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Bruschweiller and others v Secretary of State for the Environment and another

Redundant agricultural buildings — Cluster of buildings being used by different persons for restoration of and trading in antique furniture — Whether inspector failing to treat each enforcement notice individually — Matter of statutory construction — Inspector dealing with the notices compendiously — Application to remit granted

The appeal concerned five different applications against enforcement notices served on persons, including the owner, occupying and using a group of redundant agricultural buildings at Rawlings Farm, Rettendon, Essex. The notices alleged change of use in the buildings for the storage of antique and other furniture, as well as for workshops for reupholstery and repair. Other uses were for the assembly of kitchen furniture and restoration of antiques and display.

It was argued for the applicants that, in dealing with the negative planning effects such as those on the character and appearance of the landscape as well as on traffic generation, the inspector considered the alleged cumulative effect of the uses to which the buildings had been put.

Held The application to remit was granted.

1. The inspector had five different applications for five buildings, which he had to determine under section 177 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990; viz that where an appeal was brought against an enforcement notice it was to be treated as a deemed application for planning permission.

2. One could see why the inspector had adopted the course of dealing compendiously with a group of agricultural buildings, which were all on one estate. Further, the estate had been run on a basis that services were interlinked and there had been evidence from one planning expert and one highway engineer.

3. However, in reading the decision letter and giving it the most benevolent construction, the planning applications were interlinked and were run together instead of being dealt with on an individual basis: see Reed v Secretary of State for the Environment (1992) 65 P&CR 50.

4. Further, the court was in no doubt that had the inspector proceeded as he was enjoined by statute to do, he would have been quite entitled to form the conclusion that the cumulative effect of the five applications was such that to grant an application under one would make it more difficult for him to refuse the others: see Collis Radio v Secretary of State for the Environment (1975) 29 P&CR 390; and Poundstretcher v Secretary of State for the Environment [1988] 3 PLR 69.

5. However, that was not what he was doing. If he had considered the individual applications and then considered the question of precedent, he might have reached the same conclusion. But that was not for the court to speculate.

6. Having discerned an error of law, and given that it amounted to more than a mere scintilla, the court would remit the decision to the Secretary of State: see Rules of the Supreme Court Ord 94 r13(7) and Botton v Secretary of State for the Environment [1992] 1 PLR 1.

7. Leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal was granted.

Barry Payton (instructed by J Angus Thornes, of Westcliff-on-Sea) appeared for the applicants; Rhodri Price Lewis (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared for the Secretary of State for the Environment; the second respondents, Chelmsford Borough Council, did not appear and were not represented.

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