Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 — Whether landlord entitled to oppose tenant’s application for a new tenancy on ground (f) of section 30 to that Act — Whether sufficient evidence of intention — Appeal by tenant dismissed
tenant had held a lease of a plot of land — Upon the expiration of that lease
the respondent landlord opposed the grant of a new tenancy on the ground that
it proposed to develop the site through a company called Tablelodge Ltd with
whom it had a building agreement — Outline planning permission had been
obtained and upon the building agreement becoming unconditional Tablelodge Ltd
would pay the respondent £400,000 by way of a premium and would then be granted
a lease of the site to carry out development — On a preliminary issue, Judge
Edwards (sitting in Brentford County Court) held that the respondent landlord
was entitled to oppose the appellant’s application on the grounds set out in
para (f) of section 30 to the Act — The appellant tenant appealed contending
that plans and specifications were not sufficiently advanced, there might be
financial problems with Tablelodge Ltd and there were occupiers of the site
claiming to be subtenants from whom possession might not be obtained without
some difficulty
in bringing forward detailed specifications and drawings without having
possession of the site in order that the surveys might be undertaken, the
prospective developers had spent £70,000 on the project, which suggested that
this was not a case of hope but one of intention — On the need for financing of
the development by Tablelodge Ltd, it was a question of taking a view as to
what view the lending bank itself would be likely to take when the appropriate
date was reached — Although it was not directly relevant, the court was told
that the judge’s view that there would be no problem in getting rid of the
occupiers claiming subtenancies had been found to be correct in the event —
These matters were essentially a question of fact and degree for the trial
judge — It was essentially a matter for the judge who tried the case to assess
the conviction which the evidence carried — There were no grounds for
interfering
No cases are
referred to in this report.
This was an
appeal by Peter Goddard & Sons Ltd, who had made an application under Part
II of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 for a new tenancy of premises known as
The Yard, The Ham, Brentford, Middlesex, from a decision of Judge Edwards
(sitting in Brentford County Court) on a preliminary issue as to whether the
respondent landlords were entitled to oppose the application on the grounds set
out in para (f) of section 30 of the 1954 Act.
Neil Mendoza
(instructed by Mendoza’s) appeared for the appellant; and Colin Ishmael (instructed
by the solicitor to Hounslow London Borough Council) represented the
respondents.
Giving
judgment, LORD DONALDSON OF LYMINGTON MR said: This is an appeal from a
judgment of Judge Edwards, sitting in Brentford County Court, on a preliminary
issue under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954. The issue was whether the
respondent landlords were entitled to oppose the tenant’s application for a new
tenancy of premises known as The Yard, The Ham, Brentford, Middlesex, on the
grounds set out in para (f) of section 30 of the Act. That section
provides as follows:
(1) The grounds on which a landlord may oppose an
application under subsection (1) of section twenty-four of this Act are such of
the following grounds as may be stated in the landlord’s notice under section
twenty-five of this Act or, as the case may be, under subsection (6) of section
twenty-six thereof, that is to say:
. . . (f)
that on the termination of the current tenancy the landlord intends to demolish
or reconstruct the premises comprised in the holding or a substantial part of
those premises or to carry out substantial work of construction on the holding
or part thereof and that he could not reasonably do so without obtaining
possession of the holding;
I turn to the
appellant’s skeleton argument, which very helpfully sets the background in the
following three paragraphs:
1. The tenant
was the lessee of a plot of land in Brentford, Middx, which the landlords, the
local authority, wished to develop. The development was not to be done by the
local authority themselves, but by a company called Tablelodge Ltd. For the
purposes of the development the local authority entered into a building
agreement with Tablelodge Ltd. The building agreement is at pp 69-90 of the
bundle.
2. In essence,
within 60 days of the building agreement becoming ‘unconditional’ Tablelodge
Ltd would pay to the local authority the sum of £400,000 by way of premium;
Tablelodge Ltd would be granted a lease of the land to be developed and
Tablelodge Ltd would then carry out the development works.
3. The
overall development site, and that covered by the planning permission that had
been obtained (pp 64-68 of the bundle), concerned 2 parcels of land, known as
‘site A’ and ‘site B’. Site B is the area of land demised to the appellants.
Immediately next to it is site A which was demised to a Mr Cutbush.
The skeleton
argument later states, quite accurately, of course, that it was common ground
that the matters which the landlord had to prove to the court were accurately
set out in Hill and Redman’s Law of Landlord and Tenant (18th ed) at B
322, which were as follows:
To summarise,
a landlord who is seeking to establish his case under ground (f) would be wise
to ensure:
(1) that, if a corporation, there is a recent and
appropriately worded resolution of the corporation,
(2) that any requisite consents and approvals,
such as planning permission or listed building consent, have been obtained,
(3) that plans and specifications have been
obtained,
(4) that either a building contract has been
entered into for the proposed works or at least that evidence is available that
a contract will be entered into in good time,
(5) that the necessary finance for the project is
or can be made available,
(6) that the project will not be held up by some
impediment such as a tenant of another part of the building who cannot be
removed.
In the
proceedings before the learned judge Mr Mendoza, appearing for the tenant, said
that no issue arose on the Hill and Redman points other than in respect
of 3, 5 and 6. It should, of course, be said, and Mr Mendoza did not argue to
the contrary, that, helpful though these paragraphs are, they do not form part
of the statute. They are merely the distilled wisdom of a large number of
cases where it has been found that these are the points to which attention
should be directed. But the issue is and always will remain whether, upon the
termination of the current tenancy, the landlord intends to demolish or
reconstruct the premises and, when the statute refers to ‘on the termination of
the current tenancy’, of course it does not mean at the instant at which the
tenancy comes to an end, but within a reasonable time thereafter, so that the
work of reconstruction or demolition can be considered to be a continuum with
the termination of the tenancy.
Taking the
three points which were in issue, it was said that the plans and specifications
were not sufficiently advanced. What happened was that outline planning
permission had been obtained, but there were difficulties in going further
because this was a riverside site with various underground works holding up the
river bank, and it was said that there would be problems in bringing forward
detailed specifications and detailed drawings without having possession of the
site in order that surveys might be undertaken. However that may be, the
prospective developers had in fact spent some £70,000 on this project, which
does not, of itself, suggest that this was a case of hope rather than
intention.
The second
point that was taken was that there might be financial problems. Tablelodge
apparently, like many businesses, carried on its business largely with bank
finance and at the time of the hearing the bank’s agreement to advance money to
it on overdraft was about to be reviewed. There was no firm evidence that it
would be renewed. It was a question of taking a view as to what view the bank
itself would be likely to take when the appropriate date was reached.
As to the
third point, it was said that, although Mr Cutbush, as tenant of site A, could
be evicted without difficulty, there were two other occupiers who were claiming
to be subtenants, although their claims were in dispute. It is not, I think,
directly relevant, but we were in fact told by Mr Mendoza that the judge’s view
that there would be no problem in getting rid of those occupiers has been found
to be correct in the event.
The judge, who
heard all the evidence and was able to form a much better view of the true
intentions of the landlord than we can, looking purely at the matter on paper,
summarised the points and said this as to the question of plans and
specifications:
. . . it
seems to me that much of that work could be undertaken straight away. The
developers could not reasonably have been expected to go further under this
heading than they have already done.
That was a
question of fact and degree for him, as it seems to me, and I can see no
grounds for disagreeing. He then said:
As far as 5
is concerned, I am quite satisfied that the £400,000 facility [which would be
needed when the contract became unconditional] will be extended beyond February
[the review date] and that finance for the building works will be obtained from
the bank, or the end users or from other sources.
As far as the
third point was concerned, he said that he was quite satisfied that it would be
possible to get rid of the occupiers, as indeed has been proved to be the case.
This was
essentially a question of fact and degree. It was essentially a matter for the
judge who tried the case to assess the conviction which the evidence carried.
He was convinced of the statutory requirements and, for my part, I can see no
grounds for interfering. Accordingly, I would dismiss the appeal.
NOLAN LJ agreed and did not add anything.
Appeal
dismissed with costs.
