Appellant applying for certificate of lawfulness for use of land – Council issuing enforcement notice alleging change of use and requiring cessation and removal of certain objects – Objects not removed – Council preferring information alleging offence contrary to section 179(2) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 – Justices convicting appellant – Whether ownership of land proved – Appeal dismissed
In December 1994 the appellant submitted an application to the council for a certificate of lawfulness relating to land at Low Hardwick Farm, Stockton, Cleveland. The grounds of the application were that the land was being used for the purposes of a quad-bike track and had been so used for more than 10 years, entitling the appellant to a certificate of lawfulness for the activity to continue. It stated that the nature of the appellant’s interest in the land was as the owner and he had signed it. The land was depicted in a plan annexed to the application. On January 31 1995 an enforcement notice was issued specifying an unauthorised change of use for the land from “agricultural” to “recreational motor sport activities”. It required the cessation of the those activities and the removal of old vehicle tyres that were being used for defining courses, circuits and tracks. The appellant’s appeal was unsuccessful and the notice was subsequently upheld at a public inquiry. Thereafter, although the appellant ceased using the land for recreational motor sport activities, the old tyres remained. On October 20 1997 a summons was issued alleging that the appellant had failed to comply with the enforcement notice because he had failed to remove the old tyres contrary to section 179(2) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. It was common ground that section 179(2) required the defendant to be the “owner” in accordance with section 336(1) of the 1990 Act, which provided that “‘owner’, in relation to any land, means a person, other than a mortgagee not in possession, who, whether in his own right or as trustee for any other person, is entitled to receive the rack rent of the land or, where the land is not at a rack rent, would be so entitled if it were so let”. At the hearing of the information, the justices found that the appellant was the owner of the land and was guilty of the offence. He was fined £5,000. The appellant appealed contending that it had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt that he had been the owner of the land for the purposes of section 179(2) and, therefore, there had been no case to answer. It was submitted that evidence of ownership was a basic and essential requirement that had not been satisfied since the prosecution had only produced the application for a certificate of lawfulness and a letter from the appellant’s solicitors to the council.
Held The appeal was dismissed.
1. For an offence under section 179(2) of the Act, it had to be established by the prosecution that it was beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was the owner. In order to establish that, it was not necessary to prove who received, and was capable of receiving, rack-rent. The question of who was the owner would depend on the particular circumstances of each case. In certain circumstances there might be more than one person capable of owning a particular piece of land and complex questions relating to reversionary interests could arise. However, there was nothing to suggest such a complexity in relation to the land mentioned in the information.
2. In the context of the history of dealings between the appellant and the council, the letter and the application provided prima facie evidence of ownership beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the justices had been entitled to conclude that the appellant was the owner of the land mentioned in the information for the purposes of proving an offence contrary to section 179(2) of the Act.
Christopher Roy-Toole (instructed by Ward Hadaway, of Shouth Shields) appeared for the appellant; Timothy Hewitt (instructed by the solicitor to Sedgefield Borough Council) appeared for the respondents.
Thomas Elliott, barrister
