Secretary of State for the Environment confirming compulsory purchase order made by council – Applicants applying for decision to be quashed – Whether Secretary of State required to be satisfied relevant development would take place – Whether Secretary of State perpetuating error made by inspector – Application dismissed
Stockton-on-Tees Borough Council proposed to acquire land and buildings in the north-western part of Stockton-on-Tees town centre to enable its comprehensive redevelopment under the city challenge regeneration programme. In 1995 compulsory purchase orders were made under section 226(1)(a) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 on land which included the sites of a Kwik Save discount supermarket and a Baptist tabernacle, the latter being a building of national importance. In 1994 Chesterfield Properties plc (Chesterfield) had acquired Castlegate Shopping Centre which was in the town centre but not part of the land subject to the order. The Secretary of State confirmed the order.
Kwik Save and Chesterfield applied to quash the decision contending that since the Secretary of State had not been satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the development for which the orders were required would take place, by virtue of section 226(1)(a) he was not entitled to authorise the compulsory acquisition of land. They further contended that since acquisition of land against a person’s will violated constitutional rights, the orders could only be authorised if substantial justification was shown. As a matter of discretion therefore, the Secretary of State had no power to authorise compulsory purchase unless satisfied that the relevant development would probably occur. It was also contended that the Secretary of State had perpetuated an error made by the inspector because he had proceeded on the footing that it was for the objectors to make out their case rather than for the inspector to decide whether there were substantial reasons to justify the order.
Held The applications were dismissed.
1. There was nothing in the wording of section 226(1)(a) to impose what would amount to a requirement of precedent fact before the Secretary of State could authorise an order. If parliament had intended the Secretary of State’s power to arise only if he were satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the development would be carried out, it would have provided so in clear terms.
2. The requirement that the Secretary of State should find substantial public interest to justify a compulsory purchase order did not imply that he was required to conclude on the facts that the development would probably take place. There was no basis upon which the court could hold that such a conclusion was a sine que non for the existence of such public interest.
3. It was plain from the inspector’s report that he had looked at the merits of the scheme on a proper inquisitorial basis. Therefore neither the inspector nor the Secretary of State had approached their tasks on a misconceived basis.
Timothy Straker QC and Robert Lewis (instructed by Berwin Leighton) appeared for Chesterfield Properties plc; Anthony Dinkin QC and Robin Green (instructed by Lee Bolton & Lee, London agents for Bullivant Jones & Co, of Liverpool) appeared for Kwik Save; David Holgate QC (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared for the Secretary of State for the Environment; John Steel QC and Murray Hunt (instructed by Addleshaw Booth & Co, of Leeds) appeared for Stockton-on-Tees Borough Council.
