Collective enfranchisement – Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 1993 – Valuation – Parking spaces – Parking spaces not included in demise to lessees but instead forming part of appellant landlord’s reserved property – Whether spaces having immediate value – Leasehold valuation tribunal deferring value to end of existing lease terms – Whether immediate value precluded on ground that sale or letting of parking spaces interfering with rights of lessees – Whether lessess having right to park or some lesser right – Appeal dismissed The appellant was the freeholder of a property containing six flats let on long leases, which was the subject of a collective enfranchisement claim by the respondent under the Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 1993. The matter was referred to the leasehold valuation tribunal (LVT) to determine the price payable to the appellant on enfranchisement. An issue arose as to the value to be attributed to three marked parking spaces to the rear of the property. These formed part of a surfaced area of land extending to the side and rear, which was not demised by any of the leases and formed part of the reserved property of the appellant. The relevant lease provisions prohibited any vehicle from being left on the reserved property, although they conferred rights of access and egress over it and the right to use it in common with the lessees and occupiers of all the flats. The LVT found that the parking spaces would have a value of £24,000 if they were capable of being sold with immediate effect. However, it found that they could not be sold since the leaseholders had a legal right to park, arguably acquired by prescription or by reason of an estoppel, notwithstanding the terms of the leases. In reaching that conclusion, it found that the lessees had in fact used the parking spaces on a Òfirst come first servedÓ basis. It therefore determined that the value should be deferred to the end of the unexpired term of the leases, at a rate of 5%, to produce a valuation of only £1,150.15. The appellant contended that the LVT had erroneously relied on the principles of prescriptive rights and estoppel without conducting any proper consideration or analysis of the legal requirements for the accrual of such rights. The respondent submitted that even if there were no right to park, the appellant still could not sell or let the parking spaces without interfering with the lessees’ other rights over the reserved land. Decision: The appeal was dismissed. (1) The terms of the leases expressly prohibited any right to park. No such right could arise by implication, both because of the express terms of the lease and because the case lacked any sufficiently exceptional features to justify such an implication: Moncrieff v Jamieson [2007] UKHL 42; [2007] 1 WLR 2620; [2007] 43 EG 200 (CS) distinguished. The LVT had erred in finding that a right to park had accrued by prescription or estoppel, in the absence of any specific evidence to support such a conclusion. Moreover, no such rights could arise as a matter of law. As to prescription, a tenant could not prescribe against its own landlord: Gayford v Moffatt (1868) 4 Ch App 133 applied. As to estoppel, this required that a representation be relied on to the detriment of the party seeking the estoppel: Gillett v Holt [2001] Ch 210 applied. Even if there were any evidence of a representation by the appellant, on which the respondent had relied, there was no relevant detriment. The provision of parking spaces, where parking was expressly prohibited by the terms of the leases, was a benefit not a detriment. (2) The LVT had none the less correctly concluded that the parking spaces had no immediate value. That conclusion flowed by implication from the rights granted to the lessees. Although there was no evidence that the use of the parking spaces interfered with access to or egress from the premises, the right of access and egress also carried with it the necessary incidental right to stop in order to unload or load passengers and goods, without leaving the vehicle. That incidental right was necessary in order to ensure that the vehicular right of way was more than merely illusory. The right included the area that had been demarcated as parking spaces at the rear of the house. There was therefore an implied right to stop, load and unload and to make use of that part of the reserved premises laid out as parking spaces. That right would be interfered with if the parking spaces were to be sold to a third party. It followed that the value of £24,000 for the reserved property should be deferred for the remainder of the unexpired term. Oliver Radley-Gardner (instructed by P Chevalier & Co, of Chessington) appeared for the appellant; Simon Sinatt (instructed by Woolley Bevis Diplock LLP, of Brighton) appeared for the respondent. Sally Dobson, barrister
Sinclair Garden Investments Ltd v 2 Medina Villas Ltd
Collective enfranchisement – Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 1993 – Valuation – Parking spaces – Parking spaces not included in demise to lessees but instead forming part of appellant landlord’s reserved property – Whether spaces having immediate value – Leasehold valuation tribunal deferring value to end of existing lease terms – Whether immediate value precluded on ground that sale or letting of parking spaces interfering with rights of lessees – Whether lessess having right to park or some lesser right – Appeal dismissed
The appellant was the freeholder of a property containing six flats let on long leases, which was the subject of a collective enfranchisement claim by the respondent under the Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 1993. The matter was referred to the leasehold valuation tribunal (LVT) to determine the price payable to the appellant on enfranchisement. An issue arose as to the value to be attributed to three marked parking spaces to the rear of the property. These formed part of a surfaced area of land extending to the side and rear, which was not demised by any of the leases and formed part of the reserved property of the appellant. The relevant lease provisions prohibited any vehicle from being left on the reserved property, although they conferred rights of access and egress over it and the right to use it in common with the lessees and occupiers of all the flats.
The LVT found that the parking spaces would have a value of £24,000 if they were capable of being sold with immediate effect. However, it found that they could not be sold since the leaseholders had a legal right to park, arguably acquired by prescription or by reason of an estoppel, notwithstanding the terms of the leases. In reaching that conclusion, it found that the lessees had in fact used the parking spaces on a Òfirst come first servedÓ basis. It therefore determined that the value should be deferred to the end of the unexpired term of the leases, at a rate of 5%, to produce a valuation of only £1,150.15.
The appellant contended that the LVT had erroneously relied on the principles of prescriptive rights and estoppel without conducting any proper consideration or analysis of the legal requirements for the accrual of such rights. The respondent submitted that even if there were no right to park, the appellant still could not sell or let the parking spaces without interfering with the lessees’ other rights over the reserved land.
Decision: The appeal was dismissed.
(1) The terms of the leases expressly prohibited any right to park. No such right could arise by implication, both because of the express terms of the lease and because the case lacked any sufficiently exceptional features to justify such an implication: Moncrieff v Jamieson [2007] UKHL 42; [2007] 1 WLR 2620; [2007] 43 EG 200 (CS) distinguished. The LVT had erred in finding that a right to park had accrued by prescription or estoppel, in the absence of any specific evidence to support such a conclusion. Moreover, no such rights could arise as a matter of law. As to prescription, a tenant could not prescribe against its own landlord: Gayford v Moffatt (1868) 4 Ch App 133 applied. As to estoppel, this required that a representation be relied on to the detriment of the party seeking the estoppel: Gillett v Holt [2001] Ch 210 applied. Even if there were any evidence of a representation by the appellant, on which the respondent had relied, there was no relevant detriment. The provision of parking spaces, where parking was expressly prohibited by the terms of the leases, was a benefit not a detriment.
(2) The LVT had none the less correctly concluded that the parking spaces had no immediate value. That conclusion flowed by implication from the rights granted to the lessees. Although there was no evidence that the use of the parking spaces interfered with access to or egress from the premises, the right of access and egress also carried with it the necessary incidental right to stop in order to unload or load passengers and goods, without leaving the vehicle. That incidental right was necessary in order to ensure that the vehicular right of way was more than merely illusory. The right included the area that had been demarcated as parking spaces at the rear of the house. There was therefore an implied right to stop, load and unload and to make use of that part of the reserved premises laid out as parking spaces. That right would be interfered with if the parking spaces were to be sold to a third party. It followed that the value of £24,000 for the reserved property should be deferred for the remainder of the unexpired term.
Oliver Radley-Gardner (instructed by P Chevalier & Co, of Chessington) appeared for the appellant; Simon Sinatt (instructed by Woolley Bevis Diplock LLP, of Brighton) appeared for the respondent.
Sally Dobson, barrister