Councils who let licensees into ‘short life’ property may use summary possession procedure once licence has been effectively terminated–GLC nevertheless held on facts to have begun proceedings too soon
This was an
appeal by Mr Alan Jenkins occupier of 11 Elgin Avenue, Paddington, London W9,
from a judgment of Judge Leslie at Bloomsbury and Marylebone County Court on
September 13 1974 awarding the owners of the property, the Greater London
Council, an order for possession.
Lord Gifford
(instructed by the North Paddington neighbourhood law centre) appeared for the
occupier, and Mr B K Levy (instructed by A G Gardner) represented the council.
Giving
judgment, LORD DIPLOCK said that it was common ground that the occupier went
into the house in question in the spring of 1973 as licensee of the council as
part of an arrangement for using houses which had been acquired for demolition
and replacement, known familiarly as ‘short-life properties,’ for temporary
accommodation for students and homeless persons. The first point taken on his
behalf was that the special procedure for recovery of land permitted by order
26 of the County Court Rules was not available in cases where a person remained
on as a trespasser after determination of a licence to occupy the land. He (his
Lordship) agreed with the construction put upon the corresponding order 113 of
the Rules of the Supreme Court by Pennycuick V-C in Bristol Corporation
v Persons Unknown [1974] 1 WLR 365 that it was clear beyond a
peradventure that the order applied to such cases; he disagreed with the
Vice-Chancellor’s own suggestion, however, that there was a discretion in the
court whether to permit the use of the summary procedure in a case where there
had originally been a licence to occupy. The second point, and the real issue
in the case, was whether or not the licence had been effectively withdrawn by
the date when the council commenced proceedings, ie August 14 1974. The
position was that a registered charity known as Students Community Housing
(‘SCH’) negotiated with the council on behalf of the occupier of 11 Elgin
Avenue and numerous other properties. In correspondence with SCH the council
had imposed a ‘deadline’ for occupation of No 11 which was ultimately extended
until May 31 1974, the date on which the council now claimed the occupiers’
licence ran out. Subsequently there were discussions in which SCH apparently
sought to extract from the council an undertaking by which vacant possession of
the house was made dependent on the offer of alternative accommodation. No such
undertaking was given, but letters were written in July and August which
referred to vacant possession being given by September 1 1974. He (Lord
Diplock) thought that a recipient of such a letter would be entitled reasonably
to conclude that his licence to occupy was extended to that date, and it
followed that the appeal succeeded on the technical ground that proceedings
were begun about two weeks too soon. It was to be noted that before the county
court judge emphasis was laid, no doubt for tactical reasons, on the argument
that an agreement had been reached whereby the occupier could remain until
alternative accommodation was offered.
CAIRNS LJ
delivered a concurring judgment, and BROWNE LJ agreed. The appellant was
awarded his costs in both courts.
