Insolvency — Disclaimer of freehold — Application for vesting order — Whether local authority with interest in local land charges entitled to vesting order
A notice of
disclaimer of the freehold title in a derelict listed building was given by the
trustee in bankruptcy of the registered proprietor in June 1993. Between 1988
and 1991 the applicant local authority entered a number of charges against the
property under the local land charges register in respect of the expenses to
them of works carried out pursuant to dangerous structure notices under the
London Building Acts (Amendment) Act 1939 and the Prevention of Damage by Pests
Act 1949. The applicants applied under section 320(2) of the Insolvency Act
1986 for an order vesting in themselves the freehold title, which they said was
worth £10,000. The title having escheated to the Crown, the first respondents,
Crown Estate Commissioners, had indicated by letters that they had no interest
in the matter. The position was the same in respect of the second respondent
bank, which had a charge on the property to secure £130,000.
and discharged from all estates and interests of the two respondents. The
applicants had an interest in the disclaimed property upon which it was
possible to place a value of £14,781 in respect of their expenses under the
dangerous structure notices. This was protected by the local land charges and
had
freehold interest. In view of the value of the property and the impassive
interest of the respondents, a vesting order in favour of the applicants was
appropriate.
The following
cases are referred to in this report.
Attorney-General
v Parsons [1956] AC 421; [1956] 2 WLR 153;
[1956] 1 All ER 65, HL
Birmingham
Corporation v Baker (1881) 17 ChD 782
County of
London (Devon Road, Poplar) Housing Confirmation Order 1945, In re [1956] 1 WLR 499; [1956] 1 All ER 818; (1956) 6 P&CR 133
Gilmartin,
In re [1989] 1 WLR 513; [1989] 2 All ER 835
Paddington
Borough Council v Finucare [1928] Ch 567
This was an
appeal by the applicants, Hackney London Borough Council, from a decision of Mr
Registrar Scott, who had dismissed the applicants’ application for a vesting
order in respect of property in which the first respondents, Crown Estate
Commissioners, held the freehold and the second respondent, NatWest Bank plc,
had a registered charge.
Becket Bedford
(instructed by the solicitor to Hackney London Borough Council) appeared for
the applicants; the first and second respondents, Crown Estate Commissioners
and National Westminster Bank plc, did not appear and were not represented.
Giving
judgment, Knox J said:
This appeal concerns a property called 185 Stoke Newington Church Street, I
will call it the premises. They form part of the Clissold Park Conservation
Area. They are listed Grade II. They are derelict and an eyesore and have been
for some considerable time. The parties before the court are the
appellants/applicants, Hackney London Borough Council, and two respondents,
neither of which have appeared either below or on this appeal. The first
respondents are the Crown Estate Commissioners, the second is National
Westminster Bank plc. The appeal is an appeal from a decision of Mr Registrar
Scott on August 7 1995 when he refused an application made by the borough
council on July 13 1995. That application was for leave to apply out of time
for an order under the Insolvency Act 1986, section 320 vesting the freehold
interest in the premises in the applicants, the borough council; second, an
order vesting the said freehold interest in the applicants; third, an order
excluding the first respondents, Crown Estate Commissioners, from all interest
in the premises; fourth, an order excluding the second respondent, NatWest
Bank, from all interest in the said land and costs.
In fact,
although the order of the learned registrar recites that neither the applicants
nor the first or second respondents were present or represented before him that
is inaccurate as regards the applicants, who were represented before Mr
Registrar Scott when the matter was argued before him although I understand he
reserved his judgment and no one appeared when judgment was delivered.
The premises
were vested in a registered proprietor, Mr Moishe Rottenberg, in respect of
whom a bankruptcy order was made on June 18 1992. That was followed by a
disclaimer by the trustee in bankruptcy, of which notice was filed on June 22
1993. Hence the interest of the Crown Estate Commissioners, in whose favour
there has been an escheat on the basis that the property no longer has an
owner. The attitude of the Crown Estate Commissioners is to be found in two
letters from them that are in evidence widely spaced in date. The first is dated
November 25 1993 and the material part reads as follows:
I understand
that the above property was formerly in the ownership of Mr Moishe Rottenberg,
a Bankrupt …
Following
disclaimer by the Official Receiver the bare legal estate in the property will
have been deemed to have escheated to the Crown, and dealt with by the Crown
Estate Commissioners.
In accordance
with advice which has been given to them on past occasions the Commissioners do
not propose to take any action which might be construed as an act of possession
with regard to this property, since to do so may incur upon the Crown Estate
future liabilities.
The question
of a sale of Crown Estates’ interest is not, however, out of the question but I
should point out that any such sale would need to be subject to any charges
which may exist over the freehold.
They were
later again approached and they wrote the following letter which is dated May
17 1994:
As stated in
my letter of 25th November 1993, the Crown Estate Commissioners do not propose
to take any action which might be construed as an act of possession with regard
to this property.
The Commissioners
would not therefore oppose an application for an extension of time in which to
apply for a Vesting Order nor would they object to the making of a Compulsory
Purchase Order in respect of the mortgagee’s interest. Such non-objection
should not, however, be taken as consent.
No doubt this
rather passive attitude is not entirely disassociated from such matters as the
decision of the Attorney-General v Parsons [1956] AC 421. The
NatWest Bank, similarly, has not been exactly active. It wrote two letters that
are in evidence before me. The first is dated June 4 1993 and it states, so far
as material:
Whilst the
Bank retains its mortgage over the above-mentioned property, we do not intend
to take further action and would not be prepared to become involved in meetings
concerning the future of the property.
We trust you
will take matters forward as you see fit.
The second
letter that has been written on behalf of the bank is dated June 13 1994. It
states, so far as material:
Turning now to
the amount outstanding in relation to the Bank’s Charge on the above property,
this stands at approximately £133,000, and will remain due until such time as a
disposition of the mortgaged property takes place, by whatever means.
We do not
intend taking any action at all in this matter, and merely leave you to take
matters forward as you see fit.
There is thus
an attitude of passive resistance on the part of the respondents and it has to
be said the evidence reveals something short of strenuous activities on the
part of the borough council which, from the dates that I have already given,
took another year before making the application that came before the registrar.
So far as the
evidence regarding the premises and their present condition is concerned, it
will suffice for me to say that there is an affidavit before me from Mr Harding
who is a member of a planning division of the directorate of environmental
services of the borough council. He describes the property as presently
derelict. There are exhibited some photographs that more than bear that out.
There is very little left of the property. There are side walls and there is a
back wall and there is a hoarding at the front. The roof and the upper floors
have completely disappeared and it really can only be described as a ruin. So
far as the rights of the borough council in relation to the property are
concerned, Mr Harding in that affidavit, sworn on May 23 1995, states in para
5:
The Council
has an interest in the Property. He of course is referring to what I am calling
the premises as the property. On 5 separate occasions between 1988 and 1991 the
Council had cause to register charges under the Local Land Charges Register in
respect of works carried out pursuant to Dangerous Structure Notices under the
London Building Acts (Amendment) Act 1939 and the Prevention of Damage by Pests
Act 1949.
There are
exhibited the results of a search in the Local Land Charges Register. They
reveal a registration on December 3 1991 of costs and expenses of work carried
out pursuant to section 4 of the Prevention of Damage by Pests Act 1949, a
registration on October 16 1991 which, for some reason, was reissued the same
day but I assume this is all one notice. It is described as ‘Costs and Expenses
of Dangerous Structure Notice’, pursuant to the London Building Acts
(Amendment) Act 1939 and supporting legislation.
There is also
a registration on September 21 1989, ‘Costs and Expenses of Dangerous Structure
Pursuant to London Building Acts’. There is also on September 5 1989 a
registration of ‘Costs and Expenses of a Dangerous Structure’ notice dated
August 24 1989 pursuant to the London Building Acts and, finally, on June 6
1988 there is a registration of ‘Costs and Expenses of Dangerous Structure’,
pursuant to London Building Acts (Amendment) Act 1939 and supporting
legislation.
Before the
bankruptcy occurred Mr Rottenberg had been written to by the borough council to
threaten him with a compulsory purchase if he did not remedy the acute
disrepair of the premises which even then existed. I need not read that in any
detail but it shows that the council were seeking to procure a solution to the
problem posed by the dereliction of this listed building. It also shows that Mr
Rottenberg was reminded in the last paragraph of any significance in that letter
of the existence of those charges that I have just listed. The paragraph reads:
Finally, may
I advise you that the charges registered for carrying out emergency works by
Council Contractors remain outstanding and will be recouped from you, if
necessary through further legal action.
There was no
notice taken of that or any other threats and the dereliction has continued to
date. The evidence regarding the present state of the building also includes an
affidavit from a Mr Hugh Thomas, who is senior valuer in the council’s valuer’s
division, and he is an associate member of the RICS. He states this among other
things:
The Property
is currently valued at £10,000 and this figure does not take account of the
Bank’s charge of £130,000. The costs alone of reinstating the Property to its
former condition will exceed its re-sale value. However despite this deficit
the Property has in my opinion a value of £10,000. If the cost of discharging
the Bank’s Charge were to be taken into account the Property would have a massive
negative value and it will be uneconomic for any developer to take on the
Property.
He also gives
evidence of the existence of some individuals who are expressing interest in
proceeding with the required refurbishment and he states his belief that such
individuals would be likely to offer a small sum to the council to enable them
to undertake the refurbishment of the property. He adds the fairly obvious
proposition that if they were required to discharge the bank charge their
interest would evaporate. No doubt in fact the bank’s charge, which was put at
£133,000 over a year ago, has significantly increased in amount.
The decision
under appeal proceeded on the footing that the effective application made by
the borough council was under Insolvency Act 1986, section 320(2)(b). I
will read the relevant parts of the section. Subsection (1):
This section
and the next apply where the trustee has disclaimed property under section 315.
It is quite
clear that that applies because there was a disclaimer, as I have already
mentioned, of the premises some little while ago and, clearly, section 320
applies in principle.
(2) An
application may be made to the court under this section by —
(a)
any person who claims an interest in the disclaimed property,
(b)
any person who is under any liability in respect of the disclaimed property,
not being a liability discharged by the disclaimer, or
(c)
where the disclaimed property is property in a dwelling house, any person who at
the time when the bankruptcy petition was presented was in occupation of or
entitled to occupy the dwelling house.
Subsection (c)
is obviously wholly irrelevant.
(3) Subject
as follows in this section and the next, the court may, on an application under
this section, make an order on such terms as it thinks fit for the vesting of
the disclaimed property in, or for its delivery to —
(a) a
person entitled to it or a trustee for such a person,
(b) a
person subject to such a liability as is mentioned in subsection (2)(b)
or a trustee for such a person, or
(c)
where the disclaimed property is property in a dwelling house, any person who
at the time when the bankruptcy petition was presented was in occupation of or
entitled to occupy the dwelling house.
The learned
registrar described the circumstances regarding the premises:
In these
difficult circumstances with neither the Commissioners nor the Bank being
prepared to take any step or to consent to any step apart from the possibility
of a voluntary sale by the Crown to the Council, the Council has instituted the
present application which seeks (1) leave to apply out of time for a vesting
order (2) a vesting order as regards the freehold interest (3) an order
excluding the Crown from all interest in the land and (4) an order excluding
the bank from all interest in the land. Under section 320(3) of the Insolvency
Act 1986 the court may on such terms as it thinks fit make a vesting order in
respect of disclaimed property. There are three classes of persons in whose favour
a vesting order may be made but the only class into which the Council may fall
is class B, that is a person under any liability in respect of the disclaimed
property, not being a liability discharged by the disclaimer. The Council
claims to be under such liabilities.
Mr Registrar
Scott implicitly held that the borough council had no interest in the
disclaimed property. If that is not a correct view then there clearly was an
error of law such as to entitle an appellate court to intervene, notwithstanding
that the appellate jurisdiction of this court under section 375(2) of the
Insolvency Act is by way of true appeal and not by way of rehearing. Mr Becket
Bedford sought to persuade me that the decision to that effect, In re
Gilmartin [1989] 1 WLR 513, which has been followed on numerous occasions,
should be distinguished from this appeal but I am quite unpersuaded that there
is any difference in principle between an appeal from a bankruptcy order, which
is what In re Gilmartin was, and the case now before me of an appeal
from a registrar’s decision under section 320 of the Insolvency Act. They both
come under section 375(2) of the Insolvency Act and under insolvency rule
7.48(2).
The question
therefore arises whether the borough council was a person which claimed an
interest in the disclaimed property. That is of course literally true because
that is precisely what Mr Harding said in para 5 of his affidavit which I have
read. One clearly has to go further and see first whether that claim has any
substance and whether the court has discretion to make a vesting order of a
disclaimed property in their favour under section 320(3)(a) as a person
entitled to it. The ‘it’ grammatically refers to the disclaimed property. That
is made somewhat clearer in the earlier version of this legislation which is
section 54(6) of the Bankruptcy Act 1914, which section 320, along with section
321, substantially replaces. That subsection (6) reads:
The court
may, on application by any person either claiming any interest in any disclaimed
property or under any liability not discharged by this Act in respect of any
disclaimed property, and on hearing such persons as it thinks fit, make an
order for the vesting of the property in or delivery thereof to any person
entitled thereto, or to whom it may seem just that the same shall be delivered
by way of compensation for such liability as aforesaid, or a trustee for him,
and on such terms as the court thinks just …
I need not
read the rest of it. What has to be shown, in my judgment, is that the
claimant: (a) has an interest in the disclaimed property; and (b) is entitled
to obtain the disclaimed property under a vesting order. In effect, this
involves the court being satisfied that there is no competing interest with
priority to the claimant’s interest.
I turn
therefore to look at what is claimed to be the borough council’s interest. So
far as the dangerous structure notices are concerned, and the registration of
the local land charges in respect thereof, the relevant legislation is section
70 of the London Building Acts (Amendment) Act 1939. Subsection (1) reads:
Where [the
local authority] have incurred any expenses in respect of any dangerous or
neglected structure and have not been paid or have not recovered those expenses
it shall notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any Act be lawful for a
court of summary jurisdiction on complaint by [the local authority] within
twelve months after the date of the demand for the payment of the said expenses
to make an order fixing the amount of the said expenses and the costs of the
proceedings before the said court and directing that no part of the land upon
which the dangerous or neglected structure was or is situate shall be built
upon or that no part of the dangerous or neglected structure if repaired or
rebuilt shall be let for occupation until after payment to [the local
authority] of the said amount and thereupon no part of the said land shall be
built upon and no part of the dangerous or neglected structure so repaired or
rebuilt shall be let for occupation until payment to [the local authority] of
the said amount.
(2)(a)
Section 15 of the Land Charges Act 1925 shall apply to orders made under
subsection (1) of this section …
(b)
For the purpose of enforcing any such charge arising out of an order made after
the commencement of this Act [the local authority] shall have all the same
powers and remedies under the Law of Property Act 1925 and
accepting surrenders of leases and of appointing a receiver.
During the
course of argument I referred Mr Bedford to the decision In re County of
London (Devon Road, Poplar) Housing Confirmation Order 1945 [1956] 1 WLR
499. The facts are conveniently stated in the headnote:
In 1940
certain property in the Metropolitan Borough of Poplar was in a dangerous state
of disrepair, and under powers conferred by the London Buildings Acts
(Amendment) Act, 1939, the London County Council repaired the property. In 1941
the property was totally destroyed by enemy action and qualified for a value
payment under the War Damage Act, 1943, which was subsequently fixed by the War
Damage Commission at £3,735. In 1943 the London County Council obtained orders
under section 70 of the London Building Acts (Amendment) Act, 1939, fixing the
cost of repairs which the council were entitled to recover at £207 7s 11d, and
directing that no part of the property, if repaired or rebuilt, should be let
for occupation until after payment to the council of this sum. These orders
were duly registered as local land charges.
In 1944 the
council made a compulsory purchase order acquiring the property, and this order
was subsequently confirmed by the Minister. In 1945 the council served a notice
to treat on the respondent who claimed to be at all material times the owner of
the property. The respondent failed or neglected to prove his title to the
property and accordingly in 1955 the council paid compensation moneys of £3,735
into court under section 76 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, and
vested the land in itself under section 77 of this Act. The council now claimed
payment out of court of the sum of £207 7s 11d in respect of the cost of
repairs
They succeeded
in that claim but in the course of it Upjohn J expressed doubts about the
efficacy of section 70 of the London Building Acts (Amendment) Act 1939 in
relation to the creation of a charge. He read the section, and I need not
repeat it, and went on at p502:
It is
unfortunate that, unlike sections in earlier comparable Acts — for example,
section 257 of the Public Health Act, 1875, and section 13 of the Private
Street Works Act, 1892 — subsection (1) imposes no charge in express terms upon
the property enabling the council to recover the expenses incurred as though it
was a mortgagee for that amount.
Subsection 2(b)
of section 70 appears to proceed upon the footing that registration under the
Land Charges Act, 1925, puts the council in the position of a mortgagee, but it
is important to observe that the subsection in itself created no charge. If the
section proceeds upon an erroneous view of the law it cannot be construed
otherwise than in its ordinary meaning so as to attain the result which it is
thought was achieved by registration under the Land Charges Act; if the view be
truly erroneous the section has misfired …
He cited
authorities for that view of the law. Going on he stated:
The Land
Charges Act can only operate to impose a charge if the last paragraph of
section 15(1), a paragraph inserted by the Law of Property Act (Amendment) Act,
1926, does so.
That paragraph
read:
For the
purposes of this section any sum which is recoverable by a local authority
under any of the Acts aforesaid from successive owners or occupiers of the
property in respect of which the sum is recoverable shall, whether such sum is
expressed to be a charge on the property or not, be deemed to be a charge.
It only
creates a charge if successive owners are liable, and section 66 of the Act of
1939 only provides that the expenses incurred shall be paid ‘by the owner of
the structure’. I am not convinced that that section imposes on successive
owners any obligation to pay, though no doubt subsequent owners will do so
where the charge has been registered as the price of being permitted to develop
the land.
Whatever my
doubts may be as to whether section 70 in fact achieves its object of
conferring a charge enabling the chargee to exercise all the powers of a
mortgagee to recover the expenses incurred, there can be no doubt that the
council, having registered their charge, had a good equitable charge in the
nature of a restrictive covenant enabling it to prevent any letting of any
building rebuilt on the site until the amount of the expenses and costs is
paid.
It is clear,
in my view, that in enacting section 70(2)(b), parliament took the view
that section 70(1) and (2)(ii)(a) did create a charge. Upjohn J’s doubts
were strictly obiter because he did not have to go further than find
that there was an equitable interest by way of restrictive covenant vested in
the local authority in order to decide the issue before him. That was the
extent to which the parties before the court, on the one hand the local
authority which had incurred expenses in dangerous structure works, and, on the
other hand, the owner of the property were entitled to payment out of court of
the moneys that had been paid in on the compulsory purchase. The provision
which Upjohn J applied in deciding as he did that the local authority were
entitled to payment out of the dangerous structure expenses was section 78 of
the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845. That reads as follows:
Upon the
application … of any party making claim to the money so … deposited as last
aforesaid, or any part thereof … the said Court of Chancery … may … order
distribution of the money according to the respective estates, titles, or
interests of the parties making claim to such money or lands, or any part
thereof, and … may make such other order in the premises as to such court shall
seem fit.
It follows
that Upjohn J took the view that the local authority’s rights, to use a neutral
expression, amounted to an estate, title or interest. He said at p504 having
read section 78:
That section
confers a wide discretion upon the court in ordering payment out. The facts are
clear. The value of the interest of the respondent which was acquired by the
council was £3,528, and too much by £207 has mistakenly been paid into court.
That sum was properly expended by the council pursuant to its statutory powers
and duties. It is recoverable as a debt from the respondent though that right
may now be statute-barred. The difficulty has arisen solely because of the
neglect or failure of the respondent to make a title. No question could have
arisen if he had made title, and the matter completed in 1945.
In those
circumstances he decided that the discretion could only be exercised in one
way. It does seem to me to follow that he took the view that the council’s
interest in respect of the £207 did amount to an estate, title or interest in
the land or the moneys representing it. It therefore seems to me that on a
careful examination this decision affords more support than obstacle to the
acceptance of the view that the borough council did have an interest in the
disclaimed property. Whether or not it is properly described as a charge it is,
in my view, an interest upon which it is possible to place a value. That deals
with the status of the borough council’s rights in relation to dangerous
structure expenses. The situation is much clearer in relation to the local land
charges registered under the Prevention of Damage by Pests Act 1949. Section
7(2) of that Act reads:
Sections two
hundred and ninety-one, … and two hundred and ninety-four of the Public Health
Act 1936 (which provide respectively for charging on the premises expenses
recoverable under that Act from the owner, … and for limiting the liability for
expenses recoverable under that Act of owners receiving rent as agent or
trustee) shall so far as applicable apply to expenses recoverable by a local
authority under section five or section six of this Act as they apply to
expenses recoverable under that Act by a local authority within the meaning of
that Act.
Section 291 of
the Public Health Act 1936 is quite specific in creating a charge in those
circumstances. It reads:
(1) Where a
local authority have incurred expenses for the repayment of which the owner of
the premises in respect of which the expenses were incurred is liable, either
under this Act or under any enactment repealed thereby, or by agreement with
the authority, those expenses, together with interest from the date of service
of a demand for the expenses, may be recovered by the authority from the person
who is the owner of the premises at the date when the works are completed, or,
if he has ceased to be the owner of the premises before the date when a demand
for the expenses is served, either from him or from the person who is the owner
at the date when the demand is served, and, as from the date of the completion
of the works, the expenses and interest accrued due thereon shall, until
recovered, be a charge on the premises and on all estates and interest therein.
This inclusion
of those latter words ‘and on all estates and interest therein’ gave effect to
a series of decisions on similar legislation
291(1) of the Public Health Act 1936, where it was held that the charge imposed
for unpaid expenses incurred by a local authority was a charge not only on the
premises, which was alone mentioned in the Act, but also on all estates and
interest in it. I was referred to Paddington Borough Council v Finucare
[1928] Ch 567 where Russell J came to that conclusion in relation to section 3
of the Housing Act 1925. At p573 he quoted section 257 of the Public Health Act
1875 and at p574 he quoted in that context what the Master of the Rolls, Sir
George Jessel, had said in an earlier case of Birmingham Corporation v Baker
(1881) 17 ChD 782 where he said:
The works in
question are an improvement to the property, not to the interest of any
particular owner of the property, but of every owner of the house; and
consequently there is no good reason in the world why there should not be a
charge on the property, that is, on the respective interest of every owner of
the property according to the value of his ownership.
A little later
he said:
If there be a
charge on the houses it is a charge on the total ownership … on the
proprietorship; not on any particular section or portion of the proprietorship,
but on the whole. In an ordinary case, in the absence of any covenants, it
would be borne by every proprietor in proportion to his interest in the house.
That reasoning
is given statutory force by the Public Health Act 1936, section 291, which is
incorporated in the Prevention of Damage by Pests Act 1949, section 7, and is
therefore directly applicable to the charge to which, on the evidence, the
borough council are entitled. There is evidence before me which, in the quite
exceptional circumstances of this case, I admitted on the hearing of this
appeal, that the amount of that charge under the Prevention of Damage by Pests
Act 1949 including an administration fee of 15% was £2,974.38. I do not have
any evidence whether the amount of the charge under the Act includes that
administration fee and I propose in the interests of safety to discount that
15% and that leaves £2,586.42.
The logic
behind the reasoning in the authorities leading up to Paddington Borough
Council v Finucare above seems to me just as applicable to the
borough council’s rights under the dangerous structure notices where, whether
or not it is properly described as a charge, there are rights exercisable in
respect of the property into whosoever’s hands it passes. The figure in
evidence on that score is £14,024.18 including the administration fee which
again, because I do not have precise evidence whether or not it was included in
the orders obtained under the London Building Acts (Amendment) Act, I propose
to discount, leaving £12,194.94.
That means
that there are the following interests in the premises which rank in the
following order. First, the borough council’s rights under the London Building
Acts (Amendment) Act and the Prevention of Damage by Pests Act £12,194.94, plus
£2,586.42, which adds up to £14,781.36. Second, the NatWest Bank plc charge,
which was £133,000 over a year ago, and is no doubt higher. Third, the freehold
vested in the Crown Estates Commissioners. The premises are on the evidence
only worth £10,000 as they now stand. In the light of the totally impassive
attitude adopted by the two respondents and the unchallenged evidence as to the
value of the property I do think it fit to make a vesting order in favour of
the borough council, freed and discharged from all estates and interests of the
Crown Estate Commissioners and NatWest Bank. I am therefore departing in
principle from the approach of the learned registrar who did not give express
consideration to section 320(2)(a) and (3)(a) and it follows that
his decision cannot stand and the appeal will be allowed.
I should,
however, add that in all other respects I was quite unpersuaded that his
decision was flawed although Mr Bedford tried to persuade me that it was. I
need not, in the circumstances, deal with that aspect of the matter which turns
on section 320(2)(b) and 3(b).
Finally, I
should say that had NatWest Bank taken anything other than a supine attitude in
this matter I would have been minded to afford it an opportunity of applying
for and taking a vesting order in its favour subject to the local land charges
registered in favour of the borough council. Since on the figures this would
have involved the NatWest Bank acquiring an asset worth £10,000, with
liabilities worth a minimum of £14,781, it seemed to me clear that it would not
have wanted to avail itself of such an option. In the interests of saving costs
I have decided against giving it any such option. There will be no order for
costs.
