Local authority – Homeless person – Duty to provide accommodation – Appellant’s husband and mother holding joint tenancy of matrimonial home – Appellant’s mother telling her to leave property – Respondent council denying duty to accommodate appellant – Whether court erring in law in upholding respondents’ decision that appellant had “home rights” entitling her to remain in occupation — Appeal dismissed
The appellant lived in a two-bedroom council house with her son, husband and her mother – the latter two had held a joint tenancy of the house from the respondent council since 2002. The appellant said that she was homeless, or was threatened with homelessness, because her mother had asked her to leave, and that the respondents were under a statutory duty to rehouse her.
The respondents decided that: (i) the appellant was not homeless since she should be treated as having accommodation available by reason of an implied licence to occupy from her mother and her husband; (ii) it would be reasonable for her to continue to occupy the house pursuant to section 184 of the Housing Act 1996; (iii) since her mother was only one of two joint tenants, she could not revoke her daughter’s licence to occupy; and (iv) as a spouse in the matrimonial home, the appellant had “home rights” under section 30 of the Family Law Act 1996, which prevented her from being evicted or excluded from the house occupied by her with her husband and son. Those rights included a right not to be evicted or excluded from a dwelling-house without the leave of the court. The respondents’ review officer and, on appeal, the county court recorder, upheld that decision.
The appellant appealed, contending that the recorder had erred in law by: (i) stepping outside her remit on the appeal by making findings of fact that had not been considered in the review decision under appeal; (ii) holding that one joint tenant could not unilaterally, and without the consent of the other, determine a licence granted to them both; and (iii) failing adequately to consider whether the respondents had determined whether it was reasonable for her to continue to occupy the house.
Held: The appeal was dismissed.
The criticisms of the recorder’s judgment were unjustified. She had correctly approached the appeal by reading the review decision as a whole and correctly concluded that it was not legally wrong. It had not been for the review officer to embark on a legal analysis of the mother’s power, as one joint tenant acting alone, to terminate a licence to occupy by reference to such cases as Annen v Rattee [1985] 1 EGLR 136; (1985) 273 EG 503, Robson-Paul v Farrugia (1969) 20 P&CR 820 and Hammersmith & Fulham London Borough Council v Monk [1992] 1 EGLR 65; [1992] 09 EG 135.
It was self-evident that the house was the matrimonial home within the meaning of the Family Law Act 1996 and that the mother’s joint tenancy and occupation of the house could not prevent section 30 from applying to protect the appellant from being evicted or excluded from the matrimonial home. It would be contrary to the objective of the statute and absurd, if the appellant were to be denied the protection of the Family Law Act 1996 merely because her husband had taken the tenancy of the home jointly with a person who was not his spouse.
Almost two years after the respondents had been approached for housing assistance, the mother had not enforced her request that the appellant should vacate, which was a relevant factor as to whether the appellant had somewhere to live. Moreover, the review officer had given proper consideration had been given as to whether it was reasonable for the appellant to live in the house.
Furthermore, the recorder had not strayed into making findings of disputed facts. The primary facts were not in dispute. The recorder had been entitled and bound to consider the legal significance of undisputed facts in the context of the Housing Act 1996 and section 30 of the Family Law Act 1996.
Christopher Baker and Victoria Osler (instructed by Gillian Radford & Company) appeared for the appellant; Ian Peacock (instructed by the legal department of Westminster City Council) appeared for the respondents.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister
