Caravan — Planning control – Enforcement notice – Planning inspector quashing enforcement notice on basis that structure introduced on agricultural land was caravan – Whether inspector erring in law in finding that assembled structure capable of being moved lawfully by road – Whether inspector erring in law by assessing planning control position at time of appeal – Appeal allowed
The interested party (E) and his family occupied a structure on their agricultural land that looked like a one-storey wooden house, but that E asserted was a caravan because it had been brought onto his land on a lorry and trailer in two parts that were subsequently bolted together. Following its arrival, the appellant council issued an enforcement notice on the basis that it constituted a material change of the agricultural use of the land and that there was no planning permission for a residence.
E appealed against that decision, inter alia, under section 174(1)(c) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, contending that planning control had not been breached because: (i) the structure constituted a caravan within section 13 of the Caravan Sites Act 1968; and (ii) building operations were adjacent to the caravan on which he was employed, and he occupied it for that purpose. By reason of the Part 5 of Schedule 2 to the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) Order 1995 and para 9 of Schedule 1 to the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960, a deemed planning permission arose and no specific permission for the change of use was necessary.
The respondent’s inspector found that the structure was a caravan in law and that relevant building operations were carried out lawfully pursuant to planning permission as at the date of the appeal. Therefore, she held that E and his family were occupying the structure for the purpose of his employment on the adjacent building works so that planning control had not been breached. The inspector allowed E’s appeal and quashed the enforcement notice.
The appellant appealed, contending that: (i) the inspector’s finding that the structure was a caravan had no evidential or rational basis; and (ii) alternatively, planning control had still been breached because of the absence of lawful building operations at the time of the enforcement notice, which, as a matter of law, was the relevant time to assess the position, and not, as the inspector found, as at the time of the appeal.
Held: The appeal was allowed.
(1) The structure purported to be a “twin-unit caravan” governed by section 13(1)(b) of the 1968 Act, which provided that such a structure, when assembled, could be moved by road (the mobility test).
The question of whether the mobility test had been satisfied was a question of fact rather than of planning judgment and the court would reluctantly interfere with an inspector’s findings of fact. It was for the appellant (in the instant case E) to prove that planning control had not been breached so the burden of satisfying the inspector that the structure was a caravan rested on him: Byrne v Secretary of State for the Environment (1997) 74 P&CR 420 and Brightlingsea Haven Ltd v Morris [2009] 1 EGLR 117 considered.
In the instant case, no evidence had been before the inspector, expert, technical or otherwise, as to whether the structure, when assembled, could be moved by road. E’s statement of case before the inspector had suggested that the appropriate way to move the structure would be first to dismantle it: that could not be treated as a formal admission that the structure could not be moved in one piece, but it was a relevant matter.
If the structure had been designed so as to comply with section 13(1)(b) of the 1968 Act, evidence might be available from the manufacturer to that effect and E’s failure to adduce any evidence on the point seemed a remarkable omission. Accordingly, the inspector’s decision would be quashed and the matter remitted for reconsideration.
(2) With regard to the timing issue, in examining the planning control position at the time of the appeal, the inspector had not erred in law.
The language of section 174(1)(c) did not prevent it from covering the case where, by the time of the appeal, planning control was not being breached. In the case of an appeal under section 174(1)(c), an appellant could, if necessary, rely on matters occurring since the date of the enforcement notice, but only to show that at the time of the appeal, the development that had occurred did not amount to a breach of planning control.
Eric Owen (instructed by the legal department of Bury Metropolitan Borough Council) appeared for the appellant; Sarah Hannett (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared for the respondent; the interested party did not appear and was not represented.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister
