Back
Legal

First challenge to mayor’s call-in powers

In R (on the application of Spitalfields Historic Trust Ltd) v Mayor of London [2016] EWHC 1006 (Admin); [2016] PLSCS 134, the High Court has rejected the judicial review brought by Spitalfields Historic Trust Ltd against the (previous) mayor of London’s decision to call in the planning application made by British Land Property Management Ltd for the major mixed-use redevelopment of land at Norton Folgate, London.

The scheme comprises 26,030 sq m of offices, 3,387 sq m of shops and restaurants and 45 flats. The developer sought permission for the development and listed building consent. The council resolved that it was minded to refuse the applications. This prompted the mayor to use his powers to intervene under the Town and Country Planning Act (Mayor of London) Order 2008. In September 2015 he directed that he was to be the local planning authority for the purposes of the planning application and the associated listed building consent. He resolved to grant permission, subject to British Land entering into a section 106 agreement.

The claimant sought judicial review on the basis that the mayor had unlawfully concluded that the proposed development met the call-in criteria set out in Article 7 of the 2008 order. This was the first challenge to the exercise of the mayor’s call-in powers.

The court dismissed the application, holding that:

(1) It had been unwise of the officer to send an email to the applicant indicating he would recommend that the mayor should determine the apllication. However, the court was satisfied that the comprehensive report that had been subsequently prepared had dealt very fairly with all the objections to the development.

(2) The argument that the development would not have a significant impact on the implementation of a spatial development strategy was without merit. The report had given ample reasons why it would affect implementation. The arguments on the effect on the development on the implementation of policies and employment had been enough to meet the criterion in Article 7(1)(a) with ease.

(3) There were ample reasons given in the report to justify the assessment of the effects as significant, and the report and the mayor had been perfectly entitled to have reached the planning judgment that they would occur.

(4) The objections to the principle of development had not gone to the question of whether the Article 7 criteria had applied. The arguments about the effects of the implementation of the plan or of cross-boundary effects had been the same whatever view was taken about the conservation or heritage aspects. It was highly unlikely that the arguments would have affected the view on whether the criteria for determination had been met.

 

Martha Grekos is a partner and head of planning at Irwin Mitchell

Up next…