Breach of planning control – Council issuing enforcement notice – Appeal against notice – Whether terms of notice sufficiently clear – Section 173 of Town and Country Planning Act 1990 – Appeal dismissed
In 1973 conditional planning permission was granted for a change of use of a 262 acre site (the site) from use as a military airfield to use as a “motor vehicle proving ground”. In 1983 the applicant acquired the site.
Subsequently, the second respondents, Harborough District Council, claimed that there was evidence of the site being used for recreational purposes and media publicity, involving the use of production vehicles whose top speed and capabilities were well known and well established, and that this was causing noise and nuisance to local people.
The council issued two enforcement notices, describing the vehicular activities on the site that were a source of nuisance to local people and requiring any activities to be limited to those that were not in breach of planning legislation. On appeal by the appellants, the inspector upheld the notices with some amendment, and the appellant’s appeal to the High Court was also dismissed.
The appellant appealed against the amended enforcement notice contending that: (i) the notice did not comply with section 173(3) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 because it was not sufficiently clear to allow the appellant to ascertain what action it was required to instigate by way of remedy; (ii) the notice did not comply with section 173(1) because it did not allow the appellant to ascertain what it had done wrong; (iii) the notice went too far in requiring the cessation of activities that were ancillary to the permitted activities; and (iv) the terms of the notice made it impossible to identify the activities prohibited, rendering it impossible to give appropriate consideration to the normal planning considerations that would inform a decision whether or not to grant planning permission for such activities.
Held: The appeal was dismissed.
1. The purpose of a description of the breach of planning control was primarily to enable an appellant to decide what steps to take in relation to an appeal. In the instant case, the enforcement notice, when looked at as a whole, enabled the appellant to know which matters the council considered to be breaches of planning control. Moreover, it contained sufficient information to enable the appellant to decide upon a strategy for appealing, and the Secretary of State to decide whether or not to grant planning permission, either for driving for any purposes whatsoever or for some limited purposes.
2. While planning permission for an activity was deemed to include other activities incidental to the one permitted, and while enforcement notices should not be issued unless it was expedient to do so, the council had not erred in concluding that it was expedient to issue a notice that had the effect of prohibiting all driving that was in breach of planning control. If the appellant wished to carry out any inoffensive driving that the notice prohibited, then the appellant could obtain an appropriate grant of planning permission or a suitable modification of the enforcement notice. It would be wrong to impose a requirement that all enforcement notices were to be worded in such a way that there was a notional planning application for a number of activities ancillary to a non-specified master activity.
Gregory Stone QC and Andrew Fraser-Urquhart (instructed by Marrons, of Leicester) appeared for the appellant; Jeremy Morgan (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared for the first respondent; the second respondent district council did not appear and were not represented.
Thomas Elliott, barrister
