Where a claim for judicial review is envisaged, CPR 54 requires that the application for permission to proceed is made promptly and, in any event, not later than three months from the date on which the grounds for the application arose. Section 31 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 allows the court to grant an extension of time if there is good reason, but even if there is, the court may refuse relief if it would be likely to cause substantial hardship or prejudice or be detrimental to good administration. Delay, therefore, can be fatal to the claim.
In Health and Safety Executive v Wolverhampton City Council [2009] EWHC 2688 (Admin); [2009] PLSCS 299, a developer had, in July 2007, sought planning permission from the council to construct four blocks of flats to provide student accommodation. The application site was located within 100m of an LPG facility. The council consulted the HSE and was advised against granting planning permission on grounds of safety. Nevertheless, in August 2008, it granted planning permission. It failed to give the HSE advance notice of its decision and did not provide it with full details, as it was bound to do, to enable it to decide whether to ask the secretary of state to call in the application. Finally, it failed to notify the HSE of the grant of planning permission.
On learning of the grant in December 2008, the HSE tried unsuccessfully to persuade the council to revoke or modify the planning permission. In July 2009, it lodged its claim for judicial review. It challenged the lawfulness of the grant principally on the ground of the failures set out above. It also challenged the council’s refusal to revoke or modify the planning permission. By that time, three of the four blocks had been constructed. The HSE accepted that it would therefore be inappropriate to quash the planning permission. However, it sought declarations as to its unlawfulness and an injunction preventing the construction of the fourth block and the occupation of the three that had been built.
The court acknowledged that the council’s decision to grant planning permission was flawed as a result of those failures, but confirmed that the planning permission remained valid unless set aside by the court. It was not appropriate, in any event, to do that owing to the undue delay on the part of the HSE in bringing its claim. (Seven months had elapsed since the HSE had become aware of the grant.) The judge held that revocation of the planning permission would also be inappropriate in circumstances where three blocks had been built, the planning permission remained valid and the developer would be adversely affected. Finally, it would also be inappropriate in the circumstances to grant an injunction against the developer, even if authority existed suggesting that the court could do so. The
John Martin is a freelance writer
