The issue of consistency in determining planning appeals arose again in Wainhomes (South West) Holdings Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2012] EWHC 914 (Admin) where the claimant sought to quash a decision of the Secretary of State on an appeal refusing outline planning permission for 1,300 dwellings and associated development on the outskirts of St Austell, Cornwall. One reason for refusal was based on the principle of prematurity.
In North Wiltshire District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment [1992] 3 PLR 113, Mann LJ stated that one important reason why previous appeal decisions are capable of being material, is that like cases should be decided in a like manner to ensure consistency in the process. (The term “like cases” in this context means cases not distinguishable in some relevant aspect.) This does not mean that like cases must be decided alike. The decision maker must always exercise his own judgment. He is therefore free to disagree with the judgment of another. But before doing so, he ought to have regard to the importance of consistency and give his reasons for departure from the previous decision. This is so whether the decisions relate to the same appeal site, or to two different ones.
The claimant’s main ground of challenge in Wainhomes was the apparent inconsistency between the Secretary of State’s decision, and his decision in an earlier planning appeal in respect of a site outside Bude, Cornwall in which the issue of prematurity also arose. Both appeals involved residential development, the same local planning authority and the same emerging core strategy. In the Bude appeal, however, the Secretary of State had granted planning permission following his conclusion that no material harm would be caused by the release of the site for development in advance of adoption of development plan documents.
The court rejected the claimant’s argument and dismissed the application, holding that the Bude appeal decision was not a material consideration by reference to consistency. It was distinguishable. The proposed development there was only one quarter the size of the St Austell development. The two proposals concerned different towns, and were intended to extend those towns in different ways. For those reasons alone, the Secretary of State was not required to explain why he took a different view as to prematurity in the present case.
John Martin
