House and land claimed to be agricultural holding — House not let as a farmhouse — Purpose cannot be changed by tenant — Notice to quit valid — Appeal fails
The Court dismissed this appeal by Mrs Louisa Waite, living in a self-contained part of Rodborough Manor, Stroud, against the order of Judge Kirkhouse Jenkins, at Stroud County Court, to deliver possession of the house and 32 acres of land to Mrs Blanche Helena Godfrey, the owner.
The Judge held that the six months’ notice to quit was valid, and that the house was not let as a farmhouse and did not come within the definition of part of an agricultural holding in the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1948. The letting, he found, was to Mrs Waite’s husband. The notice to quit was given to him but he died before it expired.
Mr Anthony Cripps (instructed by Wellington & Clifford, of Stroud) appeared for the appellant, and Mr Donald Bain (instructed by Little & Bloxham, of Stroud) represented the respondent.
Mr Cripps said the question was whether this particular parcel of land was an agricultural holding under the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1948. If it was then the six months’ notice was invalid. If it was not then the tenancy had been terminated. He submitted that the notice was invalid, and further, that the house was comprised in an agricultural tenancy.
The Master of the Rolls: You say that if a farmer acquires a house adjacent to his land, then prima facie the occupation of the house is referable to the farming activities and is to be treated as part of an agricultural holding?
Mr Cripps replied that the house had to be connected with the land, but there need not be geographical propinquity. “A farmer cannot farm without living somewhere, and he must live near his farm,” he said. “Therefore, there must be agricultural trade user.”
Mr Bain, replying for Mrs Godfrey, argued that if Mr Cripps was right, then any house occupied by a farmer, where he did certain clerical work in connection with his farm, was part of an agricultural holding.
Mr Cripps said that at the time of the letting there was no expression of intention in regard to the house and therefore no restriction as to its use.
The Master of the Rolls, giving judgment, said this was not a case where the order of the Judge should be disturbed. He had held that the house was let as a dwelling-house and not as a farmhouse to be used in connection with the 32 acres. Notice to quit the land and house was served on Mr Waite, but he died before it had expired. The notice had, in fact, now expired and Mrs Waite was holding over. The question was whether the house and land could be considered an agricultural holding within the meaning of the Act. In other circumstances Mrs Waite might have had another string to her bow. If Mr Waite had become a statutory tenant by surviving until the notice had expired, Mrs Waite might have had the right to remain in possession by virtue of the Rent Restrictions Acts. The real question was whether the half of the manor occupied by her was intended to be anything more than a dwelling-house for Mr and Mrs Waite. The Judge found that it was not used for agriculture, and in his Lordship’s opinion he rightly rejected the plea that it was a farmhouse. One had to have regard to the purpose for which it was let, and that purpose could not be changed by the tenant without the landlord’s consent.
Lords Justices Denning and Hodson agreed, and the appeal was dismissed.
