It is settled law that a local planning authority is not empowered to grant planning permission for development that amounts to a substantial alteration to that sought by the original application. What constitutes a “substantial alteration” is a matter of planning judgment, and the courts will intervene only where the exercise of that judgment is manifestly unreasonable. The Court of Appeal had to consider this principle in the context of one of a number of issues arising in Green v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2010] EWCA Civ 64; [2010] PLSCS 44.
In that case, in response to a section 78 appeal, an inspector had granted planning permission to a traveller to site three caravans on his land for use as all-year-round dwellings, subject to conditions.
Condition 2 restricted the use of the land to use as a caravan site by gypsies and travellers, as defined by para 15 of ODPM Circular 01/2006. Condition 4 prevented the residentially occupied land from being subdivided into more than three separate pitches. Condition 5 provided that not more than two caravans, including one static caravan, should be stationed on plot one; not more than three caravans, including two static caravans, should be stationed on plot two; and not more than three caravans, including one static caravan, should be stationed on plot 3. It also provided that “caravan” was to be defined as in Part I of the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960 and section 13 of the Caravan Sites Act 1968.
The Court of Appeal had to consider whether this permission amounted to a substantial alteration to the subject of the original application. The court decided, albeit construing the conditions “creatively”, that it did not when read with those conditions and in the context of policy guidance relating to caravan sites.
Against the background of that guidance, the touring caravans were clearly intended for a use ancillary to the static caravans, that is, by the same family that occupied the static caravan. The conditions were used as a way of imposing a specific restriction on the maximum use that could be made of the site for caravans;, the concepts of intensification of use and ancillary use would otherwise have left a vagueness that could give rise to future disputes. Furthermore, the conditions were lawful and sufficiently clear to define the extent and the limits of the permission granted.
John Martin is a freelance writer
