of Lymington MR and I need not repeat them. 32 If there had been no failure on the part of Surrey County Council to comply with their duties under section 6 of the Caravan Sites act 1968, the case against the grant of interlocutory injunctions at the suit of the respondent local authorities would be virtually unarguable. To apply the test set out by Bingham LJ in City of London Corporation v Bovis Construction Ltd (1988) 86 LGR 660, at p 682, the inference is irresistible that the appellants’ unlawful operations will continue unless and until effectively restrained by law and that nothing short of an injunction will be effective to restrain them. So the main issue on this appeal is whether Surrey County Council’s failure to perform their statutory duty should affect the exercise of the court’s discretion to grant or refuse the injunctions sought. The argument is that no injunction should be granted, or the operation of any injunction granted should be suspended, until the county council provide sufficient caravan sites for the use of gypsies. This is equivalent to saying that the appellants should be granted temporary planning permission for the use of their land pending the availability of sufficient authorised sites. That is a policy decision for the planning authorities and, as is pointed out by both Sir Michael Ogden QC in the Reigate and Banstead case, and by Hoffmann J in the Mole Valley case, even temporary planning permission was considered and rejected by the Secretary of State. Thus, the court is being asked to reverse the decisions of the authorities to whom Parliament has entrusted the relevant decision, not on grounds of illegality, but on grounds of policy. This is not something which, in my judgment, the court should do. I agree with Lord Donaldson MR that the appellants do have a legitimate grievance, in that the county council are in breach of their statutory duty towards gypsies in general. Nevertheless, the appellants as individuals have no enforceable rights against either the county council or the respondent local authorities. In effect — although it was not put in so many words — the court is being asked to put indirect pressure on the county council to comply with their statutory duty by withholding the remedy which the respondent councils would otherwise be entitled to expect. While I have some sympathy with the object which is sought to be achieved — to require the county council to perform their duty to provide sufficient caravan sites for gypsies — I do not accept that the means proposed would be a legitimate exercise of the court’s discretion. In my judgment, both Hoffmann J and Sir Michael Ogden QC exercised their discretion in a manner with which this court neither could nor should interfere. Accordingly, I agree with Lord Donaldson MR that these appeals should be dismissed. I also agree that the operation of the orders under appeal should be suspended until May 31 1992. STUART-SMITH LJ: I also agree. Appeals dismissed with costs to be paid by the legal aid fund; leave to appeal to the House of Lords refused.