Town and country planning – Development – Planning permission – First defendant secretary of state refusing planning application for motorway service area – Claimants applying to quash decision – Whether first defendant making inconsistent, irrational and unreasonable decision – Application dismissed
The three claimant companies had all sought planning permission for a motorway service area on the A1/A1(M) road in North Yorkshire, in the stretch between Wetherby to the south and Barton to the north. The claimants’ schemes were all rivals to each other, to the first interested party and to a fifth proposal for a truck stop area, because all the parties accepted that, if there was a need for a motorway service area on the relevant section of the A1, there was not a need for more than one.
An inspector appointed by the first defendant secretary of state held a public inquiry to consider all five proposals. The inspector recommended that the third claimant’s proposal should be accepted but rejected the other four.
The first defendant decided to grant planning permission for a motorway service area proposed by the first interested party and for the truck stop proposal. The claimants’ proposals for a motorway service area at sites elsewhere on the same section of the A1 were refused. The claimants challenged that decision under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The relevant local authorities were joined as parties to the proceedings but did not appear and were not represented.
They contended, among other things, that the first defendant had given inconsistent, irrational, unreasonable and inadequate reasons for his decision that the proposal put forward by the first interested party would best meet the need for a motorway service area in that section of the A1.
Held: The application was dismissed.
(1) The decision that the first defendant had to make involved a classic exercise of planning balance and judgment and his assessment of four admittedly imperfect proposals was both reasonable and clearly explained. He had concluded, taking everything into account, that the proposal he ought to approve was that of the first interested party because of its conformity with the development plan, which made it unique among the rival schemes, and the sustainability of the development, which would not involve any encroachment into the countryside or any loss of best and most versatile agricultural land or any visual harm. There was no evidence of any impediment to the motorway service area and its access being constructed, or to show that, once opened, it could not be run as a viable business. The first defendant had weighed all the relevant considerations, comparing the balance of advantage and disadvantage for all the proposals and had concluded that the proposal of the first interested party was the best of the four. The court would be trespassing beyond its function if it sought to interfere with that judgment and it would not do so. Far from being internally inconsistent and irrational, the first defendant’s conclusions on the question of need, on the ability of the proposed development to meet it, and on the relative merits of the competing proposals, were entirely coherent and clear. They could not be said to be irrational and in a public law challenge they were unimpeachable.
(2) The decision-maker had to provide intelligible and adequate reasons on the main issues in dispute, knowing that the decision would be read by an informed audience. In this case the audience for the decision included the claimants, who had all taken part in a lengthy public inquiry, submitting evidence and argument to the inspectors on the merits of their own proposals and their rivals’. Both the need for an additional motorway service area and the ability of each proposed development to meet it were central issues. But the first defendant’s conclusions on those issues did not have to be elaborate. His reasons, read fairly as a whole, were a straightforward explanation of the decision he reached, in the light of the inspectors’ reports. They showed how he came to his own conclusions on the issue of need, and on the choice of the right development to meet it. They were both intelligible and adequate: South Bucks District Council v Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions [2004] 4 PLR 50 applied.
(3) The first defendant had been entitled to exercise his judgment on matters differently from the inspector. In the end it was the first defendant’s planning judgment that mattered and there was nothing to suggest that that judgment had been infected by any misunderstanding or misapplication of planning policy. The first defendant had discussed the salient points of advantage and disadvantage for each proposal as he had seen them, including the fact that the first interested party’s site would only be 12 miles from another potential site. He was not to be criticised for saying nothing about some hypothetical future proposal and its merits. What he had to do and had done was to decide whether planning permission should be granted for any of the proposals that had actually been before him and, if so, for which. He had done that by applying the relevant provisions of the development plan and having regard to all material considerations, including government policy in the circular: Tesco Stores Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment [1995] 2 EGLR 147; [1995] 27 EG 154 applied.
Richard Moules (instructed by Walton & Co (Planning Lawyers) Ltd) appeared for the first claimant; Sonal Barot (instructed by Iliffes Booth Bennett) appeared for the second claimant; Clive Newberry QC and Sarah Sackman (instructed by Manches LLP) appeared for the third claimant; Tim Buley and Jacqueline Lean (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared for the first defendant; The second and third defendants did not appear and were not represented; James Maurici QC (instructed by Ward Hadaway) appeared for the first interested party; The second interested party did not appear and was not represented; Robert Fookes (instructed by Savills) appeared for the third interested party.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister
