Respondent owning two houses to accommodate large family — Respondent claiming jobseeker’s allowance — Whether both houses forming one dwelling for purposes of calculating jobseeker’s allowance based upon capital assets — Appeal dismissed
The respondent had purchased two properties in order to accommodate his large family. It was common ground that if his entire family were to occupy only one of the houses, it would be overcrowded and therefore in breach of sections 325 and 326 of the Housing Act 1985. In 1999, the respondent was made redundant and he applied for a jobseeker’s allowance. Under the Jobseeker’s Allowance Regulations 1996, an applicant whose capital exceeded a specified amount was not entitled to the allowance. In calculating such an allowance, the capital value of only one property occupied as the family home could be excluded. The value of the respondent’s second property, which housed his older children, was therefore deemed to be part of his capital, and, since it exceeded the allowed capital limit, the claim for benefit was disallowed.
At first instance, the commissioner held that, for the purposes of the 1996 Regulations, a “dwelling” could consist of more than one building or unit of accommodation. The Secretary of State appealed. At issue was whether the arrangement of the two houses meant that they were, in effect, one family unit, so that the tribunal could be satisfied that the second house was “normally” occupied by the claimant as his home.
Held: The appeal was dismissed.
The applicable welfare legislation was wide-ranging and confusing, which meant that it was impossible to derive any coherent support for convincing argument as to the meaning of the term “dwelling occupied as the home” for the purposes of para 1 of Schedule 8 to the 1996 Regulations. The definition was therefore construed from within the regulations. These were alive to the possibility of two separate buildings constituting a single dwelling; for example, para 3 of Schedule 2 allowed for the eventuality of one owner having two dwellings that were both to be treated as his home.
A home was the place where the owner lived, ate, slept, bathed and relaxed with his family. It was absurd to consider that, for example, two semi-detached houses could not be a single dwelling on the basis that they had to be accessed from the outside, when knocking a hole through the party wall would convert the two dwellings into one. Although, in the instant case, the houses were not adjoining, the principle was the same. On the grounds of common sense and fairness, it was clear that when the respondent had purchased the second house to accommodate his growing family, he could as easily have purchased one larger house. Since that house would have been disregarded for the calculation of his jobseeker’s allowance, it could not be fair that he should suffer when the purpose of having two properties was exactly the same as having one: the situation could be distinguished from one in which two properties were owned for the purpose of providing the owner with a holiday home.
If the Secretary of State could not lay the regulations before parliament in a way that made clear his position, the regulations were to be construed against him. The purpose of the provisions was to provide benefits for those in need, and they were to be construed to relieve hardship in favour of the appellant, rather than in favour of the public purse.
James Maurici (instructed by the solicitor to the Department of Work and Pensions) appeared for the appellant; Daniel Kolinsky (instructed by McGrath & Co, of Birmingham) appeared for the respondent.
Vivienne Lane, barrister
