Planning permission — Material factors — Loss of amenities — Claimant wishing to install all-weather surface on site of existing grass tennis court — Application for planning permission refused — Planning inspector dismissing appeal against refusal — Whether inspector failed properly to consider whether proposed work would significantly reduce amenities of adjoining residents — Section 288 of Town and Country Planning Act 1990 — Claim dismissed
The claimant acquired Meriden Hall, an imposing mansion situated in Coventry, for use as its headquarters. In order to enhance recreational facilities for staff, the claimant applied for planning permission to install a new all-weather surface to an old existing tennis court. Some of the residents of adjoining properties objected to the proposal since the tennis court was situated only about 4m from the boundary with their back gardens. The gardens were between 22m and 31m deep, and were the principal amenity spaces for the residents’ dwellings. Despite the recommendation of its planning officer, the council refused to grant planning permission. The claimant appealed.
The planning inspector found that: (i) although there was no express provision for spectators, it would be possible for several people to stand on a bank adjoining the court; and (ii) an all-weather surface would allow more intense use of the court. The inspector concluded that the proposed development would lead to the standard of amenity enjoyed at a number of the residents’ dwellings being reduced, and he dismissed the claimant’s appeal.
The claimant challenged the inspector’s decision under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. It argued that the inspector had failed properly to consider: (i) the grant of conditional permission to limit the hours of use; (ii) existing use rights as a material factor; and (iii) equivalent disturbance; which had resulted in him carrying out a false balancing exercise.
Held: The claim was dismissed.
1. The inspector expressly explained that a condition should only be imposed if it were reasonable. In this case, he considered that a condition would only satisfy the test of reasonableness if it allowed use of the court outside conventional working hours and at weekends. That was understandable as the court was intended to be for use by employees, who presumably were not being paid to play tennis during normal working hours. It was the period outside normal working hours that the inspector identified as being of chief concern in terms of affecting residents’ quiet enjoyment of their gardens. He expressly considered the possibility of a conditional permission, and his reasons for rejecting that possibility were clear and concise.
2. Despite there being some question whether there had ever been a tennis court where the works were proposed, the inspector had no doubt, having viewed the site, that the land had been levelled to create a grass court. He had expressly noted that the fact that the court might have been little used for 50 years or more did not prevent its being brought back into regular use. Further, he noted that if permission were granted, the hours of use could be limited by condition, whereas reviving the present court would enable it to be played on at any time. However, the inspector took the view that the necessary condition would not be reasonable and that, even if a condition were imposed, the all-weather surface would allow more intensive use to be made of the court: it was difficult to see why the surface had been proposed if that were not the case.
3. The inspector clearly considered fairly the claimant’s proposition that four people playing tennis would create a similar disturbance to that of a family in a garden. He was entitled to take into account the possibility of spectators increasing the disturbance, and it was in having regard to the overall picture that the inspector had concluded that the residents’ standard of amenity would be significantly reduced.
4. Another inspector might have been more sympathetic, but this one agreed with the councillors rather than the planning officer and there had been no error of law.
Andrew Fraser-Urquhart (instructed by Hall Reynolds, of Bidford-on-Avon) appeared for the claimant; Paul Brown (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared for the first defendant; the second defendants did not appear and were not represented.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister
