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Mortell v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and another

Land – Redevelopment – Compulsory purchase order (CPO) – Claimant resident attending inquiry as party aggrieved – First defendant confirming CPO on recommendation of inspector – Claimant challenging validity of CPO as unfair and biased – Whether first defendant making errors of law justifying quashing of CPO – Application dismissed

The claimant’s dwelling was to be acquired under a compulsory purchase order (CPO) known as the Oldham (Derker Area Phase 1 Regeneration) Compulsory Purchase Order 2006. The first defendant secretary of state accepted her inspector’s recommendation to confirm the CPO, following a 13-day inquiry. The claimant was a person aggrieved by the CPO for the purposes of section 23(1) of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981 and a statutory objector to it. Thus, by virtue of section 13(2) of the 1981 Act, he and other objectors had been entitled to be heard at the inquiry.

Following confirmation of the CPO, the claimant applied to quash it on the ground that it did not fall within the power conferred by the 1981 Act. It was alleged that the inspector had acted unfairly, thereby leading the claimant and other objectors to believe that he was biased in favour of the second defendant acquiring authority. Further, it was contended that the approach of the inspector and the second defendants contained errors of law.

The first defendant argued that the CPO was necessary in order to address low housing demand in the area, and would create a balanced housing market that would provide a choice of housing in terms of size, type and tenure in neighbourhoods in which people would want to live.

Held: The application was dismissed.

The CPO would stand since the claimant’s complaints had no substance. The inspector had not failed to have regard to any important considerations. Neither he nor the first defendant could be accused of having committed an error of law; nor was there any evidence of unfairness, let alone bias.

The test to be applied by the first defendant in deciding the efficacy of a CPO was whether: (i) there was a compelling case in the public interest for the order to be made; and (ii) it could achieve one or more of the objectives set out in section 226(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. Provided that (i) could be made out and that the compulsory purchase was reasonably necessary, it was not required to be the least intrusive option: R (on the application of Clays Lane Housing Co-operative Ltd) v Housing Corporation [2004] EWCA Civ 1658; [2005] 1 WLR 2229 considered.

Per curiam: Section 39 of the Land Compensation Act 1973 required the payment of compensation based upon the market value of the property and a duty to rehouse residents in circumstances such as arose in the instant case. Thus, the diminution in value of the houses arising from the problems in the area covered by the CPO would make it difficult, if not impossible, for those affected to find an equivalent property at an affordable price. However, having regard to section 39, the expectation was that the second defendants would do all they could to ensure that suitable alternative accommodation was found and proper compensation was awarded: James v United Kingdom A/98 (1986) 8 EHRR 123 and Pascoe v First Secretary of State [2006] EWHC 2356 (Admin); [2007] 1 WLR 885 considered.

Robert McCracken QC (instructed by Public Interest Lawyers, of Birmingham) appeared for the claimant; John Litton (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared for the first defendant; Stephen Sauvain QC (instructed by the legal department of Oldham Metropolitan Borough Council) appeared for the second defendants.

Eileen O’Grady, barrister

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