Town and Country Planning – Planning permission – Local authority development – Defendants’ planning committee granting permission for green belt development – Claimant city council applying for judicial review – Whether defendants having regard to development plan – Whether defendants giving adequate reasons for decision – Whether defendants erring in failing to regard application as premature – Application dismissed
The claimant city council applied for judicial review of a decision of the defendant council to grant planning permission for the development of a green field site by the demolition of two houses and the construction of Truro Eastern District Centre to comprise park and ride, a household waste and recycling facility, a Cornish Food Centre, an energy centre, hub building, a residential development of 97 dwellings and separate lodge house, the formation of four new vehicular accesses, car and cycle parking, open space, landscaping, and associated works.
The claimants had objected to the development. They argued that the planning application was premature, the proposal would result in the loss of high quality agricultural land, it would cause material harm to and adversely impact upon the vitality of Truro city centre contrary to policy in PPS4 and would be in conflict with the development plan, especially because new residential development in the open countryside was not justified.
The application was considered over a number of months and in December 2011 and, following consideration of lengthy reports presented to the defendants’ strategic planning committee, planning permission was granted for the development in October 2012.
The principal issues to be determined on the claimants’ application for judicial review were whether the defendants had: (i) complied with their duty under section 38(6) of the Planning Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 to have regard to the development plan; (ii) given adequate reasons for the grant of permission pursuant to article 31 of the Town and Country Planning (Development Management Procedure)(England) Order 2010 (SI 2010/2184); and (iii) erred in failing to refuse planning permission on the grounds of prematurity.
Held: The application was dismissed.
(1) On analysis, it was apparent that the defendants had been aware of the primacy of the development plan and had not relegated it to the category of other material considerations. The conflict of the proposed development with the development plan had been recognised throughout the process as evidenced in the reports to the committee. It was important to read the reports as a whole and the defendants had done so and applied rigour to their approach by first looking at the development plan position and then considering other material considerations and the weight to be attached to them. Even when focusing on the retail aspects, the report had taken the development plan as their starting point, then considered national policy and reached conclusions on the acceptability or otherwise of the proposal. When the defendants departed from the development plan, the reasons for so doing, on a fair reading of the reports, were clear. It was not realistic to expect every officer report to consider each development plan policy on an individual basis and in each case set out with particularity why that policy was no longer up to date and to be followed. The degree of particularity required would vary on a case-by-case basis. What was needed was a clear examination of the development plan and the policies relevant to the application in question. If it was not to be followed, because material considerations indicated otherwise, those material considerations had to be clearly set out together with the weight attached to them so that it was clear that they overrode the statutory development plan, which was what the report had done in the present case: Edinburgh City Council v Secretary of State for Scotland [1997] UKHL 38; [1997] 3 PLR 71 and Cala Homes (South) Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2011] EWHC 97 (Admin); [2011] PLSCS 45 considered.
(2) Where, as here, members of the committee had followed their officer recommendation and there was no indication that they had disagreed with the reasoning in the report leading to the recommendation, a relatively brief summary of reasons might well be adequate. The majority of members had acceded to the recommendation made. The fact that a significant minority were exercising their democratic right to vote against the application did not affect the approach to the giving of reasons. The members had initially been troubled by various aspects of the application before them and so had deferred the decision before delegating approval to officers upon being satisfied with the additional information received in a second report. There was no necessity, therefore, to provide extensive reasons. The duty of the local planning authority was to provide reasons for the granting of planning permission, not to repeat each of the main issues in the report and set out how they had been resolved. In that context, it was not surprising that there was no mention of conflict with the development plan or prematurity which were had not been reasons for the grant of permission. They were prior issues which had arisen and been resolved by the members as part of the balancing exercise undertaken to determine whether planning permission should be granted: R (on the application of Tratt) v Horsham District Council [2007] EWHC 1485 (Admin); [2007] PLSCS 117, R (on the application of Siraj) v Kirklees Council [2012] EWCA Civ 1286, R (on the application of Telford Trustee No 1 Ltd and Telford Trustee No 2 Ltd) v Telford and Wrekin Council [2011] EWCA Civ 896; [2011] PLSCS 200 and R (on the application of Prideaux) v Buckinghamshire County Council [2013] EWHC 1054 (Admin); [2013] PLSCS 129 considered.
(3) The defendants had not erred in the way they approached the issue of prematurity. They had followed the guidance set out in the Planning System: General Principles, considered the existing and emergent development plan position and concluded that little weight could attach to either. Nothing could be identified in any emerging document which could be pre-empted by the development proposals. The alternative would have been to await an uncertain timetable and uncertain outcome of the development plan process. The defendants had then considered the need for the application, taken account of the benefits that flowed from it and concluded that they were overriding factors. There was nothing irrational or in error in the way that the defendants had proceeded: Arlington Securities Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment and Crawley Borough Council [1989] 2 EGLR 179 and Larkfleet Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2012] EWHC 3592 considered.
Philip Coppel QC (instructed by Follett Stock LLP) appeared for the claimant; Jonathan Clay (instructed by Cornwall Council Legal Services) appeared for the defendant.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister
