Council making compulsory purchase order where crucial aspect of development scheme remaining unresolved – Claimant objecting – Inquiry held – Secretary of State adopting inspector’s recommendations and confirming order – Whether Secretary of State’s decision lawful – Section 226 of Town and Country Planning Act 1990 – Claim dismissed
In May 1999 Coventry City Council made the City of Coventry (Phoenix Initiative) Compulsory Purchase Order (CPO) pursuant to sections 226(1)(a) and 226(3)(a) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The CPO was part of the Phoenix Initiative, a proposed comprehensive redevelopment of the city centre for which the council had granted outline planning permission. Gala Leisure Ltd (the claimant) owned a prominent building in the city centre, which fell within the area subject to the CPO. Under the planning permission, a large road junction (the junction) and the claimant’s building were to be replaced by a large area of open space, known as Millennium Square. The claimant objected to the CPO and an inquiry was held.
The claimant’s case was that there remained uncertainties over a crucial aspect of the scheme, namely the closure of the junction to vehicular traffic. The inspector concluded that the closure of the junction was crucial and that it was “controversial” and “problematic”. He found that there were difficulties in implementing the various options for road closure and that it was premature to predict the outcome of those various procedures. However, the inspector recommended, “on balance”, that the CPO be confirmed without modification. In his decision letter, the Secretary of State agreed with the inspector “that it is premature to predict the outcome of any s 247 or other road closure procedure. Whilst recognising the difficulties over implementation, he is satisfied that alternative options for closure exist and… that such possible difficulties should not stand in the way of confirming the Compulsory Purchase Order”.
The claimant applied to quash the Secretary of State’s decision under section 23 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981. It submitted that: (i) the Secretary of State was prevented from confirming the CPO because of the lack of a concluded solution to the road closure issue; (ii) the scheme was dependent upon the junction’s closure, and the land could not be said to be suitable and required if there was no way of predicting whether the necessary closure was viable and achievable in planning terms; and (iii) the Secretary of State therefore reached a decision that was perverse.
Held: The claim was dismissed.
The Secretary of State was obliged to have regard to the road closure issue and to weigh it in the overall balance, but was not required by section 226(1)(a) of the 1990 Act to resolve the issue before the CPO could be confirmed. Having considered the road closure issue, the Secretary of State was entitled to go on to conclude that the making of the CPO was nevertheless compellingly justified: Chesterfield Properties plc v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [1998] JPL 568 applied. The requirements of section 226 were therefore met, and there was no irrationality in the view taken by the Secretary of State. His decision was meticulous, realistic and fully explained and could not be faulted on the ground of perversity.
John Steel QC and James Strachan (instructed by Shoesmiths, of Nottingham) appeared for the claimant; Timothy Mould (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared for the first defendant; Robert Griffiths QC and Robert Palmer (instructed by the solicitor to Coventry City Council) appeared for the second defendants.
Sarah Addenbrooke, barrister
