Parking scheme — Scheme introduced by council resolution — Appellant challenging validity — Whether bylaw required — Whether council having power to introduce scheme by virtue of section 21(1) of Housing Act 1985 — Appeal dismissed
The appellant was a tenant of a flat on a large council estate owned by the respondents. The respondents operated a parking scheme on the estate, which had been introduced by a council resolution rather than a bylaw. Under the scheme, parking was permitted only in designated bays and only if a resident’s or visitor’s permit was displayed in the vehicle, failing which it could be clamped and removed. The tenancy agreements for houses on the estate contained a provision preventing tenants from parking, or allowing visitors to park, in a “no parking” area and obliging them to co-operate with any parking control scheme that the respondents introduced.
On three occasions, the appellant was issued with a penalty charge notice for wrongful parking, pursuant to section 66(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1991, and on each occasion his car was clamped. His appeals to the respondents’ housing services manager were dismissed, and he brought proceedings in the county court in which he claimed, inter alia, that the parking scheme was invalid. He submitted that it should have been introduced under a bylaw pursuant to section 23(1) of the Housing Act 1985 and section 7(1) of the Greater London Council (General Powers) Act 1975, both of which provided for local authorities to pass bylaws for the management, use and regulation of their houses. The case eventually came to the Court of Appeal, which rejected the appellant’s arguments and found that section 21(1) of the 1985 Act, either alone or in conjunction with section 111 of the Local Government Act 1972, conferred sufficient power to operate the scheme. Section 21(1) provided: “The general management, regulation and control of a local housing authority’s houses is vested in and shall be exercised by the authority.” Section 111 gave authorities the power to do anything to facilitate, or that was conducive and incidental to, the discharge of any of their functions. The appellant appealed.
Held: The appeal was dismissed.
The functions of a local housing authority could include the regulation and control of the parking of vehicles on housing estates in order to safeguard and improve the amenity of life of their tenants and to facilitate their access to, and enjoyment of, their houses: Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council [1992] 2 AC 1 considered. It was not necessary to look for terms in the tenancy agreements to provide a foundation for the power to introduce parking schemes. The concept of management of a housing estate contained in section 21(1) of the 1985 Act had to be construed widely: R v Ealing London Borough Council, ex parte Lewis (1992) 24 HLR 484 applied. It was inherent in the management of houses in a housing estate that parking on the estate should be regulated. Unregulated parking could lead to congested roads and a lack of parking places for residents. It was also important to ensure access onto the estate by service and emergency vehicles. Those factors could clearly affect the amenity of life for the residents, as well as their access to, and enjoyment of, their houses. Section 7(1) of the 1975 Act, relied upon by the appellant, threw no light on the construction of section 21(1) of the 1985 Act. The matter was put beyond doubt by section 111 of the 1972 Act. The regulation and control of parking on a housing estate was clearly conducive or incidental to the respondents’ discharge of their function of managing the houses on the estate.
Sibghat Kadri QC and Ezekiel Pipi (instructed by Clifford Watts Compton) appeared for the appellant; Andrew Arden and Christopher Baker (instructed by the solicitor to Hackney London Borough Council) appeared for the respondents.
Sally Dobson, barrister
