Town and country planning – Local planning authority – Mayor of London – Claimant applying for judicial review of direction by defendant mayor of London to act as local planning authority for purpose of planning and listed building consent applications – Whether defendant failing to have regard to material consideration – Whether defendant misinterpreting relevant criteria – Whether officer’s report being objective assessment – Application dismissed
The second interested party (BLL) applied for planning permission and listed building consent to construct a substantial development in the form of a mixed-use scheme on a site in the North Folgate area which lay to the east of Shoreditch High Street on the fringe of the City of London. The site had a listed structure, lay within a conservation area, and parts of it fell within a scheduled ancient monument and an area of archaeological importance. The first interested party local authority resolved that it was minded to refuse the applications.
The claimant wrote to the defendant Mayor of London, urging him not to issue a direction on the application, under section 2A of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 that he was to be the planning authority. The first interested party resolved to refuse the applications. The defendant subsequently directed, under article 7 of the Town and Country Planning (Mayor of London) Order 2008 (SI 2008/580) and the powers conferred by section 2A, that he be the local planning authority for the planning and listed building consent applications. The defendant then resolved to grant permission, subject to the second interested party entering into a section 106 agreement. The claimant applied for judicial review of that decision.
The claimant contended that: (i) the defendant had failed to have regard to a material consideration, namely its letter opposing a direction; (ii) the defendant’s conclusion had been vitiated by misinterpretation of the first criterion in article 7(1)(a), concerning significant impact on the implementation of the spatial development strategy, his having taken into account irrelevant matter, but having failed to have regard to relevant matter and had been inadequately reasoned; (iii) the defendant’s conclusion on article 7(1)(b), concerning significant effects on more than one London borough, had been vitiated by misinterpretation, taking into account irrelevant matters, failing to have regard to relevant matters and had been inadequately reasoned; and (iv) the officer’s report had not been an objective assessment, as his email showed that he had made up his mind before considering the referral from the first interested party.
Held: The application was dismissed.
(1) It had been unfortunate that the officer wrote his report in such a way as to give the impression that the claimant’s letter had been addressed in the report when it was unlikely that it had been. However, the issues raised by the claimant had actually been comprehensively addressed in the report. It was hard to see how the points taken by the claimant would have led to a different decision.
(2) The argument that the development would not have a significant impact on the implementation of a spatial development strategy was without merit. The report had given ample reasons why it would significantly affect implementation. The arguments on the effect on the development on the implementation of policies and employment had been enough to meet the criterion in article 7(1)(a).
(3) There could be no question that there would be some effects on more than one London borough. It had been for the report and the defendant to consider if they would be significant. There were ample reasons given in the report to justify the assessment of the effects as significant, and the report and the defendant had been perfectly entitled to have reached the planning judgment that they would occur.
(4) It had been unwise of the officer to send the email he did but a full and comprehensive report had actually been written, dealing with the objections to the development fairly. The report had not been written in a predetermined, inflexible cast of mind and it had not been unacceptably partisan. In any event, the objections to the principle of development, many of which focused on heritage and conservation issues, had not gone to the question of whether the article 7 criteria applied. The arguments about the effects of the implementation of the plan or of cross-boundary effects had been the same whatever view one took about the conservation or heritage aspects. It was highly unlikely that the arguments would have affected the view on whether the criteria for determination had been met: R v Teeside Development Corporation, ex parte William Morrison Supermarkets plc [1998] JPL 23 distinguished. R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p Kirkstall Valley Campaign Ltd [1997] 1 PLR 8 considered.
Richard Harwood QC (instructed by Richard Buxton Environmental and Public Law Solicitors, of Cambridge) appeared for the claimant; Daniel Kolinsky QC (instructed by Transport for London Legal) appeared for the defendant; The first interested party did not appear and was not represented; Russell Harris QC and Robert Walton (instructed by King & Wood Mallesons LLP) appeared for the second interested party.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister
