Tenancy – Proprietary estoppel – Appellant succeeding to tenancy on death of mother – Appellant failing to notify respondent landlord of death – Respondent seeking possession to move appellant to smaller property – Appellant challenging claim for possession by asserting date of mother’s death – Whether appellant precluded from defeating respondent’s claim by proprietary estoppel – Appeal allowed
The appellant’s mother had been a secure tenant of a property owned by the respondent council. She died in January 2003. Following her death, the appellant was entitled to succeeded to her tenancy but was concerned that he would be moved to smaller accommodation. Acting fraudulently, he failed to register her death or to inform the respondents that she had died. He continued to pay the rent in her name but, in 2006, the respondents became aware that his mother had died.
Under ground 16 of Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1985, the respondents, if they wanted to move a tenant to different accommodation, were required to commence proceedings not less than six months or more than 12 months from the date of death.
Once they had discovered that their tenant had died, the respondents claimed possession of the property, arguing that, because the appellant had failed to notify them of his mother’s death, he could not assert the true date of her death to defeat their claim. They obtained a possession order in respect of the property and the county court subsequently dismissed the appellant’s appeal against that order.
On the appellant’s appeal to the Court of Appeal, an issue arose as to whether a proprietary estoppel that might found an action for recovery, when it was accepted that other forms of estoppel could act as a shield but not as a sword.
Held: The appeal was allowed.
The right of a local authority to claim possession against a person who succeeded to a tenancy on the death of a family member other than a spouse on the ground that the accommodation was larger than he or she reasonably required was not an interest in land capable of giving rise to a proprietary estoppel against the tenant. Accordingly, it was impossible to oust a tenant who had concealed his mother’s death for three years in order to avoid being moved on the ground that the time for doing so had expired before the local authority had become aware of the death.
The purpose and policy of ground 16 was that a local authority should be entitled to recover family-sized properties but that it should not do so either too soon or too long after the tenant’s death. The doctrine of proprietary estoppel could not apply in those circumstances, since the interest of the local authority as freeholders was not in question. They were making a strictly statutory claim for possession.
In the present case, the appellant’s acts were estoppel by representation and the respondents could not found a claim on that outside the time limits laid down by the 1985 Act.
Per curiam: The conclusion was undoubtedly unjust and frustrated the statutory purpose of the legislation, since it meant that the property could not be used by a family. It was to be hoped that the legislature might found an answer.
Michael Barnes QC and John Beckley (instructed by Hodson Parsons James & Vaux, of Newport) appeared for the appellant; Andrew Arden QC and Iain Wightwick (instructed by the legal department of Newport City Council) appeared for the respondents.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister
