Rent (Agriculture) Act 1976–Whether gamekeeper employed in ‘agriculture’–Gamekeeper employed to rear pheasants for sport–Definition of ‘agriculture’ for purpose of Act–‘Livestock keeping and breeding’ covers animals (including birds) kept for production of food, but not for sport–judge’s finding that pheasants were kept for sport, although 80 per cent of those killed and retrieved were sold, conclusive against gamekeeper’s claim to be protected by Act–Appeal dismissed
The appellant,
John Rapley, appealed against a decision of Deputy Judge Massey, at Salisbury
County Court, granting possession to Lord Glendyne of a cottage, known as
Keeper’s Cottage, at Hurdcott, Barford St Martin. The appellant had been
employed as a gamekeeper by Lord Glendyne, the respondent to this appeal, and
claimed that he was entitled to protection in his occupation of the cottage by
virtue of the Rent (Agriculture) Act 1976.
M P Kolanko
(instructed by Theodore Goddard & Co, agents for Batt, Broadbent &
Beecroft, of Salisbury) appeared on behalf of the appellant; R C Pryor
(instructed by Young, Jones, Golding, Patterson) represented the respondent.
Giving the
judgment of the court, LORD SCARMAN said: On November 18 1977 Deputy Judge
Massey, sitting in the Salisbury County Court, gave the plaintiff judgment
against the defendant for possession of Keeper’s Cottage, Hurdcott, Barford St
Martin. The defendant, who now appeals against the judgment, contends that he
is entitled, as an agricultural worker, to the protection of the Rent (Agriculture)
Act 1976. The learned deputy judge held that he was not employed in agriculture
and, therefore, not entitled to the protection of the Act. The only point
raised in this appeal is whether the defendant was employed in agriculture. If
he was, his appeal succeeds.
Mr Rapley, the
appellant, was employed by Lord Glendyne, the respondent, from June 2 1972
until September 19 1977 as a gamekeeper. A term of his employment was that he
should have a house, ie the Keeper’s Cottage at Barford St Martin, rent and rates
free. His rate of pay was to be under the terms of the agricultural wages
structure which is itself derived from the Agricultural Wages Act. The learned
judge found that his job was to keep and rear pheasants for sport; that,
although paid for convenience by Lord Glendyne’s farm manager, he was not
employed on the farm; and that his wages did not go through the farm books. The
defendant himself told the judge that his job was ‘to put birds in the air as
targets for sportsmen.’ Upon this
evidence the learned judge concluded that the defendant’s job was to rear
pheasants not for food but for sport. Though Lord Glendyne sold 80 per cent of
the birds he and his guests shot, he would not have kept pheasants at all had
it not been for the sport they provided. Accordingly, the judge held that the
defendant was not employed in agriculture and that he was not entitled to the
protection of the Act.
The appeal
turns on whether keeping and breeding pheasants for sport is within the
definition of agriculture to be found in section 1 of the Act. A number of
cases in which similar definitions in other statutes have been considered by
the courts were cited to us. They do not help, save to emphasise what might
seem to be obvious, that not every rural pursuit is an agricultural activity.
The point
turns on the definition itself. The section, so far as relevant, is in these
terms: ‘(1) in this Act–(a) ‘agriculture’ includes–(i) . . . livestock keeping
and breeding . . .; . . . (2) For the purpose of the definition in subsection
(1)(a) above–. . . ‘livestock’ includes any animal which is kept for the
production of food, wool, skins, or fur, or for the purpose of its use in the
carrying on of any agricultural activity, and for purposes of this definition
‘animal’ includes bird but does not include fish.’ Agriculture, therefore, includes ‘livestock
keeping and breeding’; ‘livestock’ includes ‘any animal which is kept for the
production of food’; and ‘animal’ includes birds but not fish.
The judge’s
finding that Lord Glendyne kept pheasants for sport, not food, clearly puts the
defendant’s employment outside the express terms of the definition. But it was
urged before us that the definition was not intended to be exhaustive and that
the statute should not be given a narrow meaning.
points: (1) the definition is introduced by the word ‘includes’; (2) this
‘inclusive’ type of definition is used to enable the court to construe in a
broad and flexible way the term ‘agriculture,’ so as to retain its essentially
fluctuating nature; (3) keeping pheasants is part of the rural scene which
includes agriculture; it is truly an agricultural activity; (4) the word
‘livestock’ is similarly to be given a broad and flexible meaning; (5) Mr
Rapley’s contract was drafted so as to incorporate into it the rates of pay and
holiday entitlement established under the agricultural wages legislation.
Finally, Mr Kolanko reminded us that the statute has an important social
purpose and should not be construed so as to introduce refined and difficult
distinctions into rural and farming operations and country life.
These
arguments are entitled to respect. They fail because plainly not every rural or
country activity is intended to be included in the definition of agriculture.
Fishing, for example, is clearly excluded. The definition is really directed
towards including all operations involved in farming land for commercial
purposes of which the one relevant to this appeal is the production of food.
The finding that these pheasants were kept for sport, though 80 per cent of
those killed and retrieved were in fact sold, is, in our judgment, conclusive.
Mr Rapley’s employment was to promote not agriculture but a field sport. This
is a country activity but not an agricultural one. The appeal is, therefore,
dismissed.
The appeal
was dismissed. Legal aid taxation ordered of appellant’s costs. Application by
respondent for payment of costs out of Legal Aid Fund adjourned.
