Landlord and tenant — Agricultural land — Respondent serving notice to quit — Surrender agreement subject to allowing appellants’ continued occupation of land — Appellants refusing to surrender land — Whether appellants occupying land pursuant to implied licence from respondent — Appeal dismissed
The appellants were the son and daughter-in-law of one of three brothers who had been the tenants of a farm owned by the respondent. The first appellant had lived at the farm for most of his life. By the mid-1960s, the respondent had become dissatisfied with the brothers’ farming methods and served a notice to quit for failure to comply with the rules of good husbandry, pursuant to section 24(2) of the Agricultural Holdings Act 1948.
An oral agreement was made for the surrender of the tenancy, subject to the respondent allowing some of the brothers to remain in occupation for life. The final agreement mistakenly granted to two of the brothers an annual tenancy that was determinable upon six months’ notice. The brothers subsequently refused to vacate the land and disputes ensued. A further notice to quit was served in 1985, in response to which the first appellant’s father asserted his right to a life tenancy. Negotiations continued until 2000, when the father died, leaving his estate to the first appellant.
The respondent again served a notice to quit, followed by proceedings for possession. The first appellant counterclaimed for a declaration that he was the fee simple absolute owner in possession of the disputed land because his father had been in continuous possession of that land since 1985 and had acquired title to it by adverse possession. The respondent contended, inter alia, that the brothers’ occupation after 1985 had been with the respondent’s permission, to be implied from the fact that it had not pursued the notice to quit and had allowed the brothers to continue to occupy the farmhouse.
The county court rejected the appellants’ claim, declaring that they had no title to, or right, estate or interest in, the disputed land, and ordered them to deliver it up to the respondent. The appellants appealed. The issue was whether the occupation of land arose from the respondent’s implied permission within the meaning of the second part of para 8(4) of Schedule 1 to the Limitation Act 1980.
Held: The appeal was dismissed.
The respondent was entitled to possession of the disputed land. The second part of para 8(4) expressly permitted a finding that a person’s occupation of land was by the implied permission of the person entitled to it “in any case where such a finding is justified on the actual facts of the case”.
There had to be some overt act on the part of the landowner or some demonstrable circumstances from which it could be inferred that permission had been given, although it was irrelevant whether the occupant was aware of those matters. Further, it was necessary to establish that a reasonable person would have appreciated that the occupation was with the landowner’s permission: Colin Dawson Windows Ltd v King’s Lynn and West Norfolk Borough Council [2005] EWCA Civ 9; [2005] NPC 8 applied.
The appellants’ submission that permission to occupy land could be implied only if communicated by words or conduct was incorrect, at least in the context of adverse possession. Once communicated, the permission would cease to be implied and would become express.
Mark Wonnacott (instructed by Howlett Clarke Crowther Wood, of Brighton) appeared for the appellants; Timothy Morshead (instructed by Farrer & Co) appeared for the respondent.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister