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Kensington and Chelsea Royal London Borough Council v Khan and another

Statutory charge — Limitation — Claimants bringing proceedings to recover possession of land pursuant to statutory charges — Judge finding action brought within limitation period and allowing claim — Defendants appealing on ground claim out of time — Date cause of action accruing — Section 37 of Housing Act 1957 — Section 64 of Housing Act 1964 — Section 15 of Limitation Act 1980 — Appeal dismissed

The defendants failed to carry out works to their premises as required by notices served upon them by the claimants. The claimants then carried out the works themselves. Upon completion, they obtained statutory charges over the premises to secure their expenses resulting from the works, plus interest, by operation of the Housing Act 1957 and the Housing Act 1961, as amended by the Housing Act 1964.

On 10 July 1987 the claimants served demands on the defendants for payment of the sums owed. Section 64(4) of the 1964 Act and section 37 of the 1957 Act provided that such demands did not become operative until 21 days after service. By section 64(3) of the 1964 Act, a statutory charge did not take effect until the demand became operative.

The defendants did not pay, but the claimants did not bring proceedings to recover possession of the land charged until 30 July 1999. The judge found that the claim had been brought within the 12-year limitation period laid down by section 15 of the Limitation Act 1980, since the cause of action to recover the land had not accrued until 21 days after service of the demands for payment. He accordingly allowed the claim.

The defendants appealed. They submitted that the date upon which the cause of action had accrued was the same as for a money claim to recover the expenses, namely the date of completion of the works, and that the claimants’ action was accordingly time-barred.

Held: The appeal was dismissed.

The phrase “takes effect” in section 64(3) of the Housing Act 1964 did not relate purely to enforcement of a charge, but meant that a charge was not fully constituted and created until 21 days after service of a demand. The effect of the 1957 Act was the same in that respect. Although it was possible for a cause of action to accrue at a time when, for procedural reasons, proceedings could not yet be brought in respect of it, the requirement that a demand should become operative before a charge took effect was not purely procedural. It related to the very creation of the charge sought to be enforced: Swansea City Council v Glass (Executor) [1992] 2 All ER 680 distinguished. It followed that no cause of action to recover possession of the land pursuant to the charge could accrue until 21 days after service of the demand. That conclusion was reinforced by the fact that interest on the expenses ran only from that date. The claimants’ action was not statute-barred, and the judge had been right to allow the claim.

Clive Jones (instructed by the solicitor to Kensington and Chelsea Royal London Borough Council) appeared for the claimants; Aditya Sen (instructed by CM Atif & Co) appeared for the defendants.

Sally Dobson, barrister

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