Green belt — Presumption against development — Claimant council refusing permission for continuing use of building as office for business as inappropriate development in green belt — Inspector concluding “very special circumstances” for inappropriate development in green belt — Claimants applying to quash that decision — Whether inspector erring in approach to “very special circumstances” — Claim dismissed
The appeal site was situated within the green belt. It included a building with a first-floor office. Planning permission had been granted to use the building as offices in conjunction with two nearby buildings that were used for storage by a builder’s business. This permission was subsequently relaxed when the claimant council granted a three-year temporary planning permission to allow a small firm of accountants to use part of the building as offices.
The second defendant eventually occupied the entire building for the administration of its financial services business. When the temporary planning permission expired, the second defendant applied to the claimants for permission to continue to use the building as an office for a business that was unrelated to the use of the remainder of the site. The claimants refused planning permission principally on the ground that such use would, as a result of the traffic and general activity that would be generated, harm the openness and rural character of the green belt.
The first defendant’s inspector allowed the second defendant’s appeal against that refusal. He found that the present use of the site constituted inappropriate development in the green belt, but concluded that, in accordance with PPG 2, special circumstances clearly outweighed the harm to the green belt that would be occasioned by allowing inappropriate development. He considered that the early introduction of a secure remote access to the second defendant’s computer database might reduce the need for its consultants to travel to the offices and, the current use of the offices would not give rise to excessive traffic. The claimants applied, under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, to quash that decision.
Held: The claim was dismissed.
The inspector had been entitled to conclude that remote access to the second defendant’s database amounted to “very special circumstances” within para 3.2 of PPG 2.
The issue of whether an increase in traffic would constitute harm was a different planning consideration than whether a building in the green belt was harmful. That was what the inspector had found to be an inappropriate development and it was a matter of planning judgment for the inspector whether the remote-access system would significantly reduce traffic movements. It seemed to be the unusual case in which very special circumstances were not put in the balance to outweigh the acknowledged harm (as in the “gypsy” cases) but to show that they would significantly reduce the perceived harm: R (on the application of Chelmsford Borough Council) v First Secretary of State [2003] EWHC 2978 (Admin); [2004] 2 PLR 34 considered.
The arguments were finely balanced, but the inspector had been entitled to reach the conclusion that he had. He had not said that remote access counterbalanced the harm but that it effectively and significantly reduced any harm, and he had given clear and logical reasons for his conclusion.
Hugh Richards (instructed by the legal department of Cherwell District Council) appeared for the claimants; Philip Coppel (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared for the first defendant; the second defendant did not appear and was not represented.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister
