Agricultural tenancy–Notice to pay rent ‘due to JLHA’ held invalid by majority, the true landlords being the trustees of JLHA’s discretionary settlement–Section 24 (2) (d) of the Act of 1948 is a forfeiture provision and must be strictly construed–References to Jones v Lewis 226 Estates Gazette 805
This was an
appeal by Mr Charles Arthur James Pickard, tenant of Owlacombe Farm, Roborough,
Winkleigh, Devon, from a decision of Deputy Judge Roberts at Barnstaple County
Court on July 9 1974 upholding the validity of a notice to pay rent served by
the respondent landlords, Mr John Bishop and Mr Alfred Cotton, trustees of J L
H Arkwright’s discretionary settlement.
Mr E
Campbell-Salmon (instructed by Crosse, Wyatt & Co, of South Molton)
appeared for the appellant, and Mr W Blum (instructed by Wray, Smith & Co)
represented the respondents.
Giving
judgment, LORD DENNING said: The Agricultural Holdings Acts did a great deal of
good for tenant farmers. Previously such men had no security of tenure. They
held on tenancies from year to year which could be determined at the end of the
year by six months’ notice. Even though they had farmed the land and lived in
the house for generations, they could be turned out. The Agricultural Holdings
Acts removed that injustice. Every tenant farmer now has security of tenure for
his life provided that he pays his rent and farms the land properly. The farm
is thus a most valuable asset. But it is liable to be forfeited if the tenant
is late for two months with his rent after it is demanded. It is necessary for
the landlord to make a proper demand, but once this is given, if the rent is
not paid within two months, the tenant is out. He is given no days’ grace. Even
one day late is fatal. His cheque, as here, may be held up for only a day, yet
nevertheless the landlord can say to him, ‘Out you go, you and your family, for
ever.’ The hold-up may be due to a
misunderstanding with the bank, but still the landlord can give him notice to
quit. The court is powerless to help him. The statute contains no provisions to
relieve him. Equity, it is said, cannot intervene. It is important that tenant
farmers should know this to be the state of the law.
The position
is well illustrated by the present case. There is a farm of 243 acres in Devon
called Owlacombe Farm at Roborough, Winkleigh, North Devon. The farmer, Mr
Pickard, and his family have lived there for many years. He used to own it
himself, but 10 years ago, in 1965, he sold it to a gentleman living nearby, Mr
John Loftus Henry Arkwright; but on the terms that Mr Arkwright was to let him
have an agricultural tenancy of it and would not increase the rent for 10
years. The price was some £50,000, which I suppose was about right then, though
the land is probably worth much more now. On the other hand, Mr Arkwright let
the farm back to Mr Pickard at a rent of £2,120 a year payable half-yearly,
£1,060 on March 25 and the same on September 29 every year. Thereafter every
half year the landlord’s agents served a notice to pay the rent due to Mr
Arkwright within two months, and it was paid. Five years later, in 1970, Mr
Arkwright transferred the ownership of the farm to Mr John Bishop and Mr Alfred
Cotton. One was a solicitor and the other a chartered accountant. They were
trustees of a settlement which Mr Arkwright made at that time. It was a
discretionary settlement in favour, I expect, of members of his family. But no
notice of this transfer was given to the farmer, Mr Pickard. He knew nothing of
it. Even after the transfer the agents gave notice to pay ‘the rent due to Mr
Arkwright.’ They did not say ‘the rent
due to Mr Bishop and Mr Cotton.’ Seeing
that the question is whether the notice was valid, I must describe it. Much of
it is printed. At the top in small print in a box it says: ‘This notice is to
be regarded as a notice within the provisions of section 24 (2) (d) of the
Agricultural Holdings Act 1948.’ Next
comes the name in print: ‘Drew, Gibbins & Pearce, 14 Cathedral Close,
Exeter.’ Then in handwriting: ‘Mr C A J
Pickard, Owlacombe Farm, Roborough, Winkleigh, Devon.’ Date ’29 Sep 1972.’ That was a Friday. Then in print: ‘Dear Sir
or Madam, We hereby give you notice to require you to pay within two months
from the service of this notice the rent due to’ . . . so far in print. Then in
handwriting: ‘. . . Mr J L H Arkwright one half-year’s rent due September 29
1972 £1,060.’ Finally in print, ‘Yours
faithfully, Drew, Gibbins & Pearce.’
That was the
entire demand. There were no words saying ‘on behalf of,’ or ‘as agents,’ or
anything like that. At the bottom there was a note in print saying that cheques
should be made payable to Drew, Gibbins & Pearce. That notice was sent off,
I presume, on September 29 1972, the very day that the rent fell due. It was
sent by post, not registered post. Mr Pickard received it early next week. The
arbitrator found that he received it by Monday, October 2 1972, at the latest.
Accordingly the two months would be up by Saturday, December 2 1972. That was
the deadline of the two months for payment. On Monday of that week, November
27, when there were still five days in hand, Mr Pickard drew a cheque for the
rent of £1,060. He made it out in favour of Drew, Gibbins & Pearce and
posted it to them. On Wednesday, November 29, they sent him a receipt on a
printed form: ‘Received with thanks the sum stated below for rent due to Mr J L
H Arkwright one half-year’s rent due September 29 1972 £1,060 for Drew, Gibbins
& Pearce.’ Drew, Gibbins &
Pearce paid the cheque into their bank, the National Provincial Bank in Exeter.
It was sent to the clearing house and thence on to Mr Pickard’s bank, which is
Barclays Bank at Bideford. It got to Barclays Bank at Bideford on Friday,
December 1 1972. That should have been just in time; December 2 1972 was the
last day for payment. Unfortunately the bank at Bideford did not meet the
cheque. Mr Pickard says he had already arranged with the bank to meet the
cheque for rent when presented. But unfortunately
was not enough money at the bank at that moment in Mr Pickard’s account to
cover it. So Mr Pickard’s bank at Bideford sent the cheque back to the bank of
Drew, Gibbins & Pearce, the National Provincial at Exeter.
Mr Pickard’s
bank also telephoned him to tell him about it. He is about five miles away.
They did not get him on the telephone until Saturday, December 2, when they
told him they had returned the cheque. He was upset about it and did all he
could to put the matter right. First thing on Monday morning, outside the bank
at Bideford there was Mr Pickard waiting at 9.30. As soon as the doors opened,
he went into the bank and arranged for the cheque to be met. His bank manager
at Bideford telephoned to the bank of Drew, Gibbins & Pearce in Exeter and
said, ‘The cheque has been paid, so that’s all right; let us have it
back.’ The bank at Exeter said they
would send it back through the clearing house. But they did not do so. It
appears that Drew, Gibbins & Pearce got to know what had happened and got
the cheque. It said on it, ‘Please re-present. Refer to drawer.’ This gave them their opportunity. They said:
‘The rent was not paid within the two months. It was not paid by the vital day,
December 2 1972, and therefore Mr Pickard must go.’ They waited until December 14 1972, and then
they went to solicitors in London. On December 14 1972 the solicitors gave Mr
Pickard notice to quit. The matter went to arbitration, and the arbitrator
stated a case for the opinion of the county court. The county court judge found
that the demand was valid, that Mr Pickard had not complied with it, that there
was no relief available to Mr Pickard, and that he must go. Mr Pickard appeals
to this court.
The first
point taken was this. Under section 19 (1) (a) of the Agriculture (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act 1963 a notice requiring the tenant to remedy a breach must be
‘in the prescribed form,’ which contains a warning of the consequences of a
failure to remedy. It was submitted that a notice to pay rent should also be in
the prescribed form and contain a warning of the consequence. But I cannot so
construe the statute. Section 24 (2) (d) of the 1948 Act draws a clear
distinction between a ‘notice to pay any rent’ and a ‘notice to remedy any
breach.’ Section 19 (1) (a) of the 1963
Act applies only to a notice to remedy a breach. The notice to pay rent does
not have to comply with any prescribed form. The second point taken was that
the notice was bad because it said the rent was due to Mr Arkwright, whereas it
should have said that it was due to Mr Bishop and Mr Cotton. To decide this
point, I must read section 24 (2) (d) of the Agricultural Holdings Act 1948. It
authorises the giving of notice to quit in these circumstances:
‘Where . . .
at the date of the giving of the notice to quit the tenant had failed to comply
with a notice in writing served on him by the landlord requiring him within two
months from the service of the notice to pay any rent due in respect of the
agricultural holding to which the notice to quit relates.’
The word
‘landlord’ is defined in section 94 (1), which says, ”Landlord’ means any
person for the time being entitled to receive the rents and profits of any
land.’ So section 24 (2) (d) in this
case requires that notice in writing be served on Mr Pickard by the landlords,
that is, by Mr Bishop and Mr Cotton, requiring him within two months to pay any
rent due to Mr Bishop and Mr Cotton. Mr Pickard says that this notice does not
comply with the statute, because on the face of it it does not require him to
pay rent due to Mr Bishop and Mr Cotton, who were the ‘landlords’ at all
material times. It requires payment of rent due to Mr Arkwright, the previous
owner, who was not the ‘landlord.’ Mr
Pickard says that the notice is equivalent to a notice signed, ‘Drew, Gibbins
& Pearce on behalf of Mr Arkwright,’ which would plainly be bad.
In construing
section 24 (2) (d) it must be recognised that it is a provision which enables
the landlord to forfeit the tenant’s interest and obtain possession, to the
great advantage of the landlord and great loss of the tenant. Now it is a
settled rule of construction that forfeiture clauses are to be construed
strictly. The party who seeks to enforce a forfeiture must comply strictly with
every requirement leading to it. I would therefore construe section 24 (2) (d)
strictly so as to require the landlords to fulfil it to the letter. So far as a
‘notice to remedy a breach’ is concerned, the legislature has itself required
absolute strictness. Section 19 (1) (a) of the 1963 Act says, ‘A notice requiring
the tenant to remedy a breach . . . must be in the prescribed form.’ The prescribed form [set out in the schedule
to the Agriculture (Forms of Notices to Remedy) Regulations 1964 (SI 1964 No
707)] shows that the signature must be in writing: If the landlord himself
signs, that will suffice, but if the notice is signed by any person other than
the landlord of the holding, the prescribed form says that he must state ‘in
what capacity or by what authority the signature is affixed.’ So if the notice in this case had been a
‘notice to remedy a breach,’ it would have been bad. It was not signed in
writing, and it did not say in what capacity Drew, Gibbins & Pearce were
acting. I realise, of course, that the prescribed form does not apply to a ‘notice
to pay rent.’ Nevertheless it is a
useful precedent on which landlords should draw if they wish to be safe.
So far as the
cases are concerned, the courts have construed the notices strictly. In Jones
v Lewis in this court on February 23 1973 (reported in the ESTATES
GAZETTE of May 5 1973 at p 805) we held that a service on one only of two joint
tenants was bad. It should be served on both of them. In Magdalen College,
Oxford v Heritage [1974] 1 WLR 441 a notice demanding rent was bad
because it did not mention the two months. So as a matter of principle, these
notices must comply strictly with the provision of the statute. This notice
does not satisfy this strict test. It did not purport to be served by the
‘landlord,’ that is by Mr Bishop and Mr Cotton, nor was it served on their
behalf. It was served by Drew, Gibbins & Pearce on behalf of Mr Arkwright.
At any rate, that is how I construe it. It required payment of the rent due to
Mr Arkwright. That imports that the agents were giving the notice on behalf of Mr
Arkwright, making the demand on behalf of Mr Arkwright and serving it on his
behalf. Now he was not the ‘landlord.’ I
know that Mr Bishop and Mr Cotton are only trustees under a discretionary trust
which was founded by Mr Arkwright. But that does not cure the notice. In point
of law it is the same as if Mr Arkwright had sold to someone else for a vast
sum. In order to be good, these notices must get the landlord right. This one
did not. We were referred to Frankland v Capstick [1959] 1 WLR
204. A notice claimed arbitration, but contained a mistake. It said, ‘On behalf
of your landlord Raven Frankland we hereby give you notice,’ etc, whereas the
real landlord was Edward Frankland. The county court judge had held that the
notice was bad. This court held it was good because the operative words were
‘your landlord,’ and the tenant knew perfectly well who the real landlord was.
That case is quite distinguishable from this case. It was not concerned with a
forfeiture, and here Mr Pickard, the tenant, did not know anything about Mr
Bishop and Mr Cotton at all. We were also referred to the case of Stoneman
v Brown [1973] 1 WLR 459, where I did throw out the suggestion that
there might be some circumstances in which there might be some equity to
relieve the tenant. It is unnecessary to pursue that now. I rest my decision on
this one point, that the notice here does not comply with the statute. I would
allow the appeal accordingly.
BROWNE LJ: I
agree with what my Lord has said on the first and third points raised by Mr
Campbell-Salmon. On the third point, I would only add for the sake of
completeness what Harman LJ said about relief in the case of
said in the case of Stoneman v Brown to which my Lord has just
referred, at pp 463-4. So far as the second and vital point is concerned, I
have reluctantly come to the conclusion that I feel bound to differ from my
Lord on this point. However, in order to put an end to the suspense of the
parties, I am authorised to say that Sir John Pennycuick agrees with my Lord on
this point, and so I am giving a dissenting judgment.
Under the
tenancy agreement of March 25 1965 the landlord was Mr Arkwright and the tenant
was Mr Pickard. We were told by counsel that Mr Pickard had before that been
the owner of the farm. He sold it to Mr Arkwright and then took back the
tenancy. The tenancy was for one year from March 25 1965 and thereafter from
year to year at a rent of £2,120 a year. At some time after the commencement of
the tenancy but before September 29 1972 the freehold reversion of the property
subject to Mr Pickard’s tenancy was transferred from Mr Arkwright to the
respondents, Mr Bishop and Mr Cotton, as trustees of Mr Arkwright’s
discretionary settlement. We were told by counsel that this transfer took place
in August 1970. But Mr Pickard was never notified of this change of ownership.
In the case stated the arbitrator made the following findings:
2. Subsequent
to the commencement of the tenancy but prior to September 1972 the freehold
reversion of the property subject to the tenancy became vested in John Bishop
and Alfred Cotton as trustees of J L H Arkwright’s discretionary settlement
(hereinafter called ‘the landlords’).
I stress those
last few words, which one must bear in mind in reading the findings later on in
the case where the words ‘the landlords’ are used.
3. The firm
of Drew Gibbins & Pearce, of 14 The Close, Exeter, chartered surveyors
(hereinafter called ‘the agents’), acted as agents of the landlords in the collection
of the rent due under the agreement.
‘The
landlords’ there therefore means Mr Bishop and Mr Cotton.
13 (a) The notice demanding payment of rent then due
was received by the tenant on October 2 at the latest.
There was a
dispute as to the date on which it was received, but that is not material for
present purposes. Then paragraph 13 goes on:
(b) The agents were authorised by the landlords
to give the notice which they in fact gave.
That is
plainly referring to the notice to pay dated September 29 1972, and again ‘the
landlords’ means Mr Bishop and Mr Cotton.
(c) The form of notice demanding payment of rent
and incorporating a notice to pay within two months in accordance with section
24 (2) (d) of the Act was the same as had been sent to the tenant ever since
the commencement of the tenancy . . .
(f) The notice stated that it was given on behalf
of Mr Arkwright.
In my view
that is not a finding of fact, though it is described as such. That is a matter
of the construction of the notice, and I will come back later to what the
notice means on its true construction. I say at once that in my judgment
paragraph (f) is right as a matter of construction, even though I do not think
it is a finding of fact. My Lord has already referred to the notice to pay of
September 29 1972, and I need not refer to it in detail again. It should be
noted, however, that in the box at the top it is stated that the notice is to
be regarded as a notice within section 24 (2) (d). In the middle of the notice
it is said, ‘We hereby give you notice to require you to pay within two months
from the service of this notice the rent due to Mr J L H Arkwright.’ And then in the bottom left-hand corner:
‘Cheques and Post Office orders should be made payable to the order of Drew,
Gibbins & Pearce.’ The question is,
was this good notice under section 24 (2) (d)?
My Lord has already read this section, and I need not read it again. The
vital words are that the notice must be a notice in writing served on the
tenant by the landlord requiring him within two months from the service of the
notice to pay any rent due in respect of the holding; and as my Lord has said,
‘landlord’ must be read in accordance with the definition in section 94 of the
Act. The grounds of appeal on this point are grounds 1 (b) (iii) and (iv),
which are as follows: ‘(iii) It’–that is the notice–‘was not expressed to be
given by or on behalf of the respondents. (iv) It was therein stated that the
rent therein referred to was due to ‘Mr J L H Arkwright’ and not to the
respondents.’
Section 24 (2)
(d) requires that the notice shall be served on the tenant by the landlord, as
defined by section 94. I think it is clear that the words ‘by the landlord’
must mean ‘by or on behalf of the landlord.’
This is conceded by Mr Campbell-Salmon, and if any authority is needed,
there is the case to which my Lord has already referred, Frankland v Capstick
[1959] 1 WLR 204, and in particular what Sellers LJ said at page 208 and
Roxburgh J at page 209. The arbitrator in the present case found that Drew,
Gibbins & Pearce were authorised by the landlord–which means Mr Bishop and
Mr Cotton, as trustees of the discretionary trust–to give the notice of
September 29 1972: see paragraphs 2 and 13 (b) of the case stated. But the
notice does not necessarily say on whose behalf it was given, and in my view it
impliedly says it was given on behalf of Mr Arkwright by the use of the phrase
‘rent due to Mr Arkwright.’ The position
is, therefore, in my view that the notice was in fact served on behalf of the
landlord, and therefore by the landlord, but that it would have led the tenant
to believe that the landlord was someone other than he was. It is true that if
this notice had been required to be given in the form prescribed by the
regulations in respect of notices to remedy breaches of terms or conditions, it
would have had to state in what capacity Drew, Gibbins & Pearce were
signing. But we are all I think agreed that this notice requiring payment of
rent does not have to be given in the prescribed form. The notice requires Mr
Pickard to pay the rent due, but it requires him to pay the rent due to Mr
Arkwright. I have no doubt that Mr Pickard thought that Mr Arkwright was still
his landlord on September 29 1972. As I have said, Mr Pickard had sold the farm
to Mr Arkwright and taken the tenancy agreement from him, and the arbitrator
found that the notices to pay had been in the same form ever since the
commencement of the tenancy: see paragraph 13 (c) of the case. But the notice
instructs Mr Pickard to make the payment to Drew, Gibbins & Pearce, and the
arbitrator found that they had authority to collect the rent on behalf of Mr
Bishop and Mr Cotton: see paragraph 3 of the case. If, therefore, Mr Pickard
had paid the rent to Drew, Gibbins & Pearce, he would have got a good
discharge in spite of the transfer of the reversion from Mr Arkwright to Mr
Bishop and Mr Cotton, even apart from section 151 of the Law of Property Act
1925, which in itself would have given him a good discharge. The notice was, in
my view, plainly inaccurate, because it implied that the landlord was Mr
Arkwright when in fact it was Mr Bishop and Mr Cotton. But I cannot see that
this was of the slightest importance to Mr Pickard or caused him any prejudice
whatever. The notice was in fact served on Mr Pickard by the landlord, because
it was served by an agent of the landlord who had authority to serve it on his
behalf and it required him to pay the rent due under the tenancy to someone
whose receipt as agent for the person who was the landlord would give him a
good discharge.
In the case of
Frankland v Capstick [1959] 1 WLR 204 to which my Lord has
referred, Sellers LJ says this on p 206 (he is quoting from the judgment of
Romer LJ in Mountford v Hodkinson [1956] 1 WLR 422 at 427):
Apparently,
according to the judgment which Danckwerts J delivered [in Ward v Scott
[1950] WN 76], Mr Miles for the tenant had said: ‘The court is indulgent in
respect of notices of this kind and does not in effect care for merely
technical points, and if the meaning is so plain that the landlord cannot
mistake what is meant, then effect should be given to the notice.’ that proposition, I think, commended itself
to Danckwerts J, though he actually decided the case on another point. For my
part, I think that is right, though perhaps subject to this, as Mr Megarry,
counsel for the tenant, pointed out, that one should add the word ‘reasonably’
so as to make it read: ‘and if the meaning is so plain that the landlord cannot
reasonably mistake what is meant, then effect should be given to the
notice.’ It seems to me to be the proper
test to apply to notices of this sort.
In that case,
it was a notice given by the tenant to the landlord, but it seems to me just
the same test would apply to a notice given by the landlord to the tenant. In
my judgment, applying that test, Mr Pickard could not reasonably have mistaken
what was meant. What was meant was that the landlords required him within two
months to pay the rent to Drew, Gibbins & Pearce, to whom he had paid his
rent as agents for the landlord throughout the tenancy. In my judgment the two
cases to which my Lord has referred, Jones v Lewis (1973),
reported in ESTATES GAZETTE, volume 226 at p 805, and the Magdalen College
case [1974] 1 WLR 441, are plainly distinguishable from this case. The notices
in those cases clearly did not comply with the section. In Jones v Lewis
the notice was not served on the tenant because it was only served on one of
two tenants. In the Magdalen College case the notice plainly did not
comply with the section because it did not specify the period of two months. In
my judgment this notice in the present case was a notice served on the tenant
by the landlord requiring the tenant to pay rent due in respect of his holding.
In my judgment it was a good notice under section 24 (2) (d), and I would
dismiss the appeal, but as my Lords think otherwise, the result will of course
be that the appeal succeeds. I said at the beginning of my judgment that I had
reached this conclusion with some reluctance, because I recognise the force of
what my Lord has said about the effect of noncompliance with a notice of this
sort, that is, working a forfeiture. At the same time, having come to the clear
conclusion that as a matter of law the result is as I have tried to state, I
feel bound to express it.
SIR JOHN
PENNYCUICK: I agree that section 19 of the Agriculture (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act 1963 has no application to the first limb of paragraph (d) of
subsection (2) of section 24 of the Agricultural Holdings Act 1948, which deals
with failure to comply with a notice to pay rent. I need not pursue that point.
I turn then to paragraph (d) of subsection (2) of section 24. That paragraph,
so far as now material, runs as follows:
‘The foregoing
subsection shall not apply where . . . (d) at the date of the giving of the
notice to quit the tenant had failed to comply with a notice in writing served
on him by the landlord requiring him within two months from the service of the
notice to pay any rent due in respect of the agricultural holding to which the
notice to quit relates . . . .’
So far as now
material, that paragraph directs that two requirements must be satisfied,
namely, (1) the notice must be served by the landlord, and (2) the notice must
require payment of the rent due. So far as the first requirement is concerned,
I have no doubt the notice may be served by the landlord’s agent. That is not
in dispute. So far as the second requirement is concerned, it seems to me that
the word ‘pay’ contemplates payment to the landlord or his agent. That is, I
think, the natural meaning of the words ‘pay any rent’ in this context. It
seems to me that an instruction to the tenant to pay rent or the equivalent of
rent to a third party, whatever may be the consequence of such an instruction,
would not constitute a requirement to pay rent, or, in more technical parlance,
a demand for rent.
Turning then
to the present case, the notice dated September 29 1972, so far as now
material, is in the following form. At the top there is a box containing the
words, ‘This notice is to be regarded as a notice within the provisions of
section 24 (2) (d) of the Agricultural Holdings Act 1948.’ It is then addressed to the tenant, Mr
Pickard. It is headed ‘Drew, Gibbins & Pearce,’ who are the agents for the
present landlords, as they were during Mr Arkwright’s possession. The notice
reads as follows: ‘We hereby give you notice to require you to pay within two
months from the service of this notice the rent due to Mr J L H Arkwright one
half year’s rent due September 29 1972 £1,060. Yours faithfully, Drew, Gibbins
& Pearce.’ There follows a footnote
in the following terms: ‘Cheques and Post Office orders should be made payable
to the order of Drew, Gibbins & Pearce and crossed ‘& Co’.’ It seems to me that on its natural
construction this notice plainly requires payment of this sum of £1,060 rent to
Drew, Gibbins & Pearce as agents for Mr Arkwright. The rent is described as
due to Mr Arkwright, and it is impossible to construe the notice as requiring
payment to anyone else. I think further that having regard to its terms, the
notice must be treated as expressed to be given by Drew, Gibbins & Pearce
as agents for Mr Arkwright. These defects are to my mind fatal to the validity
of the notice. The notice is not given by the landlord or his agent, and it
requires payment to someone other than the landlord or his agent.
I appreciate
that the trustees had given authority to Drew, Gibbins & Pearce to serve
the appropriate notice; but the circumstance that they had authority to serve a
notice on behalf of the trustees does not convert the notice expressed to be
given on behalf of another party, namely Mr Arkwright, into a notice given on
behalf of the landlords, that is to say the trustees. Nor does it satisfy the
requirement to pay to the landlord. I appreciate that Mr Arkwright was the
former landlord, and that no notice of the conveyance by Mr Arkwright to the
trustees had been given to the tenant, so that the tenant had no reason to
believe that this was not a good notice. But I do not think that circumstance
is sufficient to transform a bad notice into a good notice. Nor, I think, does
section 151 of the Law of Property Act 1925 help. Mr Blum, for the trustees,
contended that the words ‘Mr J L H Arkwright’ in the notice should be treated
as a mere misdescription, such as the misdescription in the case of Frankland
v Capstick, or alternatively as a conventional description of the
Arkwright estate, by reason that the trustees were in fact the trustees of a
family settlement made by Mr Arkwright. I am unable to accept that contention.
The trustees are persons totally different from Mr Arkwright. The words ‘Mr J L
H Arkwright’ could not be regarded as a mere misdescription of Mr Bishop and Mr
Cotton, or as a conventional description of them in their capacity as trustees
of Mr Arkwright’s settlement.
This is a
highly technical point, and I venture to think the mistake is a piece of
outstanding good luck for Mr Pickard. The fact remains that the notice to pay
is made by section 24 the foundation of forfeiture of an agricultural tenancy,
and it is of general, and I think generally recognised, importance in
connection with forfeiture that the requirements of the relevant statute or the
lease, as the case may be, should be strictly complied with.
The appeal
was allowed with costs. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.
