It is generally accepted that anti-discrimination statutes should be construed in favour of the people for whose benefit they were enacted. The Disability Discrimination Act 1995, which has now been replaced by the Equality Act 2010, requires reasonable adjustments to premises to cater for the needs of the disabled and the explanatory notes that accompany the legislation and the statutory codes of practice that must be taken into account in proceedings before the courts all reinforce the need to interpret the legislation purposefully.
In Beedles v Guinness Northern Counties Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 442l; [2011] PLSCS 116, the Court of Appeal was asked to construe the provisions requiring landlords to provide auxiliary aids and services to enable disabled people to “enjoy” their homes. Can these provisions be interpreted as transferring a positive contractual obligation to redecorate from a tenant to his landlord if the tenant cannot comply with his repairing obligations as a result of a disability?
The tenant suffered from epilepsy. He argued that, were he to decorate the premises himself, he would run the risk of suffering a seizure and being seriously injured. The landlord waived its right to require the tenant to redecorate (as well as its right to pursue a claim at the end of the lease), but the tenant felt unable to enjoy the premises because they had become shabby. The landlord denied that it was any obligation to redecorate.
The Code of Practice “Rights of Access: Services to the public, public authority functions, private clubs and premises” illustrates the ways in which a landlord can comply with its obligations to provide auxiliary aids and services. It suggests that an arthritic tenant in furnished accommodation can require a different chair and that a tenant with a hearing impairment can require a set of headphones to avoid having to turn up the volume on his television (which might annoy his neighbours). The code also describes the replacement of fuses by a management company as a reasonable step for a landlord to take.
The Court of Appeal accepted that these were all sensible illustrations of the meaning of the legislation, but ruled that the examples in the code do not govern the meaning of the statute. Had the landlord insisted on compliance with the repairing covenants, the tenant might have successfully argued that the landlord should change the terms of the lease to avoid jeopardising his safety.
However, “quiet enjoyment” means an ability to use premises in an ordinary lawful way. It had already been found as a fact that the tenant could live in the house without it being redecorated. Some work was easily remediable from ground level and was well within the tenant’s physical capabilities. Consequently, this was not a case in which the state of decoration had become so bad that it would be impossible or unreasonably difficult for the tenant to continue living in the premises – and enjoying them in that sense. None the less, the court did not rule that it would never be reasonable for a landlord to have to redecorate. Consequently, it is possible that the issue will appear again.
Allyson Colby is a property law consultant
