Property — Estoppel — Claim for possession — Whether necessary elements of proprietary estoppel established — Whether assurance capable of founding estoppel — Claim allowed
The claimant was a Panamanian company owned and controlled by A, a Singapore-based businessman. The company was the registered owner of a substantial house in Newmarket, in which the first defendant’s mother (the second defendant) had resided since 1987. This arrangement depended upon the subsistence of a relationship between A and the first defendant, and was “pursuant to a personal licence … arising solely out of the existence” of that relationship. Although the first defendant was a frequent visitor to the house, she made more use of A’s London flat. In 2000, the relationship between A and the first defendant broke down and the latter claimed an occupation order in respect of the flat. Shortly thereafter, A notified the second defendant that her licence to occupy the house had been terminated and she was asked to leave. Having subsequently lost her claim in respect of the flat, the first defendant moved into the Newmarket property with her mother.
The claimant started proceedings against both defendants for possession of the property. The second defendant counterclaimed for equitable relief on the basis of proprietary estoppel. She contended that A had represented to her that she could remain in the property for as long as she wished and that she had acted to her detriment by relying upon that representation. Accordingly, she argued that the claimant was estopped from seeking possession and/or that it would be inequitable to allow it to do so. The first defendant claimed that she was entitled to occupy the property as the licensee of the second defendant.
Held: The claim was allowed.
There was no defence to the claim because the necessary elements of proprietary estoppel had not been established.
In order to claim equitable relief based upon proprietary estoppel, the property owner would have to have offered to the person alleging the estoppel (the representee) an assurance that conferred on the representee an interest in or some right over or in respect of, his or her property. The representee would then have to show that he or she had altered his or her position in reliance upon that assurance and that the alteration of that position was detrimental to the representee. The matter was to be approached as a broad inquiry as to whether repudiation of the assurance was unconscionable in all the circumstances: Gillett v Holt [2001] Ch 210 applied.
Although to be effective, the assurance need not be as firm as would be required for it to have contractual force, it had to be capable of being reasonably understood in the way in which the representee said that he or she had understood it at the time the assurance was made. Its meaning could not change with the passage of time.
In the present case, the second defendant had failed to establish that A had made an assurance that was capable of founding an estoppel. Accordingly, there being no defence to the claim, the claimant was entitled to an order for possession against both defendants. It was also entitled to damages for their use and occupation of the property from the end of 2000, when the second defendant should have vacated. The first defendant was jointly liable for the damages relating to the period following the request for her to vacate the property in May 2001.
Kirk Reynolds QC and Norman Joss (instructed by Stephen Beverley Associates) appeared for the claimant; Andrew Glennie (instructed by Reynolds Porter Chamberlain) appeared for the defendants.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister
