Section 336(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (“the Act”) provides that for the purposes of the Planning Acts “building” includes “any structure or erection”. The court in R (on the application of McPhee) v South Downs National Park Authority (see PP 2015/132 and PP 2015/133) recently noted that decided authorities establish that three primary factors are relevant to the question of what is a “building” in this context. They are size, permanence and degree of physical attachment.
In terms of size, the court has earlier referred to structures “of such size that they either have been in fact, or would normally be, built or constructed on the [land] as opposed to being brought on to the [land] ready made”. In terms of permanence, the court has earlier referred to “some degree of permanence in relation to the [land], ie, things which once installed on the [land] would normally remain in situ, and only be removed by a process amounting to pulling down or taking to pieces”.
This issue has since come before the court once more in Gray v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2015] EWHC 2452 (Admin). There, the claimant applied under section 288 of the Act to quash, inter alia, the decision of an inspector on appeal refusing to grant a lawful development certificate in respect of a static caravan that had been incorporated less than ten years earlier into a timber framed and breeze block structure that had been constructed more than four years earlier.
The inspector had concluded that, as a matter of fact and degree, the caravan had not taken on a quality of permanence or become so integrated into other structures on the land so as to be deemed a building or part of a building. Furthermore, the siting of the caravan constituted a use of land that was not immune from enforcement under section 171B of the Act. The claimant contended that the inspector, in her approach, had erred in law.
The court dismissed the application, holding that the inspector had applied the right tests and had been entitled to reach the conclusions that she had on the evidence before her. Matters of fact and planning judgment were matters for her and not for the court. Furthermore, an application under section 288 of the Act was limited to points of law.
John Martin is a planning law consultant
