Claimant’s forebears occupying family home for 400 years — Property owned in shares by family members comprising defendant company — Claimant moving into family home upon father’s death — Defendant company serving notice to vacate premises — Whether historical precedent founding claim in proprietary estoppel — Claim dismissed
The claimant is the ninth Earl of Macclesfield. By right of primogeniture, successive earls had occupied Shirburn Castle, the claimant’s family home, for almost 400 years. Under a deed of resettlement made in 1909, the claimant’s grandfather, the seventh Earl, held the legal freehold interest in the bulk of the estate, including the castle, as tenant for life. In 1922, he incorporated Beechwood Estates Co, the defendant company, and executed a deed of disentailment, which meant that the beneficial interest in the freehold estate in reversion vested in the defendant. As a result, the seventh Earl held the legal estate in the freehold on trust for the defendant. His heir, the claimant’s father, assigned his interest as remainderman in return for one-half of the issued share capital, with the bulk of the remaining shares passing to other family members, who were, or became, directors.
In 1962, the claimant’s father and his family, including the claimant, moved into the castle at the invitation of the seventh Earl. In 1967, the claimant took the tenancy of a farm on the estate, where he resided with his family. In 1992, upon his father’s death, the claimant and his family moved into the castle, which they shared with his mother, the dowager countess. The claimant’s company, Fentville Ltd, began to conduct business from the Old Stores in the stable yard.
Disputes arose between family members and, accordingly, between the claimant and the other company directors. The defendant decided to evict the claimant from the castle, giving him four weeks in which to vacate the premises. The claimant claimed that: (i) under the principles of proprietary estoppel, he was entitled to occupy the whole of the castle, some of the outbuildings, and part of the grounds for his lifetime; and (ii) he had expected to take possession of the castle, had been encouraged to do so, and had thereby acted to his detriment in reliance upon that encouragement and expectation. The defendant maintained that the claimant and Fentville were no more than tenants at will, and that, their tenancies having been determined, it was entitled to immediate possession.
Held: The claim was dismissed.
When the claimant had moved into the castle, he and the defendant company had discussed his application to take a tenancy of the property, but the specific details had not been agreed. In particular, the issue of whether he should be granted a life tenancy had not been expressly approved or rejected. The claimant had known that no specific resolution had been reached and could not, at that time, have expected to take an interest in the property so as to support a claim of proprietary estoppel.
In addition, he did not expect to have an interest in the property for life. The tradition that the Earl would live in the castle was not sufficient to found a claim under the doctrine of proprietary estoppel: in Keelwalk Properties Ltd v Waller [2002] EWCA Civ 1076; [2002] 3 EGLR 79, it was held that a longstanding practice could not, in itself, justify the expectation that the practice would continue in perpetuity. On the evidence, the defendant had not encouraged a belief that the claimant would gain a life interest in the property.
However, the claimant had acted to his detriment in moving into the castle, in that he had given up his farm tenancy and his home. Since detriment did not need to consist of the expenditure of money or other quantifiable financial loss, so long as it was something substantial, that action would have raised an equity had the other grounds been established.
The claimant was entitled to remain in the castle until the expiry of two years’ notice, and his company was entitled to occupy the Old Stores throughout the same period.
Leslie Kosmin QC and Caroline Hutton (instructed by Manches, of Oxford) appeared for the claimant; Frank Hinks QC (instructed by Denton Wilde Sapte) appeared for the defendant.
Vivienne Lane, barrister
