Criminal offence — Aggravated trespass – Respondent allegedly committing offence of aggravated trespass by locking himself to stair rail in building – Respondent allegedly failing to leave after being directed to do so by police officer – District judge dismissing informations — Whether buildings included in definition of land — Appeal allowed
The respondent had allegedly locked himself to a stair rail in a building using a D-lock. He was charged with offences of aggravated trespass under section 68 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, and, under section 69, of failing to leave the relevant land after being directed to do so by a police officer.
At the close of the prosecution case, the respondent, with the encouragement of the district judge, submitted that there was no case to answer because “land” (in section 68) did not, or did not appear to, include buildings. Reference was made to the definition of land in section 61 of the 1994 Act. The judge upheld the submission and dismissed the informations.
The appellant appealed, requesting the court to determine whether the judge had been correct in dismissing the informations. The question of law to be answered was what constituted the definition of “land” in sections 68 and 69 of the 1994 Act, as amended by the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003; specifically whether it included buildings other than those mentioned in section 61 of the 1994 Act.
Held: The appeal was allowed.
The district judge had misconstrued the meaning of land in section 68 and should not have dismissed the informations; the definition of “land” in section 68 include buildings, as did section 69. The starting point was the definition contained in the Interpretation Act 1978, which included buildings. Section 68(5) of the 1994 Act excluded highways and roads, with reference to the exclusion in section 61(9)(b), but that exclusion did not extend to section 61(9)(a), so that buildings were not excluded. That was a positive indication that buildings were included because otherwise the reference would have dealt with section 61(9)(a). The judge had been wrong in thinking that the reference to section 61(9)(b) carried with it section 61(9)(a). The relevant words in section 61(9) were introduced by the words “in this section” and therefore did not extend to other sections.
In its unamended form, section 68 did not include buildings within the definition of “land”. The purpose and effect of the amendment was to negative the exclusion of buildings. The section should be construed in its amended form; there was no ambiguity and no lack of legal certainty.
It was in the public interest that the matter should be completed and, if asked to do so, the court would remit the matter with a direction to continue the hearing.
Lee Harris (instructed by the Crown Prosecution Service) appeared for the appellant; Gemma Hobcraft (instructed by Bindmans LLP) appeared for the respondent.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister
