Wine-making – Applicant seeking to quash first respondent’s decision refusing to grant certificate of lawfulness, planning permission and upholding of enforcement notice – Whether wine-making falling within section 336(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 – Application allowed in part
The applicant owned a farm, Wroxeter Roman Vineyard, at Wroxeter, near Shrewsbury. Most of the farm was used for livestock, but lavender had also been grown on it for a number of years. The vineyard, which was about six acres, was first planted in 1991. In 1993, the applicant sought a certificate of lawfulness for an existing use, pursuant to section 191 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, in respect of the uses then being carried on at the site. In 1994 the second respondents, Shrewsburh and Atcham Borough Council (the council) refused the certificate. On appeal, the first respondent’s inspector also refused the certificate. Following that decision, the applicant sought planning permission in 1994. Conditional permission was granted on appeal to the first respondent but was quashed by a consent order in 1996. On reconsideration, the first respondent granted permission for the making and storage of wine, subject to the condition that it was to be produced only from grapes grown on the holding. An enforcement notice was issued by the council, which accepted making and storage of wine but required the appellant to cease selling wine and light refreshments and to cease visits by fee-paying members of the public.
On appeal, the inspector upheld the enforcement notice.The appellant appealed the three decisions of the first respondent and his inspector: first, in respect of the refusal of the certificate of lawfulness, and the planning appeal, under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990; second, in respect of the enforcement notice, under section 289 of the 1990 Act. The fundamental question was whether wine-making was one of the uses of land, or of a building occupied with land used for agriculture, that did not involve development by virtue of being within section 55(2) of the 1990 Act.
Held The appeal was allowed in part.
In construing the term “agriculture” in the 1990 Act, the courts had refused to extend the definition to include activities that went beyond the growing of crops, namely processing. The approach in Salvatore Cumbo v Secretary of State for the Environment [1992] JPL 366 was followed to the extent that, unless an express extension of the definition was justified, processing did not fall within the definition of “agriculture”. It was necessary to refer to the specific words of the definition in order to determine whether wine-making was for the purposes of agriculture. In the present case, the further processing of the fruit was not the growing or cropping of the fruit. Therefore, it could not be said that wine-making was for the purposes of agriculture nor was it incidental to or ancillary to agricultural use. The inspector’s decision was in accordance with W&JB Eastwood Ltd v Herrod (VO) [1970] RA 63. There was no reason to divert from English principles of law because wine was defined as an “agricultural product” in European law. Wine-making did constitute development in the context of material change of use of agricultural land. The section 288 and 289 applications were to be remitted for redetermination, save the application on the certificate of lawfulness issue, which was dismissed.
Charles George QC and Gregory Jones (instructed by Manby & Steward) appeared for the applicant; Richard Drabble QC (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared for the first respondent, the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions; the second respondents, Shrewsbury and Atcham Borough Council, did not appear and were not represented.
Sarah Addenbrooke, barrister