Conservation area – Designation – Section 69 of Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Area) Act 1990 – Defendant local authority designating former greyhound racing track as conservation area – Claimant objector applying to quash decision – Whether site constituting “area” for section 69 purposes – Whether decision being irrational – Whether officer’s report containing errors and omissions – Whether designation being made for improper purpose – Application dismissed
The defendant local authority designated Oxford Stadium, a former greyhound racing track and speedway stadium on the edge of Blackbird Leys, to the south east of Oxford, as a conservation area pursuant to section 69 of the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Area) Act 1990. The site covered 3.4 hectares and comprised the greyhound racing and speedway tracks which surrounded a grassed central area with a go-kart track. The track, with its lighting columns, was surrounded by buildings associated with the former uses, including a grandstand, terraces, tote building, pits, traps, kennels and a paddock, yards, turnstiles, sheds and offices, kiosk, Nissen hut and a toilet block. It was not a visually attractive site, none of the buildings were listed and the defendants had not sought statutory listing for any, realistically recognising that it would be refused.
The owners wished to develop the stadium site with the erection of 220 residential dwellings. The claimant, one of the joint owners, challenged that decision on the grounds that: (i) the stadium was not an “area” for the purposes of section 69; (ii) the decision was irrational; (iii) the planning officer’s report was misleading and contained errors and material omissions; and (iv) the designation was for the improper purpose of preventing or inhibiting the redevelopment of the site for housing purposes.
Held: The application was dismissed.
(1) In deciding whether the designation was of an “area” for the purpose of section 69, the defendants first had to establish the lawful requisites for such an area and apply those requisites to the facts rationally. The word area had a very wide scope and connoted some unspecific size, but going beyond a mere mathematical square footage. The fact that the proposed area was enclosed as a single entity, albeit now in disparate uses or abandoned, did not prevent in law the enclosure, and the land and buildings within, being an area for section 69 purposes. The absence of public access or visibility went only to the desirability of preserving or enhancing the area. Single ownership was irrelevant other than perhaps to that issue. The defendants had not erred in their understanding of the concept of an “area” for the purposes of section 69: R v Surrey County Council, ex parte Oakimber [1995] 70 P & CR 649 and Metro Construction Ltd v Barnet London Borough Council [2009] EWHC 2956 (Admin); [2009] PLSCS 327 considered.
(2) The designation of the stadium as a conservation area was not irrational. The justification was unusual in the emphasis placed on the ephemeral quality of the buildings. They were of a mundane quality at best but those were features which were acknowledged in the conservation area appraisal (CAA) and the planning officer’s report and were part of the historic interest and character which the defendants saw as worth preserving or enhancing, not just for their sporting associations but for their associations with the surrounding factory, suburban developments and their residents’ leisure and sport. Moreover, it was not just the buildings, individually or together, which were the focus of designation but the whole, i.e. tracks, central open area, stands, paddocks, kennels, pits and other buildings and areas which gave the stadium site the interest and character which lay behind the designation. Assuming there was no improper purpose behind the designation, the court could not hold that the planning judgment, explicit and reasoned as it was, was not one to which a reasonable planning authority could come. The fact that no building within the site was of listable quality did not show the decision to be irrational. The relationship to the surrounding area gave the existing site interest and character beyond the intrinsic qualities of the buildings alone.
(3) The asserted failings in the officer’s report had to be considered independently of the premise that the designation decision had been motivated by a desire to prevent the demolition and redevelopment of the site. The report was thorough, taken with the CAA which was appended to it, which laid out the case for designation clearly. It set out the relevant legal framework and the issues to be considered and rational reasons why the officer had made the recommendation for designation. The report could seem imbalanced because of the absence of what the claimant and other objectors had to say but that omission was adequately made up for by the inclusion of the CAA and the claimant’s report and the reference in the officer’s report to the fact that the consultation responses would be reported on at the meeting.
(4) There was no evidence either in the officer’s report or the CAA that the desire to prevent demolition had been taken into account in the assessment of the interest of the area or in the worth of its character. There was no inference to be drawn from the mere fact of designation that account had to be taken of an irrelevant consideration or that an improper purpose was afoot, since the decision followed a rational assessment of the interest and character if what was lawfully seen as an “area” for purposes of section 69 of the 1990 Act: Trillium (Prime) Property GP Ltd v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [2011] EWHC 146 (Admin); [2011] PLSCS 412 considered.
Thomas Hill QC and Philippa Jackson (instructed by Asserson Law Offices) appeared for the claimant; Anthony Crean QC and John Hunter (instructed by Oxford City Council) appeared for the defendants.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister
