Track classified as road used as public path – Surveying authority reclassifying as bridleway – Inspector confirming – Whether inspector had correctly disregarded recent vehicular use as being use in contravention of Road Traffic Acts
As far back as records could show, a well-worn track (the Belluton track) running between the villages of Norton Malreward and Belluton, in the county of Avon, had been used by the public for passage on foot and on horseback. With the passing of the Road Traffic Act 1930 (see section 34(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1988) it became, nationally, an offence to drive a motor vehicle without authority on any road being a footpath or bridleway. In the 1950s the relevant surveying authority, complying with classification requirements imposed by section 27 of the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949, compiled a definitive map showing footpaths, bridleways and roads used as public paths (RUPPs) . The Belluton track was shown as a RUPP, with the consequence, as declared in section 32(4) of the 1949 Act, that the map was conclusive evidence of a public right on foot or horseback albeit without prejudice to any question of any other right of way. As from 1968 (see section 54 of the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981) such authorities became obliged to abandon the RUPP classification and to reclassify in terms of byways open to all traffic (BOATs), bridleways or footpaths.
On June 22 1989 the relevant surveying authority, then Avon County Council, made an order under section 54, reclassifying the Belluton path as a bridleway. Following representations from various parties, notably motorcycling and light car enthusiasts, that the track should be reclassified as a BOAT, two inquiries were held. At the conclusion of the second, the respondent’s inspector, by decision letter dated June 27 1997, confirmed the bridleway reclassification after finding that, whereas there had been a long and continuing history of use as a bridleway, significant use for vehicular purposes was relatively recent. Having so found, the inspector ruled that, since the vehicular use had been at all material times in contravention of the Road Traffic Acts, evidence of such use could not be adduced in order to claim that the track had been dedicated and accepted for uses more extensive than a bridleway. The applicant, representing various driving and motorcycling interests, moved for judicial review, contending that the inspector’s ruling was bad in law.
Held The application was dismissed.
1. The court rejected the applicant’s contention that an offence under the Road Traffic Acts could not be committed where the road in question had been classified as a RUPP. On the proper construction of the 1949 Act, a road so classified was limited to foot and bridleway use unless the contrary was shown.
2. Although the doctrine of dedication and acceptance of public rights operated to legalise acts which would otherwise amount to a series of (civil) trespasses, that doctrine (once a highway, always a highway) did not extend to acts which contravened a public statute. Having received no significant evidence of vehicular use before 1930, the inspector had correctly applied the law as stated in Robinson v Adair, unreported February 16 1995, and Hanning v Top Deck Travel Group Ltd (1994) 68 P&CR 14. The applicant derived no support from the Privy Council decision in Turner v Walsh (1881) App Cas 636 as the facts were materially different.
Edwin Simpson (instructed by Bevan Ashford, of Bristol) appeared for the applicant; John Hobson (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared for the Secretary of State for the Environment.
