Leasehold Reform Act 1967 — Qualifications for enfranchisement — The plaintiff, who had been a regulated tenant of part of a leasehold house since 1967, acquired the residue of the 99-years’ lease of the house in 1979 — Lease for 99 years from 1881 at a low rent — The plaintiff gave notice of his desire to acquire the freehold, but the defendant company, the freeholders, objected that the plaintiff had not satisfied the qualifying conditions in section 1 of the 1967 Act — Held that, although in 1979 he was a tenant holding under a long tenancy at a low rent, and although he was to be treated as having occupied the house as his residence since 1967, he had not been a tenant of the house under a long tenancy at a low rent ‘for the last five years or for periods amounting to five years in the last ten years’ — He was not, therefore, qualified to acquire the freehold reversion — Declaration accordingly
This was an
originating summons taken out by the plaintiff, Thomas Richard Harris, against
the defendants, Plentex Ltd, for a declaration on the question whether on the
true construction of section 1 of the Leasehold Reform Act 1967 and of a lease
vested in the plaintiff, and in the events which had happened, he was entitled
to acquire the freehold reversion of a house at 33 Beauchamp Road, Lavender
Hill, Clapham Junction, London SW1.
J H G Sunnucks
(instructed by G H Gelberg, Parkus & Co) appeared on behalf of the
plaintiff; M K Zeidman (instructed by Cowan, Lipson Rumney) represented the
defendants.
Giving
judgment, VINELOTT J said: This application raises a short question of
construction of the Leasehold Reform Act 1967. On July 12 1979 the plaintiff,
Thomas Richard Harris, was the lessee of a house at 33 Beauchamp Road, Lavender
Hill, under a lease dated October 16 1884 whereby the owner of the freehold
granted a building lease for a term of 99 years from March 25 1881 at a rent of
£7 4s 6d a year. On July 12 1979 the rateable value of the house was £347. Mr
Harris had acquired the lease by transfer dated May 4 1979. He had been in
occupation of part of the house since July 24 1967 when he became a regulated
tenant of a part. That part has been his main or only residence since that
date.
On July 12
1979 Mr Harris gave notice under section 8 of the 1967 Act to the defendant
Plentex Ltd, the successor in title of the original lessor and the owner of the
freehold reversion immediately expectant on the term granted by the lease, of
his desire to acquire the freehold. It is common ground that on July 12 1979 Mr
Harris was a tenant of a leasehold house in Greater London of a rateable value
of less than £400 holding under a long tenancy at a low rent, that he had
occupied part of the house for more than five years and that under section
1(2)(a) of the 1967 Act he is to be treated for the purposes of the Act as if
his occupation of part had been occupation of the whole. By Schedule 3,
paragraph 3(1), Mr Harris having made a claim to acquire the freehold, the
lease, which would otherwise have expired on March 24 1980, is in effect
extended during the currency of the claim and for three months thereafter.
Mr Harris has
made an application in the county court which, under section 20 of that Act,
has exclusive jurisdiction, but that application is still pending. In the
course of those proceedings a question of construction of section 1(1)(b) of
the Act arose, and with a view to avoiding the expense and delay of a full
hearing of Mr Harris’s application and possibly a subsequent appeal, Mr Harris
has issued an originating summons in this court asking for that question of
construction to be decided. Mr Zeidman, who appeared for the defendant company,
accepts, and I think rightly, that the originating summons is not one which
invokes ‘any jurisdiction expressed to be conferred on the court by Part I of
the 1967 Act’ and that accordingly I have jurisdiction to entertain it.
Before
explaining the question of construction which has arisen it will be convenient
to read section 1 of the Act.
(1) This Part of this Act shall have effect to
confer on a tenant of a leasehold house, occupying the house as his residence,
a right to acquire on fair terms the freehold or an extended lease of the house
and premises where —
(a) his tenancy is a long tenancy at a low rent
and subject to subsections (5) and (6) below the rateable value of the house
and premises on the appropriate day is not (or was not) more than £200 or, if
it is in Greater London, than £400; and
(b) at the relevant time (that is to say, at the
time when he gives notice in accordance with this Act of his desire to have the
freehold or to have an extended lease, as the case may be) he has been tenant
of the house under a long tenancy at a low rent, and occupying it as his
residence, for the last five years or for periods amounting to five years in
the last ten years;
and to confer
the like right in the other cases for which provision is made in this Part of
this Act.
(2) In this Part of this Act references, in
relation to any tenancy, to the tenant occupying a house as his residence shall
be construed as applying where, but only where, the tenant is, in right of the
tenancy, occupying it as his only or main residence (whether or not he uses it
also for other purposes); but
(a) references to a person occupying a house
shall apply where he occupies it in part only . . .
As I have
said, it is common ground that on July 12 1979 Mr Harris was a tenant holding a
long tenancy at a low rent of a house within the limits of rateable value
within section 1(1)(a) and that he is to be treated as having occupied the
house as his residence since July 24 1967. The question is whether on July 12
1979 he had been ‘tenant of the house under a long tenancy at a low rent and
occupying it as his residence for the last five years or for periods amounting
to five years in the last ten years’.
Mr Sunnucks,
who appeared for Mr Harris, argued that section 1(1)(b) requires an applicant
for a long lease to satisfy two conditions. First, he must show that ‘he has
been tenant of the house at a low rent’; secondly, he must show that he has
been ‘occupying it as his residence’ for the requisite period. That
construction seems to me to face two insuperable difficulties. The first
difficulty is that the first of Mr Sunnucks’ two conditions adds nothing to the
opening words of section 1(1), which only confers a right to acquire the
freehold of a house on ‘a tenant of a leasehold house’ and therefore only
confers a right to acquire the freehold of a house on someone who at the
relevant date was a tenant of a leasehold house. Any such person must have been
a tenant for a period of time however short. Secondly, section 1(2) provides
that references to a tenant occupying a house as his residence are to be
construed as applying ‘where the tenant is, in right of the tenancy, occupying
it’.
notice is served. I think it is more natural to read it as applying throughout
the period during which the tenant claims to have been occupying the house as
his residence. But, apart from these difficulties, the words in section 1(1)(b)
‘for the last five years or for periods amounting to five years in the last ten
years’ are I think most naturally read as qualifying the words ‘has been tenant
of the house under a long tenancy at a low rent’. The words ‘and occupying it
as his residence’ then introduce a further condition which must also be
satisfied during the period relied on by the tenant.
In my
judgment, therefore, on the agreed facts, Mr Harris did not at the relevant
time, that is July 12 1979, satisfy the conditions in section 1(1)(b) and had
not and has not under the Act any right to acquire the freehold reversion and I
so declare.
