Town and country planning – Development plan document – Time limit – Section 113 of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 – Defendant parish council seeking order quashing development plan document – Claimant city council applying to strike out application as being time-barred – Whether, where time limit for making application to quash development plan document ended on Sunday when court office closed, time limit ending on next working day – Application dismissed
The claimant city council applied to strike out a claim made by the defendant parish council pursuant to section 113 of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 for an order quashing a development plan document which contained the core strategy adopted by the claimants for their area.
By section 113 of the 2004 Act, an application to quash a development plan document had to be made no later than the end of the period of six weeks starting with the relevant date, here the date of adoption of the development plan document. In the present case, the development plan document had been adopted on 8 September 2014. The application to quash was made on Monday, 20 October 2014. The court office was closed on Sunday, 19 October 2014 and an application could not be made on that day. On a strict interpretation of section 113(34), the six-week period ended on the Sunday.
The question arose whether, when the last day for making an application fell on a date when the relevant court office was closed, so that an application could not be made on that day, section 113(4) was to be interpreted so that the period of six weeks for making an application ended on the next working day when an application could be made. If so, the period for making the application in this case would end on Monday, 20 October 2014 and the claim would not be barred by section 113(4).
Held: The application was dismissed.
(1) The need for short time-limits for bringing claims, and strict adherence to those time-limits, was recognised as particularly important in public law where challenges might affect not only the parties to the claim but also other third parties who might need to know whether or not a particular measure was valid. In the present context, challenges to the validity of measures brought under section 113 of the 2004 Act might affect not only the individual claimant and the defendant local planning authority. They might affect other property owners, other residents, and other applicants for planning permission. A development plan document formed part of the development plan and, by virtue of section 38(6) of the 2004 Act, applications for planning permission had to be determined in accordance with the development plan unless material considerations indicated otherwise. An approach to section 113(4) which adopted a strict, literalist approach might well be thought to be consistent with the concern to ensure certainty in relation to the validity of such measures.
However, in general terms, where a statutory provision provided that proceedings had to be brought no later than the end of a specified period, and the bringing of proceedings required that the court office be functioning, and the last day of the prescribed period fell on a day when the court office was closed, then the statutory provision was to be interpreted as permitting the proceedings to be brought on the next day when the court office was open. In the present case, the making of an application for an order to quash a development document could not be made unilaterally by the claimant and required the co-operation of the court office. If the last day of the six-week period prescribed by section 113(4) fell on a day when the court office was closed, then the claim may validly be brought on the next day when the court office was open. In cases involving section 113(4), the effect of permitting challenges to measures such as development plan documents might well affect persons other than the parties to the proceedings. If the proceedings were permitted to continue, and if a development plan document was quashed, that document ceased to be part of the development plan. That affected others who had applied for, or were about to apply for planning permission, and others affected by such applications as the applications in issue would be decided in accordance with the development plan unless material considerations indicated otherwise: Hodgson v Armstrong [1967] QB 299; 200 EG 1091, Pritam Kaur v S Russell & Sons Ltd. [1973] 1 QB 336, Aadan v The Mayor & Burgess of the London Borough of Brent [2000] 32 HLR 848 and Mucelli v Government of Albania [2009] 1 WLR 276 applied.
(3) The effect of the application of the general principle to section 113(4) was that persons would know that if the six-week period ended on a weekend, or a bank holiday when the court office was closed, the claim might be brought on the next working day. There would still be certainty about the application of the limitation period in section 113(4). Further, the prescribed time limit for bringing proceedings would not be unduly lengthened beyond what Parliament must have intended when enacting section 113(4). The general principle would only have the effect, in practical terms, of lengthening the period by one or two days (if the six week period ended on a weekend) or possibly three or four days (if it ended on the first day of a period where there were two Bank Holidays and a weekend). The time limit would still be short and would still have to be adhered to strictly as there was no provision for any discretionary extension of time.
Annabel Graham Paul (instructed by Nottingham City Council) appeared for the claimants; Richard Turney (instructed by the Direct Pubic Access) appeared for respondents.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister
Read a transcript of Nottingham City Council v Calverton Parish Council here
