The primary question for the court in Miaris v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2015] EWHC 1564 (Admin); [2015] PLSCS 170 was this: When there is no appeal against an enforcement notice on ground (a), namely that planning permission ought to be granted in respect of any breach of planning control to which the notice relates, in what circumstances may the secretary of state entertain an appeal against the notice on ground (f), namely that the steps required by the notice exceed what is necessary.
(In this context, it is important to remember that the effect of section 173(4) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (“the Act”) is that a local planning authority (“LPA”) may specify steps in an enforcement notice for the purpose of (A) remedying any breach of planning control and/or (B) remedying any injury to amenity. However, there is no requirement to state in the notice the purpose or purposes.)
In Miaris, the appellant owned premises the lawful use of which was as a restaurant. He changed that use to a mixed use of restaurant, drinking establishment and nightclub. The LPA was concerned about a consequential increase in pedestrian movements outside the premises, and a change in the pattern and timing of those movements. It was also concerned at an increase in noise, vibration and disturbance. It issued an enforcement notice requiring three things to stop, namely (i) the use of the premises as a drinking establishment (ii) the use of the premises as a nightclub and (iii) DJs being allowed to perform at the premises.
The appellant appealed to the secretary of state, but on ground (f) only. The inspector dismissed the appeal, concluding that in the absence of an appeal on ground (a) he was not entitled in the present case to take into account the general planning considerations raised by the appellant. They were more appropriate to a ground (a) appeal. The appellant then appealed to the court under section 289 of the Act, contending that the inspector had erred in law.
The court dismissed the appeal, holding as follows: An enforcement notice appeal made on ground (f) alone cannot be entertained when there is no appeal on ground (a) and the planning objections which the steps address are not limited to any injury to amenity. Here, the steps relevant steps were not ones merely seeking to remedy the injury to amenity that such uses had caused. (In other words, they were aimed also at remedying breaches of planning control.) Accordingly, the inspector had not erred in law.
John Martin is a planning law consultant
