Land — Compulsory acquisition — Defendant’s predecessor transferring land to claimants — Land compulsorily acquired and vested in defendant — Whether claimants’ adverse possession extinguishing defendant’s title — Claim dismissed
The claimants claimed title by adverse possession to land lying between, and the airspace enclosed by, 10 arches that supported a flyover forming part of the A13. They claimed to have used the disputed land following the transfer to them, by the Greater London Council (GLC), of surrounding land in November 1985. The GLC were, at the time, the proprietors of the road and the structure of the arches, including the disputed land.
Following the abolition of the GLC in April 1986, all that property was vested in the secretary of state for transport and therefore became Crown land. In 1998, a compulsory purchase order was made in respect of the land, which had remained vested in the secretary of state for transport until July 2000, when it was purportedly vested in the defendant.
Section 15 of the Limitation Act 1980 specified a 12-year time limit for actions to recover land. However, para 10 of Schedule 1 to the Act provided that section 15(1) would apply to an action by the Crown to recover land, thereby substituting the reference to 12 years with a reference to 30 years. Paragraph 12 provided that where, in any action “brought by a person other than the Crown…, the right of action first accrued to the Crown… through whom the other person claimed, the action may be brought at any time” before the expiry of either: (a) the period during which the Crown could have brought an action; or (b) 12 years from the date upon which the right of action accrued to someone other than the Crown.
An issue arose as to whether the defendant’s title had been extinguished by the claimants’ prior adverse possession. The defendant argued that even if the claimants could prove adverse possession from November 1985, the Crown’s ownership during that period meant that the relevant limitation period had not expired. It submitted that para 12 applied, even though the right of action to recover the disputed land had originally accrued to the GLC and not to the Crown, because the word “first”, in the phrase “first accrued to the Crown” meant “earlier” or “previously”, rather than “originally”.
Held: The claim was dismissed.
Paragraph 12 provided a complete code for persons claiming through the Crown, whether or not the right of action accrued originally to the Crown. The true meaning of the word “first” in para 12 was “earlier” or “previously”.
The period during which the Crown could have brought an action was 30 years from the date upon which the right of action originally accrued, either to the Crown or to a predecessor. Paragraph 12 entitled the Crown’s successor in title to the benefit of the alternative periods set out in para 12. That indicated that the feature of paramount importance in para 12 was that the claimant to possession was someone claiming through the Crown, which itself had a right of action. It was immaterial whether the right of action had originally accrued to the Crown or to someone else because, in any event, the longer, 30-year period ran from the date of that original accrual.
It was not possible to derive from Part II of Schedule 1 to the Act as a whole, or from para 12 in particular, any logical reason for a narrow interpretation of the word “first” in the relevant phrase. In any case, on the facts, the claimants had failed to prove that they had taken possession of the retained land prior to April 1986.
Kirk Reynolds QC and Philip Kremen (instructed by Hughmans) appeared for the claimants; Thomas Jefferies (instructed by Eversheds LLP) appeared for the defendant.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister