Secure tenancy – Succession – Respondent’s mother becoming sole tenant by survivorship on death of husband – Concept of secure tenancies subsequently introduced – Whether mother constituting “successor” so as to prevent respondent from succeeding to tenancy on her death – Whether family member excluded from succeeding to tenancy – Sections 87 and 88 of Housing Act 1985 – Appeal dismissed
The respondent lived with his mother in a three-bedroom house let by the appellant council. The mother had originally occupied the property under a periodic joint tenancy that had been granted to her and her husband in 1965. After her husband’s death in 1969, she had become the sole tenant by the right of survivorship. She subsequently became a secure tenant following the introduction of that concept by the Housing Act 1980.
After the death of his mother, the respondent claimed to be entitled to succeed to the tenancy, under the provisions of Chapter II of the Housing Act 1985. Section 87 provided that certain individuals were entitled to succeed “the tenant under a secure tenancy” unless “the tenant was himself a successor”. The appellants disputed the respondent’s right to succeed to the tenancy on the ground that his mother had herself been a successor, as defined in section 88(1)(b).
In possession proceedings against the respondent, the appellants argued that the mother had fulfilled the factual criteria for a sucessor as set out in section 88(1)(b), being someone who “was a joint tenant and has become the sole tenant”. They submitted that it was irrelevant that the concept of secure tenancies had not existed at the date at which that had happened.
The question was whether the words “has become the sole tenant” referred to any time in the past or was limited to a case in which a tenant became the sole tenant under a secure tenancy, that is, after the 1980 Act came into force. The judge ruled that it meant the former, but the Court of Appeal held that it meant the latter: [2006] PLSCS 142. The appellants petitioned the House of Lords.
Held: The appeal was dismissed.
The words “he was a joint tenant and has become the sole tenant” in section 88(1)(b) meant that “he” was a joint tenant under a secure tenancy and had become the sole tenant under a secure tenancy. When the respondent’s mother became the sole tenant, it was not of a secure tenancy and she was therefore not a successor.
The events to which section 88(1) referred were events in relation to tenancies that had become secure tenancies and not to events that had happened earlier. In support of that construction was the general presumption against retrospectivity. One did not expect rights conferred by statute to be destroyed by events that had taken place before it was passed. Second, the word “successor” most naturally meant successor to a secure tenancy. Although “successor” was a defined expression, the ordinary meaning of the word formed part of the material that could be used to construe the definition. Furthermore, there was no rational purpose in making the definitions retrospective.
Ashley Underwood QC and Catherine Rowlands (instructed by legal department of Birmingham City Council) appeared for the appellants; Jan Luba QC and John Beckley (instructed by Aston Legal Centre, of Birmingham) appeared for the respondent.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister
