Proprietary estoppel – Detrimental reliance – Remedy – Respondents claiming entitlement to property – Whether such entitlement arising as a result of representation by deceased owner as to intention to leave the property to the respondents in his will if they moved in – Whether detriment to respondents insufficient to justify award of entire property – Appeal dismissed In August 2001, the respondent couple moved with their children from their home in Sheffield to live with the first respondent’s uncle and godfather in his property, a large house in Cornwall set in 15 acres of grounds. Relations between the uncle and the respondents deteriorated and, in June 2009, the respondents discovered that the uncle was not intending to leave the property to them in his will as they claimed he had promised to do. The uncle brought proceedings for a declaration that the respondents had no beneficial interest in the property and were no more than licensees and tenants. After his death, aged 90, his claim was continued by the appellants as his executors. The respondents counterclaimed for a declaration that they were entitled to the property under the principles of proprietary estoppel. In the county court, the claim was dismissed and the counterclaim was allowed. The judge found that the second respondent had been reluctant to move because of local family ties, but had been persuaded to do so by the uncle, who considered that the respondents’ presence would improve security at the property and who had represented that he would leave it to them in his will if they wanted it. The judge found that the respondents had acted to their detriment in reliance on that representation, both by the move itself and by carrying out improvements to the property, notwithstanding that they also benefited from the move and were the immediate beneficiaries of much of the work; he also found that they had contributed to the uncle’s care. He concluded that the proprietary estoppel claim was made out and that the appropriate remedy was a declaration that the entire property was held on trust for the respondents, provided that they bore the inheritance tax attributable to it. The appellants appealed. They contended that: (i) a draft letter composed by the uncle in July 2001, coupled with a refusal to confirm his intentions to the respondents in writing, negated any intention to leave the property to them; and (ii) if there was any representation as alleged, any detriment suffered by the respondents in reliance on it was balanced out by the benefits to them, such that it was disproportionate to award them the entire property. Held: The appeal was dismissed. (1) The judge had made proper and sufficient findings as to the uncle’s representations and their cumulative effect on the second respondent, and through her on the first respondent. It had been open to him to find that neither the contents of the draft letter, nor the uncle’s refusal to confirm his intentions in writing, negated the promise that he had previously made to the second respondent that he would the property to the respondents if they came to live there. The judge had been entitled to find that neither of those matters amounted to a communication to the respondents that the uncle reserved to himself the right to deal with the property as he thought fit in his will. They did not negate the existence of a continuing and operative representation that remained in force at the time when the respondents moved into the property in reliance on it; nor did they render such reliance unreasonable. (2) On the issue of detrimental reliance, there were several elements in the case to which no conventional or measurable value could be assigned. These included the advantage of living in a house with large and pleasant grounds, on the one hand, and, on the other, the fact that the second respondent was living there a long way away from her family. Other factors could be assigned some kind of value, including the cost and value of works done to the property. The judge had legitimately taken the view that, despite the immediate advantage that some of the works might have provided, in terms of the occupation of the property by the respondents and their children, the respondents would not have carried them out had they not believed that they were assured of more than the ability to live at the property for the uncle’s lifetime. He had been entitled to conclude that the works amounted to detrimental reliance. Moreover, the requirement for the respondents to bear the inheritance tax on the property reduced the value of the award to them. The judge had directed himself correctly as to the law, taken into account all relevant factual considerations and carried out an evaluan of the benefits and disadvantages and how the respondents would be placed if the claimants were permitted to resile from the uncles representation. He had committed no error in carrying out that process or in the conclusion that he reached: Thorner v Majors [2009] UKHL 18; [2009] 1 WLR 776; [2009] 2 EGLR 111 and Jennings v Rice [2002] EWCA Civ 159; [2002] 1 FCR 501 considered. Leslie Blohm QC and Philip Jenkins (instructed by Wolferstans, of Plymouth) appeared for the appellants; Alexander Learmonth (instructed by Foot Anstey LLP, Exeter) appeared for the respondents. Sally Dobson, barrister
Proprietary estoppel – Detrimental reliance – Remedy – Respondents claiming entitlement to property – Whether such entitlement arising as a result of representation by deceased owner as to intention to leave the property to the respondents in his will if they moved in – Whether detriment to respondents insufficient to justify award of entire property – Appeal dismissed In August 2001, the respondent couple moved with their children from their home in Sheffield to live with the first respondent’s uncle and godfather in his property, a large house in Cornwall set in 15 acres of grounds. Relations between the uncle and the respondents deteriorated and, in June 2009, the respondents discovered that the uncle was not intending to leave the property to them in his will as they claimed he had promised to do. The uncle brought proceedings for a declaration that the respondents had no beneficial interest in the property and were no more than licensees and tenants. After his death, aged 90, his claim was continued by the appellants as his executors. The respondents counterclaimed for a declaration that they were entitled to the property under the principles of proprietary estoppel. In the county court, the claim was dismissed and the counterclaim was allowed. The judge found that the second respondent had been reluctant to move because of local family ties, but had been persuaded to do so by the uncle, who considered that the respondents’ presence would improve security at the property and who had represented that he would leave it to them in his will if they wanted it. The judge found that the respondents had acted to their detriment in reliance on that representation, both by the move itself and by carrying out improvements to the property, notwithstanding that they also benefited from the move and were the immediate beneficiaries of much of the work; he also found that they had contributed to the uncle’s care. He concluded that the proprietary estoppel claim was made out and that the appropriate remedy was a declaration that the entire property was held on trust for the respondents, provided that they bore the inheritance tax attributable to it. The appellants appealed. They contended that: (i) a draft letter composed by the uncle in July 2001, coupled with a refusal to confirm his intentions to the respondents in writing, negated any intention to leave the property to them; and (ii) if there was any representation as alleged, any detriment suffered by the respondents in reliance on it was balanced out by the benefits to them, such that it was disproportionate to award them the entire property. Held: The appeal was dismissed. (1) The judge had made proper and sufficient findings as to the uncle’s representations and their cumulative effect on the second respondent, and through her on the first respondent. It had been open to him to find that neither the contents of the draft letter, nor the uncle’s refusal to confirm his intentions in writing, negated the promise that he had previously made to the second respondent that he would the property to the respondents if they came to live there. The judge had been entitled to find that neither of those matters amounted to a communication to the respondents that the uncle reserved to himself the right to deal with the property as he thought fit in his will. They did not negate the existence of a continuing and operative representation that remained in force at the time when the respondents moved into the property in reliance on it; nor did they render such reliance unreasonable. (2) On the issue of detrimental reliance, there were several elements in the case to which no conventional or measurable value could be assigned. These included the advantage of living in a house with large and pleasant grounds, on the one hand, and, on the other, the fact that the second respondent was living there a long way away from her family. Other factors could be assigned some kind of value, including the cost and value of works done to the property. The judge had legitimately taken the view that, despite the immediate advantage that some of the works might have provided, in terms of the occupation of the property by the respondents and their children, the respondents would not have carried them out had they not believed that they were assured of more than the ability to live at the property for the uncle’s lifetime. He had been entitled to conclude that the works amounted to detrimental reliance. Moreover, the requirement for the respondents to bear the inheritance tax on the property reduced the value of the award to them. The judge had directed himself correctly as to the law, taken into account all relevant factual considerations and carried out an evaluan of the benefits and disadvantages and how the respondents would be placed if the claimants were permitted to resile from the uncles representation. He had committed no error in carrying out that process or in the conclusion that he reached: Thorner v Majors [2009] UKHL 18; [2009] 1 WLR 776; [2009] 2 EGLR 111 and Jennings v Rice [2002] EWCA Civ 159; [2002] 1 FCR 501 considered. Leslie Blohm QC and Philip Jenkins (instructed by Wolferstans, of Plymouth) appeared for the appellants; Alexander Learmonth (instructed by Foot Anstey LLP, Exeter) appeared for the respondents. Sally Dobson, barrister