Rating–Non-payment of rates–Whether magistrates could reasonably have reached the conclusion that an owner was not in rateable occupation of a house at the material times–Owner did not sleep in the house during period in question, but some of his furniture and chattels were there (not the main furniture, which was in store), the house was kept heated, gas and electricity were consumed, the telephone was used for business and other calls, and the owner visited the house to make such calls and to decorate and maintain it–Magistrates might justifiably have concluded that there was sufficient enjoyment of the hereditament to constitute rateable occupation, but there was material on which they could reach the opposite conclusion (which they did reach)–Appeal by rating authority dismissed
In this case
Wirrall Borough Council, as rating authority, appealed by case stated against a
decision of magistrates dismissing a complaint against the respondent, Roy
Lane, for non-payment of rates in respect of a house he owned at 8 Beverley
Drive, Heswall, Wirral.
M B Horton
(instructed by P J Mills, director of Administration and Legal Services,
Wallasey) appeared on behalf of the appellant council; W Waldron (instructed by
Weightmans, of Liverpool) represented the respondent.
Giving the
first judgment at the invitation of Lord Widgery CJ, CUMMING-BRUCE LJ said: Mr
Horton moves on behalf of the Wirral Borough Council, a rating authority,
seeking relief by way of case stated in respect of an adjudication on January
13 1977 when the rating authority preferred a complaint against the respondent
that he failed to pay rates for the period from April 1 1974 to March 31 1977,
though in fact as the matter developed there was a finding that rates fell to
be levied in respect of an occupation ending in November 1975. The period upon
which the magistrates’ attention was focussed was a period from April 1 1974 to
a date in November 1975.
A question put
in the case is whether, on the evidence given to the magistrates, their finding
of fact that the respondent’s wife did not live at 8 Beverley Drive between the
said dates can be supported. Mr Horton does not pursue that ground.
Secondly,
there is a question whether on the facts found by the magistrates their
conclusion that the respondent was not in rateable occupation of 8 Beverley
Drive between April 1 1974 and October 31 1975 was reasonable. That is not the
kind of question that this court entertains, but as Mr Horton redrafted it we
approach the question on the basis that it is as follows: ‘Whether on the facts
found their conclusion was one which they could reasonably have reached, and
whether those facts were facts upon which as a matter of law they could reach
the conclusion that they did.’
The third
question does not add anything to the second one.
The facts may
be shortly summarised. They had the following background. The respondent was
the owner of a house which he purchased at 8 Beverley Drive in Heswall in May
1973. He and his wife admitted having moved into that house therein to live in
November 1975, and the facts that were found by the magistrates were that in
the interval the use of the house by the husband was as follows. The vendor had
left some curtains and carpets in the house which stayed there, and also a stool
and a table. The respondent did not throw them out. He kept the heating and the
hot water on to such a degree that he had substantial gas bills. He used the
telephone, the degree of use being greater than in other residential properties
in the same area on the same exchange, though there is no finding as to what
the degree of use in other residential properties in the same area was. Between
April 1973 and November 1975 he incurred bills commensurate with a home of its
size with gas central heating and hot water. Electricity had been consumed
since May 1973, the account being in the wife’s name. He moved into the
hereditament four objects (chattels)–a deep freeze, a cooker, a refrigerator
and a gas fire–which were stored at the property from May 1973 onwards.
The
respondent’s wife did not live at the property during the said period, and
during that period he visited the property to make business and other telephone
calls and to decorate and maintain the premises. During those visits, which
were numerous, he did not sleep there or have meals, apart from sandwiches.
There is what I regard as an unclear sentence in the findings, which may or may
not represent a finding that the respondent himself added curtains and carpets
to those that were left behind by the predecessor in title. The gas fire and
cooker were converted to North Sea Gas after November 1975. There are then some
findings which I do not think I need refer to as of significance relating to
entries on an electoral register.
The submission
from Mr Horton is that on the way in which the law has developed (and the
illustrations come mostly from the second half of the 19th century onwards) the
rating authority has to show actual and exclusive possession of such a kind as
can reasonably be described as enjoyment of the hereditament in some way. There
are dicta which suggest that the level of enjoyment may be slight. He submits
that here, first, there is a title; second, there is evidence of exclusive
occupation; thirdly, there is evidence of some enjoyment, being that bundle of
enjoyment derived from using the house to store the refrigerator, the freezer,
the gas fire and such curtains and carpets together with the stool and table
left behind by the predecessor in title; and, further, the enjoyment of the house
as a base from which to telephone during the occasions on which this apparently
considerable number of telephone calls was made, which were described and
apparently accepted by the justices as having been made on the occasions when
he visited the house for the purposes of decoration and maintenance.
At all
material times all the furniture of the respondent, save those fittings that I
have described, had been moved from the respondent’s previous house into store
where they remained until November 1975 when, on the reconciliation of the
respondent and his wife, they set up home together in the house and moved their
furniture out of store.
I think that I
have concisely summarised the significant factors which Mr Horton relies upon
for his proposition that from such kinds of enjoyment, taken together, the only
conclusion which a reasonable bench of magistrates could reach, having regard
to the law of rating, was that all the ingredients of rateable occupation had
been proved.
It is
perfectly clear that on the facts found by the magistrates they could very well
have come to the opposite conclusion to that which they did. There manifestly
was material
respondent had been in such enjoyment of his possession as to give rise to
rateable occupation. The question is whether as a matter of law that was the
only conclusion they could reasonably reach.
I have some
sympathy for the dismay of the rating authority about the finding that the
magistrates made, but for my part I have come to the conclusion that there was
enough here to justify their coming not only to the conclusion that Mr Horton
submits is right but also to the conclusion at which they did arrive. I think
that when each of the individual components of the enjoyment is considered in
each case as a matter of fact and degree a reasonable bench of magistrates may
have decided that that particular component of the enjoyment was not enough;
and on the principle that nought plus nought plus nought does not add up to
one, if they approached their findings of fact in that way, I am satisfied that
there was material on which they could reach the conclusion that they did
reach, though it may perhaps, if it is not impertinent to say so, appear rather
surprising. But they heard the evidence and it is not for this court to
speculate what individual members of this court might have concluded had they
heard the evidence.
Much was made
by Mr Horton about the storage of valuable chattels, to wit the freezer, the
refrigerator, the gas fire and the cooker, and there was the house being used
as a valuable storage depot for valuable chattels. Obviously these chattels,
which eventually were connected with the gas or to the electricity, had value.
The magistrates were, I think, clearly a little bit disturbed about that, but
they decided to apply the maxim de minimis non curat lex to these
valuable chattels. Against the background of the fact that all the much more
valuable chattels of this family appear to have been put into store, and given
the circumstances of the background, for my part I am not prepared to hold as a
matter of law that the magistrates were not entitled thus to relegate these
objects to a lowly grade of value or importance.
Mr Horton had
another very interesting submission which he submitted in the alternative was
open to him on the case, and that was that, having got to a certain distance,
the rating authority had proved exclusive occupation; and the heat and the
lighting being on, and some curtains and some carpets being up, a moment had
come when the onus of proof lying upon them had been discharged, and an onus
then lay upon the respondent. Considered in that light, the respondent’s
evidence, uncorroborated by his absent spouse, was not enough to discharge the
onus which Mr Horton submitted then lay upon the respondent.
In my view,
that interesting proposition does not arise on this case. It may or may not
arise for determination in the future, though it may appear on analysis only to
be a commentary on the evidence in the particular case.
For those
reasons I would dismiss the appeal.
LORD WIDGERY
CJ and NEILL J agreed.
The appeal was dismissed with costs.
