Landlord and tenant –– Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 –– New tenancy agreement –– Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995 –– Construction –– Terms of new tenancy –– Whether terms should provide that on assignment landlord entitled to authorised guarantee agreement or only where reasonable
The claimant tenant applied for a new tenancy under Part II of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954. The tenant held a shop in a centre
Held: The tenant’s application was allowed. By virtue of section 16(3)(b) of the Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995, a landlord’s requirement for an authorised guarantee agreement is valid and enforceable only if it is “lawfully imposed”. Where an assignment requires a landlord’s consent, and the alienation covenant is silent on the specific issue of whether he can demand an authorised guarantee agreement, then the landlord can only refuse consent if it is reasonable to do so: see section 19(1) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1927. Therefore, a landlord can only lawfully impose a condition upon the grant of his lease if that condition is reasonable.
When deciding upon what terms, other than as to the premises, duration or rent, to include in a new tenancy, the court must apply section 35 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954. Authoritative guidance as to the proper approach to adopt when applying section 35 of the 1954 Act is to be found in the decision of O’May v City of London Real Property Co Ltd [1982] 1 EGLR 76. Unless the court otherwise orders, the effect of including a covenant (which both parties agreed should be included) requiring landlord’s consent to an assignment does not entitle the landlord to require an authorised guarantee agreement as of right. He will only be entitled to do so if it is reasonable, unless the court imposes a provision entitling him to it as of right. The words “where reasonable” should be included in the alienation provisions of the new lease.
The following cases are referred to in this report.
Bocardo SA v S&M Hotels Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 17; [1979] 3 All ER 737; (1979) 39 P&CR 287; [1979] 2 EGLR 48; [1979] EGD 500; (1979) 252 EG 59, CA
Cairnplace Ltd v CBL (Property Investment) Co Ltd [1984] 1 WLR 696; [1984] 1 All ER 315; (1984) 47 P&CR 531; [1984] 1 EGLR 69; (1983) 269 EG 542
City of London Corporation v Fell [1994] 1 AC 458; [1993] 3 WLR 1164; [1993] 4 All ER 968; (1993) 92 LGR 1; [1993] 2 EGLR 131; [1993] 49 EG 113, HL
Lewis & Peat Ltd v Regis Property Co Ltd [1970] EGD 481
O’May v City of London Real Property Co Ltd [1983] 2 AC 726; [1982] 2 WLR 407; [1982] 1 All ER 660; (1982) 43 P&CR 351; [1982] 1 EGLR 76; (1982) 261 EG 1185, HL
Smith’s Lease, Re [1951] 1 All ER 346; [1951]1 TLR 254
This was a hearing of an application by the tenant, Wallis Fashion Group Ltd, for the determination of the terms of a new lease to be granted under Part II of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954, to which CGU Life Assurance Ltd was the landlord.
Timothy Dutton (instructed by Denton Wilde Sapte) appeared for the tenant, Wallis Fashion Ltd; Edwin Johnson (instructed by Clifford Chance) represented the landlord, CGU Life Assurance Ltd.
Giving judgment, Neuberger J said:
Introduction
This dispute concerns a narrow issue, namely whether to include two apparently innocuous words in a new tenancy to be granted pursuant to Part II of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 (the 1954 Act). However, it is an issue of potentially more general significance in relation to the terms of the alienation clause in a new tenancy, ordered pursuant to the 1954 Act, where the current lease was granted before the Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995 (the 1995 Act) came into force. It also raises a short point of construction of the 1995 Act.
Facts
CGU Life Assurance Ltd (CGU) is the freehold owner of the Southgate Centre, Bath, which includes at least 18 shop units. These 18 units were subject to tenancies granted for terms of between 20 and 25 years at rack rents in the mid-1970s, all expiring on 23 June 1999. Those leases included covenants by the tenant: (1) not to assign part only of the premises comprised in the lease (the premises) (clause 3.17(d)); (2) not to assign the whole of the premises without obtaining the consent of the landlord (clause 3.17(f)); and (3) not to assign the whole of the premises unless the assignee enters into a covenant with the landlord to observe all the covenants in the lease for its duration (clause 3.17(b)). Before each of the 18 leases reached its contractual term date, the procedure envisaged by sections 24-29 of the 1954 Act was implemented, so that there were 18 applications for new tenancies. One of those applications was made by Wallis Fashion Group Ltd (Wallis), which had been granted a lease of unit 3 for 25 years from 24 June 1974. The 18 applications raised various disputes as to the terms of the new tenancies between CGU and the various tenants, but with the exception of one point raised in the present application, all those disputes have been resolved. Two of the tenants have abandoned their applications to renew, and 15 of them have been granted new tenancies on agreed terms.
Law relating to assignment before and after the 1995 Act
In order to understand the instant dispute, it is necessary to set out the law relating to landlord’s rights under covenants to assign before and after the 1995 Act. In summary, the law before the 1995 Act was as follows. (1) The original tenant was liable on all the tenant’s covenants for the duration of the lease, even after he had assigned. (2) In the case of a lease falling within the 1954 Act, and in the absence of a covenant to the contrary, an original tenant who had assigned the lease was not liable for covenants, in so far as they extended into the continuation term created by section 24 of the 1954 Act: see City of London Corporation v Fell [1994] 1 AC 458*. (3) In the absence of a covenant to the contrary, an assignee was only liable under the lease during the period that the lease was actually vested in him. (4) Where a tenant could only assign subject to the landlord’s consent, there was implied by statute a proviso that such consent was not to be unreasonably withheld: see section 19(1) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1927 (the 1927 Act). (5) The parties could not define what was or was not reasonable: see In re Smith’s Lease [1951] 1 TLR 254. (6) The parties could, however, impose further express conditions on an assignment, such as, in this case, clause 3.17(b): see Bocardo SA v S&M Hotels Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 17†.
* Editor’s note: Also reported at [1993] 2 EGLR 131
† Editor’s note: Also reported at [1979] 2 EGLR 48
In those circumstances, under its current lease (the lease), Wallis was liable throughout the whole contractual term on the tenant’s covenants, whether it had assigned or not. Further, because of clause 3.17(b), an assignee of the lease from Wallis could have been made similarly liable if the landlord had required it. Apart from this, the lease could only be assigned with the landlord’s consent, which was not to be unreasonably withheld. If Wallis had assigned the lease, it would not be liable under the tenant’s covenants beyond 24 June 1999.
The effect of the 1995 Act is as follows. (1) It only applies to tenancies granted after 1 January 1996, so far as relevant for these proceedings: see section 1(1). (2) Once a tenant lawfully assigns the whole of the premises comprised in a tenancy, he is “released from the tenant covenants of the tenancy”: see section 5(2)(b). Those covenants are, effectively, the various covenants imposed on the tenant by the tenancy. (3) Section 25 contains fairly wide anti-avoidance provisions. (4) Section 16 deals with what are known as authorised guarantee agreements (AGAs). Sections 16(1) to 16(3) provide as follows:
16.––(1) Where on an assignment a tenant is to any extent released from a tenant covenant of a tenancy by virtue of this Act (“the relevant covenant”), nothing in this Act (and in particular section 25) shall preclude him from entering into an authorised guarantee agreement with respect to the performance of that covenant by the assignee.
(2) For the purposes of this section an agreement is an authorised guarantee agreement if ––
(a) under it the tenant guarantees the performance of the relevant covenant to any extent by the assignee; and
(b) it is entered into in the circumstances set out in subsection (3); and
(c) its provisions conform with subsections (4) and (5).
(3) those circumstances are as follows ––
(a) by virtue of a covenant against assignment (whether absolute or qualified) the assignment cannot be effected without the consent of the landlord under the tenancy or some other person;
(b) any such consent is given subject to a condition (lawfully imposed) that the tenant is to enter into an agreement guaranteeing the performance of the covenant by the assignee; and
(c) the agreement is entered into by the tenant in pursuance of that condition.
Section 16(4) specifically provides what an AGA cannot contain, and section 16 sets out what an AGA may contain.
(5) Section 19(1) of the 1927 Act, to which I have already referred, is extended further by sections (1A) to (1E). I only need refer to the new section 19(1A), which provides:
Where the landlord and the tenant under a qualifying lease have entered into an agreement specifying for the purposes of this subsection ––
(a) any circumstances in which the landlord may withhold his licence or consent to an assignment of the demised premises or any part of them, or
(b) any conditions subject to which any such licence or consent may be granted,
then the landlord ––
(i) shall not be regarded as unreasonably withholding his licence or consent to any such assignment if he withholds it on the ground (and it is the case) that any such circumstances exist, and
(ii) if he gives any such licence or consent subject to any such conditions, shall not be regarded as giving it subject to unreasonable conditions;
and section 1 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1988 (qualified duty to consent to assignment etc.) shall have effect subject to the provisions of this subsection.
As the present lease was granted in 1974, the 1995 Act has no relevant application to it. However, the new tenancy (the tenancy) to be granted to Wallis in these proceedings will obviously be granted after 1 January 1996, and therefore will be subject to the 1995 Act.
Issue in the present case
The alienation covenant in the tenancy is the subject of dispute, to a limited extent. It is to be found in para 17 of schedule 3 to the tenancy. The parties are agreed as to para 17(a), which is a covenant against assignment of part. Para 17(b) is in these terms:
For the purposes of s19(1)(a) of the 1927 Act it is agreed that the landlord may withhold its consent to an assignment of the whole of the demised premises in the following circumstances…
Those circumstances are: a certain class of non-resident assignee; a company and a member of a group that has certain qualities; and if there are arrears of rent.
So far as para 17(c) is concerned, Wallis proposes it should be in these terms:
For the purpose of s19(1)(a) of the 1927 Act it is further agreed that any consent of the landlord to an assignment of the whole of the demised premises may be subject to a condition that (where reasonable) the tenant shall prior to the proposed assignment being completed execute and deliver to the landlord a deed which shall be prepared by the landlord’s solicitors containing covenants on the part of the tenant in the form of those contained in the seventh schedule therein defined as the present tenant.
[Emphasis added.]
The dispute between the parties is whether the words I have emphasised, “where reasonable”, should be included, as Wallis contends, or should not be included, as CGU contends, in the tenancy.
Para 17(d) is an agreed provision that effectively provides that the tenant cannot assign without the consent of the landlord, and, as was the position and remains the position, such consent cannot be unreasonably withheld by virtue of section 19(1) of the 1927 Act.
Para 17(c) could ideally have been better drafted, but its effect is agreed between the parties as follows. On Wallis’s construction, on an assignment by the tenant for the time being, the landlord can require an AGA in the form agreed in the seventh schedule, but only if it is reasonable to do so. On CGU’s construction, an AGA can be required in such circumstances as an automatic matter of right.
Dispute on the 1995 Act
Before turning to the central issue, it is necessary to resolve a dispute as to the effect of the 1995 Act, namely whether, in the absence of a provision such as para 17(c), a landlord, whose consent cannot be unreasonably withheld to an assignment, is automatically entitled to require an AGA when his consent to an assignment is sought. Mr Timothy Dutton, who appears on behalf of Wallis, contends that, in such a case, a landlord can require an AGA as a condition of his consent to an assignment only if it is reasonable to do so. Mr Edwin Johnson, who represents CGU, argues that a landlord would be entitled to demand an AGA as a right on any assignment.
In my judgment, Mr Dutton’s submission is correct. By virtue of section 16(3)(b) of the 1995 Act, a landlord’s requirement for an AGA is valid and enforceable only if it is a requirement that is “lawfully imposed”. Where an assignment requires the landlord’s consent, and the alienation covenant is silent on the specific issue of whether or not he can demand an AGA, then the landlord can only refuse consent if it is reasonable to do so: see section 19(1) of the 1927 Act. In those circumstances, it seems to me that it follows that he can only impose a condition upon the grant of his consent if that condition is reasonable. If it is reasonable to demand an AGA as a condition of his consent, then that demand is lawfully imposed. If it is unreasonable to make such a demand, then it is not lawfully imposed. Mr Johnson argues that the words “lawfully imposed” were included in section 16(3)(b) of the 1995 Act to emphasise that the terms of the AGA that the landlord demands must satisfy the terms of sections 16(4) and 16(5). However, that does not seem to me to accord with the natural meaning of the expression “lawfully imposed”. Further, such a construction would mean that the expression really adds nothing to what is already in section 16(2) of the 1995 Act.
In light of this conclusion, it might be thought that, on the face of it, if Wallis’s form of para 17(c) is adopted, it adds nothing to the landlord’s rights. Subject to one point, that is correct. What para 17(c) does, on Wallis’s proposal, is to provide, in advance, for the form of AGA that the landlord can demand, always assuming that it is reasonable for him to do so. It therefore, very sensibly, removes any room for argument as to the terms of the AGA, if one could be required by the landlord.
General approach under the 1995 Act
When deciding what terms, other than as to the premises, duration or rent, to include in a new tenancy, the court must apply section 35 of the 1954 Act. This provides:
35.––(1) The terms of a tenancy granted by order of the court under this Part of this Act (other than terms as to the duration thereof and as to the rent payable thereunder) shall be such as may be agreed between the landlord and the tenant or as, in default of such agreement, may be determined by the court; and in determining those terms the court shall have regard to the terms of the current tenancy and to all relevant circumstances.
(2) In subsection (1) of this section the reference to all relevant circumstances includes (without prejudice to the generality of that reference) a reference to the operation of the provisions of the Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995.
Authoritative guidance as to the proper approach to adopt when applying section 35 of the 1954 Act, albeit at a time when it did not contain subsection (2), is to be found in the decision of the House of
(1) It is clear from section 34…
[I interpose that this is the section concerned with the fixing of the rent under the new tenancy]:
that, in contrast to the enactments relating to residential property, Parliament did not intend, apart from certain limitations to protect the tenant from the operation of market forces in the determination of rent. (2) In contrast to the determination of rent, it is the court and not the market forces which, with one vital qualification, has an almost complete discretion as to the other terms of the tenancy… And (3) in deciding the terms of the new tenancy, as to which its discretion is otherwise not expressly fettered, the court must start by “having regard to” the terms of the current tenancy, which ex hypothesi must either have been originally the subject of agreement between the parties, or themselves the result of a previous determination by the court in earlier proceedings for renewal…
* Editor’s note: Also reported at [1982] 1 EGLR 76
In relation to departing from the terms of the current lease when fixing the terms of the new tenancy, Lord Hailsham said at p741D:
There must, in my view, be a good reason based in the absence of agreement on essential fairness for the court to impose a new term not in the current lease by either party on the other against his will. Any other conclusion would in my view be inconsistent with the terms of the section. But, subject to this, the discretion of the court is of the widest possible kind, having regard to the almost infinitely varying circumstances of individual leases, properties, businesses and parties involved in business tenancies all over the country…
In his speech, Lord Wilberforce perhaps placed rather more weight on market forces. He said at p747C:
I accept therefore the landlord’s contention that, in principle, tenants are not to be protected from market forces; as regards rent, indeed, this is expressly laid down in section 34… The same underlying principle ought to be applied to the determination of other terms in the new lease, subject, however, to the guidelines laid down in section 35 –– as to which see below.
A little later, at p747E-G, he said:
The words “have regard to” are elastic: they compel something between an obligation to reproduce existing terms and an unfettered right to substitute others. They impose an onus upon a party seeking to introduce new, or substituted, or modified terms, to justify the change, with reasons appearing sufficient to the court…
If such reasons are shown, then the court, applying the words “all relevant circumstances”, may consider giving effect to them: there is certainly no intention shown to freeze… the terms of the lease. In some cases, especially where the lease is an old one, many of its terms may be out of date, or unsuitable in relation to the new term to be granted. If so or for other good reasons shown, the court has power to order a modification by changing the existing term or introducing a new one…
The other three members of the House of Lords agreed with both Lord Hailsham and Lord Wilberforce.
CGU’s case
On behalf of CGU, in supporting its formulation of para 17(c), and, in particular, the omission of the words “where reasonable”, Mr Johnson relies essentially on three factors. First, there is the fact that, even as proposed by CGU, the alienation provisions in the tenancy will be more generous to the tenant, and less beneficial to the landlord, than under the lease, and the court should lean in favour of following the terms of the current lease: see section 35(1) and O’May. Second, a reasonableness requirement can, even with the best will in the world on both sides, lead to uncertainty, and to costly and time-consuming disputes. Third, there is the fact that of the other 15 tenants who have agreed new tenancies in the Southgate Centre, 14 have consented to the inclusion of a para 17(c) in the form contended for by CGU. The 15th has the form suggested by Wallis, but CGU say, and I accept, that that was due to an oversight on the part of CGU or its solicitor. Accordingly, says Mr Johnson, this suggests that CGU’s formulation accords with what happens in the market, and it means that, unless CGU succeeds here, it will have leases of retail properties in the same centre on different terms, which does not accord with good estate management.
Discussion
Each of the three arguments has force, and they have even greater force when taken together, but I have reached the conclusion that Wallis’s formulation is to be preferred. So far as CGU’s first reason is concerned, the 1995 Act has changed the law substantially. In particular, it prevents a landlord from enjoying the sort of rights that he had under the old law, once the tenant assigns the lease. In these circumstances, I do not think that the terms of section 35 of the 1954 Act, as interpreted in O’May, entitle the landlord to say that, on a renewal under the 1954 Act, he should be given as generous terms as the 1995 Act provides. The 1995 Act represents a sea change in the law relating to a tenant’s liability after he assigns the lease, and it also alters the law relating to the landlord’s power to impose terms on assigning the lease. It does not merely represent a sea change in what had been common practice, but in what a landlord can lawfully require, both in terms of what is to be included in the lease initially and what he can demand upon an assignment.
In this connection, I think some assistance can be derived from the decision of the Court of Appeal, also concerning a renewal of a lease under the 1954 Act, in Cairnplace Ltd v CBL (Property Investment) Co Ltd [1984] 1 WLR 696*. The original lease in that case contained, in clause 4(31), a covenant by the tenant that he should pay the landlord the costs of preparing the lease. Applying the approach, as she saw it, as laid down in O’May, the county court judge included such a covenant in the new tenancy. The Court of Appeal held that she was wrong. At p702F, the Court of Appeal quoted section 1 of the Costs of Leases Act 1958, which was in these terms:
Notwithstanding any custom to the contrary, a party to a lease shall, unless the parties thereto agree otherwise in writing, be under no obligation to pay the whole or any part of any other party’s solicitors’ costs of the lease.
* Editor’s note: Also reported at [1984] 1 EGLR 69
The court then said, at p702H onwards:
In 1954 there was a custom that the tenant should pay the landlord’s costs of preparing a lease which was a practice generally followed by conveyancing solicitors in the absence of express agreement in the agreement for a lease. So when in 1972… (the existing lease) including clause 4(31),… [was granted] the clause was consistent with the general practice, and before the Costs of Leases Act 1958 came into operation there is no doubt that the court had the power to embody it as “another term” in the new lease pursuant to section 35 of the Act of 1954. But in 1958 Parliament relieved the tenant of the usual obligation which conveyancing custom and practice had imposed upon tenants. Thereafter it was only if there was express agreement in writing whereby the tenant agreed to pay the landlord’s costs of preparation of the lease that the tenant was under an obligation.
Where Parliament has enacted a later Act designed to relieve tenants of a specific obligation, it is not in our view a correct exercise of judicial discretion to use the wide power conferred upon the court by the general words of section 35 of the Act of 1954 to deprive the tenant of the protection conferred upon him by a later Act dealing specifically with this very obligation. It is perfectly correct to say that section 35 deals with the powers of the court and not with the agreement of a term by the parties. But it does not follow that the court when exercising discretion in determining other terms pursuant to section 35 can fairly and reasonably deprive the tenant of a protection that Parliament conferred upon him in 1958.
A similar approach is to be found in the decision of Stamp J in Lewis & Peat Ltd v Regis Property Co Ltd [1970] EGD 481 at p483, where he trenchantly expressed the view that the 1958 Act “destroyed that custom”.
I accept that the point in issue in those two cases, and the point in the present case, are not entirely equivalent. Although the 1995 Act effectively requires radical surgery to be done to an alienation clause when translating it into a new tenancy, the 1958 Act effectively required
In any event, it is to be borne in mind that CGU is getting benefits in the new tenancy, by virtue of the rewriting of the alienation covenant from the current lease, due to the provisions of the 1995 Act, which it does not enjoy in the current lease. I have in mind, in particular, its absolute right to reject to an assignment on the grounds set out in para 17(a).
Furthermore, under the lease, CGU could only impose a term, as a condition of consenting to an assignment, if it was reasonable. It could therefore be said that Wallis’s formulation more closely reflects the parties’ rights under the lease than CGU’s formulation, which would entitle the landlord to require an AGA as a condition for consent, whether reasonable or not.
So far as Mr Johnson’s second point is concerned, I see the force of the argument that a reasonableness requirement can lead to disputes and to litigation. However, I am not convinced that, in the context of the presently drafted tenancy, a dispute as to the reasonableness of the landlord’s requirement for an AGA would normally be likely to raise a reasonableness debate, unless there was a wider reasonableness debate already on foot, in relation to the proposed assignment. In practice, it seems to me that, at least normally, either the parties will agree all the terms upon which an assignment will take place or they will agree none of them. It is unlikely, but, I accept, possible, that everything would be agreed apart from the reasonableness of the landlord’s requirement for an AGA. But I suspect that such a case would be unusual.
Quite apart from this, it seems to me unattractive for a landlord to contend that he should be entitled to the benefit of a covenant in a tenancy that entitles him to be unreasonable. Furthermore, it is to be borne in mind that, in a covenant of the sort proposed by Wallis, the standard of unreasonableness is not ungenerous to the landlord. In order to show that the landlord’s requirement for an AGA is unreasonable, the tenant will have to show that no reasonable landlord could, in the circumstances, require it.
In these circumstances, both read on its own and in the context of para 17 as a whole, it appears to me that to order that para 17(c) be drafted Wallis’s way, involves striking a fair balance between the interests of the landlord and of the tenant.
Before leaving this second point, it is right to mention that, during argument, it was suggested that the logic of Wallis’s argument on this point might mean that every covenant in a new tenancy granted by the court should be made subject to some sort of reasonableness requirement. I do not think that is a good point. As demonstrated by section 19(1) of the 1927 Act, and, indeed, the great majority of alienation covenants, including those in the lease and in the tenancy, reasonableness has always been a factor that is normally included in connection with the rights of a tenant to assign or underlet. Reasonableness is not a factor that is normally found in other covenants in leases, save in relation to alteration and, less frequently, user.
The third factor Mr Johnson relies on is the fact, as I have mentioned, that with one exception (due to an oversight), the other 16 tenants have agreed para 17(c) in the form for which CGU contends. I accept that that indicates that market forces tend to produce a form of covenant as contended for by CGU, and that is a factor that undoubtedly assists it in the present case, particularly if one follows what Lord Wilberforce, rather than Lord Hailsham, said in O’May. However, while it is a factor that points the other way, it is to be borne in mind that each of the other tenants in the present case may not have regarded this point as one worth holding out for if all other issues were agreed. In the context of another type of dispute, namely as to the value of freeholds under the Leasehold Reform Act 1967, the Lands Tribunal has developed the concept of the “Delaforce effect”, which is occasionally invoked to answer reliance by landlords upon what other tenants have agreed. Many tenants may be prepared to concede a particular point in negotiations because it is not a point of great importance in relation to a particular case, but the landlord is prepared to insist on it, as he has far wider interests.
So far as estate management factors are concerned, I accept that it is mildly more convenient for a landlord to have all leases in a given development on as similar terms as possible. However, particularly in the age of computers, it seems to me unrealistic to suggest that CGU’s records will have any difficulty in coping with the fact that this particular tenancy will contain a slightly different provision so far as a landlord’s right to demand an AGA on an assignment is concerned. I have had no specific evidence as to any difficulty that CGU might encounter in relation to estate management factors, and therefore I do not think it right to give that issue much weight in the present case.
Conclusion
In the circumstances, with gratitude for the quality of the argument I have received, and with some diffidence, I have come to the conclusion that the words “where reasonable” should be included in para 17(c), and I so order.
Costs
The question of costs has been touched upon, and the parties agreed before they knew the result, to my mind rightly and sensibly, that the successful party should have the costs of this application only in so far as they relate to the issue that I have just decided. I have received statements of costs, and the figure I propose to award, bearing in mind that I am assessing not what it is reasonable for one party to pay its own lawyers but what it is reasonable for CGU to pay Wallis’s lawyers, the right figure to assess is £5,250, and that is the figure I assess.
Application allowed.
