Definition of “gypsy” — Nomadic lifestyle — Claimant refusing permission for gypsy caravan site — Inspector finding claimant no longer a gypsy because no longer nomadic — Whether cessation of nomadic lifestyle for reasons of children’s education leading to loss of gypsy status — Claim allowed
The claimant was a traditional Irish traveller who had led a nomadic existence for most of her life. In April 2000, she decided to permanently settle on a piece of land that she owned in Keynsham, Bristol, because the education of her children was suffering. Her son was deaf and had special needs, and the claimant herself suffered from diabetes and back problems. In July 2000, the claimant applied to the second defendant council for planning permission to use the land as a residential gypsy caravan site. The council refused, whereupon the claimant appealed to the first defendant Secretary of State, and an inquiry was held.
At the inquiry, the claimant argued that her status as a gypsy had to be taken into account in determining her planning application, and maintained that she would resume her travelling once her reasons for settling had been resolved. The inspector, however, concluded that she was not a gypsy, since she did not have a nomadic way of life. He based his decision upon the definition of “gypsy” in section 16 of the Caravan Sites Act 1968, and upon section 24(8) of the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960, which was the definition adopted by the relevant planning circulars and policies. The claimant challenged that decision under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.
Held: The claim was allowed.
A relatively long period of settlement was not necessarily inconsistent with the status of a statutory gypsy. Where an individual or a family had ceased to travel because of health reasons, educational requirements or old age, then all the surrounding circumstances would have to be examined in order to determine, as a matter of fact and degree, whether they remained gypsies for planning purposes. Those circumstances included: (i) their history; (ii) their reasons for ceasing to travel; (iii) their future intention to resume travelling when the reasons for settling ceased to apply; and (iv) their attitude to living in a caravan rather than a conventional house. The inspector had erred in focusing solely upon current travelling, and his decision would be quashed and remitted for reconsideration: R v Shropshire County Council, ex parte Bungay (1991) 23 HLR 195 and Wrexham County Borough Council v National Assembly for Wales [2002] EWHC 2414 (Admin); [2002] PLSCS 263 applied; R v South Hams District Council, ex parte Gibb [1995] QB 158 distinguished.
Stephen Cottle (instructed by the Community Law Partnership, of Birmingham) appeared for the claimant; Timothy Mould, David Forsdick and Carine Patry (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared for the first defendant; the second defendants, Bath and North East Somerset Council, did not appear and were not represented.
Sally Dobson, barrister
