Redevelopment — Green belt — Openness — Very special circumstances First defendant secretary of state calling in application for planning permission First defendant refusing permission contrary to inspector’s recommendations — Claimants applying to quash decision — Whether first defendant properly making contrary findings without site visit — Whether first defendant reasonably finding absence of very special circumstances — Claim dismissed
The claimants applied for planning permission to redevelop a scrapyard and erect four dwellings on a green-belt site. The scrapyard had the benefit of a certificate of lawfulness of existing use or development.
The first defendant called in the application, under section 77 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, and dismissed it. In doing so he disagreed with the recommendation of the inspector appointed who had held an inquiry. The site was not used to its full capacity but a real prospect existed of its being leased or sold for more extensive use, and it was unlikely that any necessary permissions would be withheld.
It was accepted that the proposed development was not for one of the purposes that are set out in para 3.4 of PPG 2 and that it constituted therefore inappropriate, and harmful, development in the green belt. The first defendant considered that the removal of the dilapidated buildings and fencing from the site and the addition of sensitive landscaping would improve to the visual amenity of the green belt. He agreed with the inspector’s conclusion that the fully operational scrapyard would be more harmful to the visual amenity of the green belt and more harmful to highway safety than the proposed development.
However, he did not accept that the fully operational scrapyard would be more harmful to the openness of the green belt than the proposed development nor that very special circumstances existed that justified inappropriate development.
The claimants applied to quash the decision to refuse planning permission contending, inter alia, that: (i) without a site visit, the first defendant could not properly have made a contrary finding to that of the inspector in respect of openness; or (ii) no very special circumstances existed.
Held: The claim was dismissed.
The decision had not been flawed by the absence of a site visit. It was unreal to suggest that the first defendant had to visit the site before he could differ from the inspector on visual matters. The issue was whether he had had sufficient material before him upon which he could to make a judgment. Neither the fully operational scrapyard nor the dwellings were there for either the inspector or the first defendant to see. Although the inspector’s site visit had given her an advantage in judging the potential effect upon the visual amenity, she had not had a significant advantage on the question of openness. Accordingly, the first defendant had a sufficient basis for differing from the inspector on green-belt openness, describing it, as he did, as finely balanced: Portsmouth Water plc v Secretary of State for the Environment [1993] 3 PLR 1 considered.
In the light of his view on openness, the first defendant had been entitled to give further consideration to whether very special circumstances existed. He had been entitled to balance the legitimate considerations of green-belt openness, and housing policy and sustainability and it was not for the court to substitute its own view on matters of planning judgment.
Harry Wolton QC and Robin Green (instructed by Hallmarks Solicitors, of Worcester) appeared for the claimants; James Strachan (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared for the first defendant; the second defendants did not appear and were not represented.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister
