In both Collins (see PP 2012/135) and Koumis (see PP 2012/136) there had been appeals to the Secretary of State against both (1) the refusal by the local planning authority (“LPA”) to grant planning permission and (2) the issue by the LPA of an enforcement notice. In each case the appeals were dismissed and challenges in the High Court followed, relying upon sections 288 and 289 respectively of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. One obvious difference between the two processes is that in the case of a challenge under section 288 the “person aggrieved” by the refusal to grant planning permission on appeal makes his application as of right. Against that, a person appealing under section 289 against the decision to uphold an enforcement notice requires – by virtue of section 289(6) – the permission of the court. Perhaps even more important, however, is the difference between the time limits involved in the two processes. The effect of section 288(3) is that the “person aggrieved” must make his application to the court within six weeks from the date on which the decision on his planning appeal is made. That time limit is absolute. In the event of a failure to comply with it, the court loses all jurisdiction and is not entitled to give any further consideration to the proceedings. There is no power in the court to extend the time limit, as it is set by statute and not by the CPR. By way of contrast, the time limit for an application for permission to appeal under section 289 is twenty-eight days after notice of the enforcement notice appeal decision is given to the applicant. This is provided by CPR Rule 52.20 and its accompanying Practice Direction. As a consequence, the court has a power under CPR Rule 3.1 to extend time for compliance with the time limit, even though the application for extension is made after the time limit has expired. In Collins the application for permission to appeal under section 289 had been made out of time, and the defendant took the point. However, the court concluded that as the planning and enforcement notice appeals had been heard together, and the substance of the issues between the parties fully argued, the objection was in essence a technical one. For that reason, the court extended time for applying for permission. John Martin
In both Collins (see PP 2012/135) and Koumis (see PP 2012/136) there had been appeals to the Secretary of State against both (1) the refusal by the local planning authority (“LPA”) to grant planning permission and (2) the issue by the LPA of an enforcement notice. In each case the appeals were dismissed and challenges in the High Court followed, relying upon sections 288 and 289 respectively of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.
One obvious difference between the two processes is that in the case of a challenge under section 288 the “person aggrieved” by the refusal to grant planning permission on appeal makes his application as of right. Against that, a person appealing under section 289 against the decision to uphold an enforcement notice requires – by virtue of section 289(6) – the permission of the court. Perhaps even more important, however, is the difference between the time limits involved in the two processes.
The effect of section 288(3) is that the “person aggrieved” must make his application to the court within six weeks from the date on which the decision on his planning appeal is made. That time limit is absolute. In the event of a failure to comply with it, the court loses all jurisdiction and is not entitled to give any further consideration to the proceedings. There is no power in the court to extend the time limit, as it is set by statute and not by the CPR.
By way of contrast, the time limit for an application for permission to appeal under section 289 is twenty-eight days after notice of the enforcement notice appeal decision is given to the applicant. This is provided by CPR Rule 52.20 and its accompanying Practice Direction. As a consequence, the court has a power under CPR Rule 3.1 to extend time for compliance with the time limit, even though the application for extension is made after the time limit has expired.
In Collins the application for permission to appeal under section 289 had been made out of time, and the defendant took the point. However, the court concluded that as the planning and enforcement notice appeals had been heard together, and the substance of the issues between the parties fully argued, the objection was in essence a technical one. For that reason, the court extended time for applying for permission.
John Martin
